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A B S T R A C T
This thesis addresses several questions regarding what rational agents
ought to believe and how they ought to act.
In the first part I begin by discussing how scientists contemplating
several mutually exclusive theories, models or hypotheses can reach
a rational decision regarding which one to endorse. In response to a
recent argument that they cannot, I employ the tools of social choice
theory to offer a ‘possibility result’ for rational theory choice. Then
I utilize the tools of judgment aggregation to investigate how scien-
tists from across fields can pool their expertise together. I identify an
impossibility result threatening such a procedure and prove a pos-
sibility result which requires that some scientists sometimes waive
their expertise over some propositions.
In the second part I first discuss the existing justifications for a
restricted principle of indifference that mandates that two agents
whose experiences are subjectively indistinguishable should be in-
different with respect to their identities. I argue that all existing jus-
tifications rely on the same mistaken reasoning behind the ‘staying’
strategy in the Monty Hall problem. Secondly, I show this mistake is
more widespread and I identify it in arguments purporting to show
the failure of two reflection-like principles.
In the third part I look at a recent argument that fair policy makers
face a dilemma when trying to correct a biased distributive process.
I show the dilemma only holds if the correction has to happen in
one-shot. Finally, I look at how we ought to design public restrooms
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6so that we reduce the discrimination faced by minority groups. I
make the case for opening our public restrooms to all genders.
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Part I
I N T R O D U C T I O N

1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
This thesis addresses several questions regarding what rational agents
ought to believe and how they ought to act. I divide my treatment
of these questions into three parts: one on collective rationality, one
on individual rationality and the final one on rationality in practice.
The first section on collective rationality deals with puzzles of theory
choice. The section on individual rationality deals with self-locating
beliefs and protocols for belief updating. And, finally, the section
on rationality in practice deals with a puzzle of fair distribution and
presents an efficiency argument for the design of public restrooms.
collective rationality In a recent paper, Samir Okasha (2011)
uses the formal framework of social choice theory, and Arrow’s im-
possibility theorem in particular, to argue that there is no algorithm
for using the information supplied by scientific virtues (e.g. simplic-
ity, accuracy, scope) to rationally choose the best theory. If Okasha
is right, then there is no function (satisfying certain desirable condi-
tions) from ‘preference’ rankings supplied by scientific virtues over
competing theories (or models, or hypotheses) to a single all-things-
considered ranking. This threatens the rationality of science - in the
sense in which irrespective of the method scientists employ to arrive
at an all-things considered ranking from their rankings according to
the individual virtues, sometimes they will end up with an inconsis-
tent overall preference.
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I contend Okasha’s view of scientific rationality is too austere and
I offer a two-fold response. To begin, I show that the threat to the
possibility of rational theory-choice relies on an all-or-nothing un-
derstanding of scientific rationality and I articulate instead a notion
of rationality by degrees. Such a move from all-or-nothing rational-
ity to rationality by degrees will establish that theory choice can be
rational enough. Further, I show that if Kuhn’s claims about the role
that subjective elements play in theory choice are taken seriously,
and Okasha’s framework is supplemented with an appropriate for-
mal notion of ambiguity, then the threat dissolves. The outcome of
this discussion is that there is a meaningful sense of scientific ratio-
nality beyond the mere impossibility of inconsistency.
This discussion provides several new insights. Firstly, it articulates
a new (formal) concept of ‘degrees-of-rationality’. Second, it pro-
vides a formal account of the Kuhnian notion of ambiguity. Thirdly,
it represents one of the few discussions in the social choice context
of what it means for a ranking to be ambiguous and provides, in
turn, a proof of concept (via simulation) for a new way out of the
Arrovian impossibility.
Taking Okasha’s cue that social choice can inform philosophy of sci-
ence, I investigate the commonly shared belief among scientists that:
"[i]t is wrong to bemoan the high degree of specialisation in current
research ... we should not forget that in a mature discipline only
specialization gets things done." (Slaney, 1987, 1195) Now, academic
disciplines are increasingly fragmented, and this naturally leads to
diverse areas of expertise within them. But if the state of a disci-
pline as a whole is supposed to depend on the beliefs of its experts
in a certain way, then we arrive at an impossibility result similar to
Sen’s Liberal Paradox (1970). Just as Sen’s Lewd and Prude were
forced into inconsistency by their decisiveness over their own per-
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sonal spheres, a discipline may be forced into inconsistency if ex-
perts are taken to be decisive over their respective areas of expertise.
At least this will be the case if we require that the scientific con-
sensus in the discipline – i.e what the discipline as a whole tells us
about the world – be generated by a suitably-constrained function
on the beliefs of scientists. I show this by importing Dietrich and
List (2008)’s result from the context of aggregating individual judge-
ments to that of aggregating scientific expert judgements. If this is
the correct way of thinking about what fragmented scientific disci-
plines tell us about the world, it seems that science cannot protect
itself from inconsistencies. Insofar as we think that Nature is free
of inconsistency, and we want our scientific consensus to reflect this,
something has to give. Building on the ideas of Gibbard (1974) I
suggest that the best way of avoiding inconsistencies is for experts
to waive their expertise and contribute beliefs on a par with every-
one else’s. As such I argue against the hegemony of experts.
This discussion provides several new insights: I offer a new for-
mal framework for analyzing disagreement in science. Secondly, I
translate and then prove Gibbard’s result as applied to judgment
aggregation. Finally, this discussion offers a first step towards a
broader question which I do not develop in this thesis but follows
naturally from the work here: can groups of scientists spanning mul-
tiple countries, institutions, and fields of expertise be a group agent?
My answer is that they can indeed operate as a group agent as long
as they are willing to waive their expertise over some propositions
at least sometimes.
individual rationality The second part of the thesis will
analyse the justifications for several principles which are meant to
offer a more substantial conception of rationality beyond the mere
satisfaction of the Kolmogorovian axioms, viz. Elga’s (2004) princi-
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ple of indifference for self-locating belief (and Titelbaum’s (2013) de-
fense thereof), Christensen’s (2010) principle of reflection and Mah-
tani’s (forthcoming) opaque proposition principle. I find that all of
the above arguments fail. I also show that the mistakes in these ar-
guments are similar and result from how the above authors construe
the way in which a rational agent updates her beliefs in the face of
new information.
Assuming we wanted to build a Bayesian model for an agent who
learns a new proposition, how should we construct the model? An
old and often overlooked paper by Glenn Shafer (1985) argues that
in order for Bayesian conditionalisation to be a good formal coun-
terpart to learning, one ought to specify a partition of events which
an agent can conditionalise upon. Luc Bovens and Jose Luis Fer-
reira (2010) interpret Shafer’s insight as “[w]hen we are informed of
some proposition, we do not only learn the proposition in question,
but also that we have learned the proposition as one of the many
propositions that we might have learned. The information is gener-
ated by a protocol, which determines the various propositions that
we might learn." This point can be found in the formal literature on
bayesian epistemology such as in the works of Pearl and Halpern,
but is often ignored by philosophers. When we model the scenarios
of Elga, Titelbaum, Christensen and Mahtani in light of Shafer’s in-
sight, their arguments become significantly weaker.
This works makes several contributions to the existing research in
bayesian epistemology. Firstly, it shows how Shafer’s insight af-
fects many more problems than just Monty Hall and its analogues.
Secondly, it explains why Elga’s principle of indifference for self-
locating belief fails and gauges the impact this has on several argu-
ments in the literature on self-location.
introduction 25
rationality in practice Finally, I conclude with a foray in
practical rationality. Firstly, I discuss a recent argument due to
McKenzie Alexander (2013) who presents a dilemma for a social
planner interested in correcting an unfair distribution of an indivis-
ible good between two equally worthy individuals or groups: either
she guarantees a fair outcome, or she follows a fair procedure (but
not both). I show that this dilemma only holds if the social planner
can redistribute the good in question at most once. To wit, the bias
of the initial distribution always washes out when we allow for suffi-
ciently many redistributions. I show by means of simulation that for
real, resource-bounded, agents at most 6 redistributions is enough.
Secondly, I explore what a rational way of arranging public restrooms
would look like. I do so by engaging with the current debates on
‘bathroom bills’ and assess the economic benefits of introducing uni-
sex restrooms. The idea is simple: The move to unisex restrooms
increases economic efficiency due to the reduction in waiting times.
Since everyone cares about economic efficiency, there is at least one
argument in favour of unisex restrooms that all can agree on. I con-
struct a model to evaluate the waiting times in unisex and single-sex
restrooms and show by means of simulations, that, given certain
plausible assumptions, unisex restrooms provide drastic reductions
in the total waiting times. This translates into greater productiv-
ity at lower overhead costs in terms of estates for firms. The move
to unisex restrooms will indirectly benefit people who identify as
trans∗, carers, as well as parents and children of different genders.
Furthermore, it will lead to increased potty parity.

Part II
C O L L E C T I V E R AT I O N A L I T Y

2
O K A S H A’ S A R R O V I A N I M P O S S I B I L I T Y R E S U LT
Suppose a scientist is faced with a collection of competing scientific
theories, models or hypotheses. Moreover, suppose that she cares
about a number of distinct scientific virtues – accuracy, simplicity,
and scope for example. How is the scientist to rationally choose the
‘best’ alternative, all-things-considered? One would like to think
that, whatever the details of how the choice is made, some rational
procedure is followed to make it.
According to Kuhn (1972), scientists faced with such a choice, even
if they agreed about which theoretical virtues should guide their
choice, could still rationally disagree about which is the ‘all-things-
considered’ best competing theory. In this sense, there is no ‘unique
algorithm’ that takes how well theories fare according to the scien-
tific virtues and delivers a ‘winner’. This is not to say that theory
choice is ‘a matter of mob psychology’ (Lakatos, 1970, p. 178), but
rather that the shared and objective virtues do not determine by
themselves a winner, or unique ranking of the theories.
Okasha (2011) uses the formal framework of social choice theory to
argue that, rather than there being no unique algorithm for using
the objective information supplied by the scientific virtues to ratio-
nally choose the best theory, there is no such algorithm whatsoever:
‘Where Kuhn saw an embarrassment of riches, Arrow tells us that
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there is nothing at all’ (Okasha, 2011, p. 93).
Okasha employs a simple but persuasive argumentative strategy.
Let V be a finite set of m scientific virtues, and T a finite set n of
competing theories. Each scientific virtue i ∈ V provides an ordinal
ranking of the elements of T, from most to least virtuous according
to i. These rankings are transitive, reflexive, and complete binary re-
lations.1 That this simple framework does justice to all scientific the-
ory choice contexts is debatable and Okasha offers a few examples
where it isn’t plausible. However, Kuhn appears to be somewhat
sympathetic to the impossibility of obtaining cardinal information
regarding the relative strength of theories according to the preferred
list of scientific virtues:
All historically significant theories have agreed with the
facts, but only more or less. There is no more precise an-
swer to the question whether or how well an individual
theory fits the facts. But questions much like that can
be asked when theories are taken collectively, or even in
pairs. It makes sense to ask which of two actual and com-
peting theories fits the facts better. (Kuhn, 1970, p. 147)
When theory x is preferred to theory y by virtue i I write y ≺i x.
A theory choice situation is a profile of rankings of theories by
virtues, where a profile is an ordered tuple 〈≺1, ...,≺m〉 for virtues 1
through m. A theory choice function maps profiles to an all-things-
considered binary relation  defined over T. A theory x is strictly
preferred (all-things-considered) to theory y, i.e. y ≺ x if and only
if y  x and it’s not the case that x  y.
1 In this paper I restrict the focus to strict rankings associated with scientific virtues
for simplicity. Where relevant the approach articulated in the next pages can be
extended to accommodate rankings allowing for ties. This is of no conceptual
importance.
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The discussion above presupposes that a scientist’s endorsement of
a theory, hypothesis and model is completely determined by the
way in which he deems that theory to fare with respect to a given
set of virtues. Nothing else matters. This seems to capture the
flavour of Kuhn’s portrayal of theory choice as described in Kuhn
(1970, 1972). However, one might object, that this variety of virtues
is implausible in science, and that, at least in many theory choice
contexts, it is the accuracy or fit to data of a theory that should
determine its value. On this criticism scientific theory choice isn’t
a matter of multi-criterion decision making, but the result of the
application of a single criterion, i.e. accuracy, to rank all theories
under consideration. Morreau in one of his replies to Okasha puts
this challenge to rest quite persuasively:
Theories can be brought into agreement with observa-
tions and experimental results by adjusting parameters.
Scientific data are generally noisy, though. So if we single-
mindedly pursue fit to available data, without regard to
other criteria, we will end up preferring overly compli-
cated theories, whose many parameters we can tune to fit
the noise. These theories might agree with every error in
the data; but they will fit underlying facts and future data
less well than do other, simpler theories. They will over-
fit the data. To avoid this, acceptable choice rules must
balance fit against simplicity. And they must do so not in
spite of the special importance of accuracy in science but
precisely because of it, because balance is what secures
accuracy in the long run. (Morreau, 2014, p. 1259)
What requirements should one impose on a rational theory choice
function? Okasha (2011, pp. 92-93) argues that the Arrovian condi-
tions on preference aggregation have clear analogues in the context
of theory choice. Unrestricted domain (UD) requires that a theory
choice function be applicable irrespective of how theories are ranked
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by virtues. Weak Pareto (WP) requires that, for all x, y ∈ T, if x is
ranked above y according to every virtue, then x should be ranked
above y all-things-considered. Independence of Irrelevant Alterna-
tives (IIA) requires that the all-things-considered relation between
two theories takes into account only how those two theories are
ranked by the scientific virtues, i.e. the overall comparison between
the two be insensitive to how virtues rank them with respect to a
third theory. Non-Dictatorship (ND) demands that there is no virtue
i such that for every pair of alternatives x, y ∈ T, whenever i prefers
x to y, x is ranked above y all-things-considered. Finally, Overall
Rationality (OR) demands that a theory choice function deliver a
transitive, complete ranking for every element in its domain.2 With
theories replacing social alternatives, and scientific virtues replacing
voters, it is immediate to see that Arrow’s (1951) impossibility result
applies. In other words, there is no theory choice function that satis-
fies UD, WP, IIA, ND and OR. Okasha’s challenge is, that assuming
rational theory choice requires the existence of such a function, ra-
tional theory choice is impossible.
‘If we agree that U, P, N, and I are conditions on rea-
sonable theory choice, then it is obvious that an Arro-
vian impossibility result applies. So long as there are
at least three alternative theories, there exists no theory
choice rule that satisfies all four conditions. This spells
bad news for the possibility of making ‘rational’ theory
choices’ (Okasha, 2011, p. 93).3
2 Note that this condition is usually build into the definition of an aggregation
function. In this paper I include it as a separate condition in light of the fact that
I focus later on aggregation functions that map to intransitive/incomplete binary
relations. I will use the term ‘intransitive’ to refer to the intransitivity of the entire
binary relation (), note that this is compatible with ≺ being transitive.
3 Note that his ‘U’ is my ‘UD’; his ‘P’ my ‘WP’; his ‘N’ my ‘ND’; his ‘I’ my ‘IIA’;
and where he assumes our OR in the definition of a theory choice rule I pull it
out as a further condition.
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The sense of the impossibility is important to gauge from the very
onset. Arrow’s result (and implicitly, Okasha’s), doesn’t preclude
any aggregating function from delivering a transitive overall rank-
ing in some theory choice situations. Rather the impossibility pre-
cludes any function from always being able to deliver such a ‘nice’
output. It is easy to see that any function satisfying the first four
conditions would deliver a trivial and ‘nice’ output applied to a sit-
uation in which all virtues rank the given theories in the same way.
What the result tells us is that there are (logically) possible situations
for every aggregation function we were to adopt in which it will fail
to output a transitive overall ranking. However, the result is silent
with respect to how likely it is for such situations to arise in science.
Okasha’s argument has generated much discussion. Morreau (2014,
2015) suggest restricting UD. Rizza (2013) and Stegenga (2015) fol-
low up on Okasha’s (2011) own suggestion of enriching the infor-
mational basis of scientific virtues by providing a common cardinal
scale allowing for inter-virtue comparisons (thereby dropping IIA).
Whether all scientific virtues provide such information is question-
able as discussed in Okasha’s (2015) response to Stegenga and in-
deed in Kuhn (1970, see above) . Relatedly, Gaertner and Wuethrich
(2016) suggest imposing a cardinality via a scoring rule in a way that
captures the spirit of IIA in a cardinal framework. Finally, Bradley
(forthcoming) suggests that rationality only requires ruling out cer-
tain alternatives, not a transitive and complete ranking of theories.

3
A D E G R E E N O T I O N O F R AT I O N A L I T Y
In this paper we draw attention to Okasha’s assumption that scien-
tific rationality is an all-or-nothing notion and motivate the move to
a degrees notion of rationality, instead. By considering rationality
in degrees, rather than in the all-or-nothing sense, we can precisely
gauge the threat Okasha poses, and we show that this is highly sen-
sitive to the number of alternatives and virtues under consideration.
Whether or not theory choice is ‘rational’ depends on where one
sets a threshold. This a substantial decision and different scientists
may reasonably disagree. We do not offer a solution to this problem,
nor do we believe there is one. However, we argue the constraint on
this threshold is sufficiently weak in order to make it reasonable to
accept that choosing among competing theories based on their rela-
tive ranking according to a set of scientific virtues is rational enough.
But rather than questioning any of the conditions, our strategy in
this paper is to investigate alternative ways of construing theory
choice as a rational enterprise which don’t require identifying ratio-
nal theory choice with the existence of a function that satisfies the
five Arrovian conditions. The way we do this is by focusing on the
extent to which pairwise majority voting is rational. But we begin
small.
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3.1 minimal rationality
In this section we introduce a minimal all-or-nothing notion of ratio-
nality, call it ‘minimal rationality’. This is the building block which
will be used to construct the notion of rationality by degrees that
interests us in this paper. Begin with a trivial social choice example.
Suppose Bill, Albert, and Chloe are trying to choose, as a group, be-
tween watching a football match, going to the cinema, or visiting a
restaurant. Suppose they have the following preference rankings:
Albert: Football ≺A Cinema ≺A Restaurant
Bill: Football ≺B Cinema ≺B Restaurant
Chloe: Football ≺C Restaurant ≺C Cinema
In this social choice context, the Arrovian conditions are supposed
to supply constraints on what the group should do. Some of these
conditions, such as IIA for example, put inter-profile constraints on
the behaviour of an aggregation function. Others, such as OR, put
constraints on the behaviour of a function that apply profile by pro-
file. What we call ‘minimal rationality’ supplies a way of thinking
about whether an aggregation function that satisfies the Arrovian
conditions of WP, IIA, ND and UD, e.g. pairwise majority voting as
we define it below, is normatively acceptable on a profile by profile
basis. The conditions on this are those supplied by OR: the value
of the function when applied to that profile should itself be a pref-
erence ranking, i.e. transitive and complete. Our point then, is that
some aggregation functions can be normatively acceptable at some
profiles, and yet normatively unacceptable at others.
At the profile displayed above pairwise majority vote supplies the
following:
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Group: Football ≺ Cinema ≺ Restaurant
and is thus normatively acceptable with respect to this profile. How-
ever in a scenario where Bill, Albert and Chloe held preference
rankings such that pairwise majority voting delivers an intransitive
all-things-considered value, then the function is not normatively ac-
ceptable with respect to that profile. This would be the case if they
had held preference rankings that generated Condorcet’s paradox.
A weaker requirement that might be of particular relevance in the
context of theory choice is that the function deliver a Condorcet win-
ner (an alternative preferred to all other alternatives in the all things
considered ranking), rather than a preference ranking. With three
alternatives, these conditions are equivalent.
When applying the machinery of social choice theory to theory choice,
Okasha’s strategy is to take the question of whether or not an ag-
gregation function is normatively acceptable to correspond to the
question of whether or not a (theory choice) aggregation function
is rational. And he takes the conditions on whether or not this is
the case to be the Arrovian ones. Again, some of these conditions
but inter-profile constraints on the behaviour of such functions, and
others apply profile-by-profile. So again, we can ask of a given ag-
gregation function which satisfies the conditions of WP, IIA, ND and
UD whether or not it is ‘minimally rational’ on a profile-by-profile
basis. And again, the conditions on this are supplied by OR. These
observations provide the following definition:
minimal rationality A theory choice function f is minimally
rational with respect to a profile P ∈ Dnm, if and only if it
38 a degree notion of rationality
meets UD, WP, IIA, ND (with respect to Dnm) and takes P to a
transitive and complete ranking.1
A natural weakening of minimal rationality is to demand a Con-
dorcet winner, rather than a transitive complete ranking. This gives
rise to an analogous notion of minimal Condorcet rationality in the
obvious way.
Minimal rationality can then be built up to the full blown notion of
rationality that Okasha requires, in the sense of meeting all of the Ar-
rovian conditions everywhere in a domain of profiles. If a function f
is minimally rational for every profile in Dnm then choosing the most
suitable theory out of n alternatives using m virtues by means of f
is always rational. In other words, there is nothing more to being
rational with respect to a domain than being rational with respect
to every element in that domain. This is the requirement Okasha ar-
gues is not met by any theory choice function. Indeed, by Arrow’s
theorem there is no f satisfying this (for any n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 2). In
section 5 we discuss a weakening of this requirement and show that
with it in place, the prospects of rational theory choice improve.
3.2 fixing the theory choice function
One thing to note before introducing the notion of rationality by
degrees is that in this paper we restrict our attention to a particular
theory choice function. Arrow’s result is general, it entails that there
is no function that is rational for domains where n ≥ 3, m ≥ 2.
As such, discussion of any particular function can be suppressed.
This is not so when discussing minimal rationality and rationality
by degrees. Therefore for the purposes of this paper we focus on
pairwise majority voting, which is defined as follows:
1 Dnm represents the class of all profiles that can be defined over m virtues and n
theories.
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pairwise majority voting For a set of virtues V, let ∆+ =d f
{i ∈ V : y ≺i x}, ∆− =d f {i ∈ V : x ≺i y}. Then: y ≺ x if and
only if |∆+| ≥ |∆−|.2
There are other functions that satisfy UD, WP, IIA, and ND, includ-
ing Pareto dominance and extension procedures, both of which vi-
olate completeness for various profiles, see (List, 2013, §3.2.2). We
nevertheless ignore these other functions for the remainder of this
paper. The reason is that the focus here is not on which aggregating
method is most suitable for theory choice. We are, instead, trying
to show the importance of the way in which we construe scientific
rationality for the purposes of evaluating how rational theory choice
is given Okasha’s challenge. For this purpose it is enough to look
at a single aggregation method and it seems natural to use the most
well-studied one for our proof of concept.
3.3 rationality by degrees
In Section 3 it was noted that it is not always the case that a the-
ory choice function will lead to an intransitive (or incomplete) all-
things-considered ranking. For example, pairwise majority voting is
minimally rational with respect to at least some profiles in D33. Sup-
pose that the scientific virtues of accuracy, simplicity and scope pro-
vide the following profile of preference rankings over T = {x, y, z} :
〈x ≺si z ≺si y, x ≺ac z ≺ac y, x ≺sc y ≺sc z〉, and that x,y and
z and simplicity, accuracy and scope exhaust the alternatives and
virtues under consideration. Then majority voting yields the all-
things-considered ranking of x ≺ z ≺ y. But if this was the only pro-
file in D33 with respect to which majority voting were minimally ra-
tional, then scientists using this function would succeed in rationally
2 For the remainder of this paper we will assume there is an odd number of virtues.
This means that the output of the aggregation, under pairwise majority, will al-
ways be a strict ordering (if an ordering, at all).
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choosing in only 1 out of 216 of the possible cases.3 Suppose, how-
ever, again in D33, there was only one profile of preferences which
majority voting mapped to an intransitive ranking. In such a sce-
nario, scientists would succeed in making a rational choice using
the function in 215 out of 216 of the possible cases.
In the above example, there is a sense in which pairwise majority
would be less ‘rational’ (in an intuitive sense) if it generated a tran-
sitive ranking from only 1 out of 216 profiles, than it would be if
it did so from 215. If a scientist used the function in the former
case she would be acting ‘irrationally.’ But she wouldn’t if she did
so in the latter. In fact, not using pairwise majority in such a sce-
nario would be ‘irrationally’ cautious.4 Perhaps the scientist wants
to know whether or not she should go through the rigmarole of gen-
erating rankings by virtues in order to choose between a given set
of alternatives. If there were little hope that her preferred function
map the resulting profile to a preference ranking, then this would
be a waste of her time. But if there is a high chance that her function
will deliver such a ranking and she wants to make a choice between
the alternatives, then she should proceed.
3 Assuming all 216 possible ways are equally likely to obtain, the chances of suc-
ceeding in rationally choosing the best theory are very low. See a discussion of
this assumption further below.
4 Some level of risk aversion is undoubtedly rational. Consider the following sce-
nario: you are offered two bets. Bet 1 gives you the chance to win 100$ with
probability 1. Bet 2 gives you a chance to win 200$ with probability .5 and 0$ oth-
erwise. Choosing Bet 1 in this instance does not seem irrational, and in fact, many
people will do so. However, as the probability of winning 200$ in Bet 2 increases,
Bet 2 becomes more appealing, and fewer people will avoid it. There seems to
be a point at which choosing Bet 1 over Bet 2 becomes irrationally cautious (if
this still doesn’t appeal to your intuition, consider Bet 3 with probability .9 of
winning 1,000,000$ and 99$ otherwise). In this sense, a scientist refraining from
using pairwise majority, as this rule fails in 1 out of 216 cases appears irrationally
cautious.
3.3 rationality by degrees 41
So, whether or not a function is ‘rational’ seems sensitive to how
likely it is to deliver a transitive and complete preference ranking.
And how likely it is to deliver such a ranking, for a domain Dnm, de-
pends on the likelihood assigned to each of the profiles within that
domain. This requires introducing a probability measure Pr over
Dnm.5 In the aforementioned discussion we assumed that Pr was the
equiprobable distribution, with Pr assigning 1/(n!)m to each profile
in Dnm.6 But suppose, for comparison, that the probability of the
single profile which mapped to an intransitive ranking in the latter
example above were approaching 1. Then in that case the scientist
would be ‘irrational’ to attempt to rank theories according to virtues.
This suggests the possibility of a degree measure of rationality. The
degree to which an aggregation function f is rational (for a given
Dnm, Pr) is simply the sum of the values Pr assigns to all profiles
with respect to which f is minimally-rational. We denote this sum
by µ and we call the resulting notion of rationality, rationality by
degrees.
rationality by degrees A theory choice function f , which meets
UD, WP, IIA and ND (with respect to a domain, Dnm) is µ-
rational (or rational to degree µ), with respect to Pr if and only
if
Pr({P ∈ Dnm| f is minimally rational for P}) = µ
The shift from thinking about rationality in an all-or-nothing sense,
to thinking about it in degrees is done in two steps. Firstly, we intro-
duce a probability function Pr over the elements of Dnm. Secondly,
5 The only restriction we place on Pr is that it assigns a non-zero probability to every
profile in Dnm. The motivation for this restriction is the same as the motivation for
UD. If a theory choice function is rational only if it is defined over every profile
in a domain, then all profiles are considered as ‘live options’. Assigning to any
profile a zero probability of occurring would undermine this.
6 In the social choice literature this is known as the ‘impartial culture’ assumption
Gehrlein (1983). This assumption is discussed in more detail below.
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we measure the rationality of a theory choice function f by the prob-
ability mass assigned to the set of all profiles in Dnm with respect
to which f is minimally rational. Some correspondences between
the notions emerge. If f is 1-rational, then it is rational for Dnm, or
equivalently, minimally rational with respect to every P ∈ Dnm. If,
on the other hand, f is 0-rational, then f is minimally irrational with
respect to every P ∈ Dnm.7
How µ-rational is pairwise majority then? We investigate the degree
of rationality for certain values of m and n for a probability function,
Pr assigning equal weight to all elements of Dnm:8
Theories
3 4 5
V
ir
tu
es
3 .94444 .8298 .67573
5 .93055 .7896
7 .92490
9 .92202
Table 1: The µ-rationality of pairwise majority for n theories and m virtues
The values in Table 3 indicate that pairwise majority becomes less
rational as one increases the numbers of theories under considera-
tion and the number of virtues used to evaluate them.9 The same
7 These correspondences rely on our restriction on Pr stated in fn.5 above.
8 The values in Tables 3 have been calculated in Mathematica 10. Please contact the
authors if you wish to consult the notebooks used.
9 For a more sophisticated discussion (in the context of social choice) of the results
in this table, as well as for a general formula for approximating the probability
of a cycle given any number of voters (odd) and any number of alternatives, see
DeMeyer and Plott (1970).
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trend can be observed when calculating the probability of a Con-
dorcet winner under majority. A Condorcet winner is an alternative
which ranks better than all others in one-to-one comparisons with
all the other alternatives. Notice that even if an all-things-considered
ranking is intransitive there may be still one alternative which is bet-
ter than all other, i.e. the cycle occurs lower in the ranking. The
likelihood of a Condorcet winner has already been investigated in
a series of papers in the social choice literature, i.e. Gehrlein and
Fishburn (1976) and Gehrlein (1983). Table 4 collects some of the
results of multiple papers.10
Theories
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
V
ir
tu
es
3 .94444 .8888 .8399 .7977 .7612 .7293 .7011 .6760 .6536 .6333 .6148 .5980
5 .93055 .8611 .80048 .74865 .70424 .66588 .63243 .57682 .53235
7 .92498 .84997 .78467 .68168 .72908 .60551 .64090 .54703 .50063
9 .92202 .77628 .66976 .59135 .534 .486
Table 2: The µ-Condorcet-rationality of pairwise majority for n theories
and m virtues
So what can we learn from Tables 1 and 2? In cases in which sci-
entists are choosing among a small number of theories, the values
remain quite elevated. For instance in choosing between three the-
ories based on five virtues, pairwise majority is .9306-rational. In
other words, in less than 7% of cases will a scientist trying to use
majority voting run into an intransitive all-things-considered rank-
ing. So, refraining from eliciting the individual rankings of theories
based on virtues on account of Arrow’s result is irrationally cautious
in this scenario. Nevertheless, as scientists choose between increas-
ing numbers of alternatives, using increasing numbers of virtues,
the µ-rationality of pairwise majority decreases. Finding a precise
10 The reason for this is that performing these calculations is a computational de-
manding task and some of the older papers did not have the technical means of
obtaining all results.
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threshold for when µ is high enough to warrant starting the aggre-
gation procedure, or low enough to refrain from doing so, is not our
focus here. It suffices to note that the µ-rationality of a theory choice
function is sensitive to the numbers of alternatives and virtues un-
der consideration. For relatively low numbers of both, theory choice
using majority voting is rational enough.
3.4 discussion
In this section we address some possible objections to Okasha’s
framework and our analysis in this paper.
3.4.1 Kuhn vs. Okasha
According to Kuhn, scientists guide their choice of theories by
looking at how those theories fare with respect to a series of
virtues, such as simplicity, accuracy, scope, etc. Okasha interprets
this claim as saying that each of these virtues induces a complete
ranking over the set of theories and that each scientist aggregates
(according to an algorithm set a priori) all of these rankings into an
all-things-considered ranking. This then models the order in which
the scientist endorses the theories under consideration. We take
Okasha’s challenge to be that, per Arrow’s impossibility theorem,
such an aggregation cannot be guaranteed a priori. That is, prior
to eliciting the individual rankings, a scientist cannot be sure that
the algorithm chosen to aggregate them will deliver an ordering. In
consequence, it seems that a scientist wishing to decide what theory
to endorse based on this ‘Kuhnian’ procedure is irrational. In this
paper we argue that there are plausible theory choice situations
in which a scientist would appear irrationally cautious not to
employ this Kuhnian procedure as long as the algorithm she uses is
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pairwise majority voting.
But one could question Okasha’s interpretation of Kuhn’s ideas on
multi-criterial theory choice. Firstly, Kuhn does not say that scien-
tific virtues induce complete rankings over the set of alternatives.
Secondly, he does not construe theory choice as an algorithmic deci-
sion from a set of individual rankings into an all-things-considered
ranking. Thirdly, Kuhn does not talk about scientists having a com-
plete all-things-considered ranking over the set of theories. These
considerations suggest that Okasha might be diverging from Kuhn’s
project more than he lets on. But the purpose of this article is not
to engage in Kuhnian hermeneutics, but rather to reply to Okasha’s
challenge to the rationality of theory choice. and whether an al-
gorithmic procedure for arriving at an all-things considered best
theory is possible is an interesting, albeit less Kuhnian than Okasha
sells it to be, question. This paper shows that the viability of such an
algorithm hinges on allowing an all-or-nothing vs. a degrees view
of scientific rationality and on setting a threshold for what counts as
rational suitable for the theory choice situation one is facing.
3.4.2 Impartial culture
In articulating the notion of rationality by degrees we remarked that
we require a probability distribution defined over the space of all
possible profiles definable over m virtues and n theories. There we
assumed that this probability distribution is the equiprobable one.
In the social choice literature this kind of assumption is known as
the ‘impartial culture’ (IC) assumption (Gehrlein, 1983). Impartial
cultures are a natural starting point: they make computations
much easier and they have been widely studied in the social choice
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literature.11
But our primary motivation for assuming the equiprobable distri-
bution is epistemic.12 Prior to beginning the process of eliciting
the rankings according to each virtue, a scientist cannot deem how
likely it is for a particular profile to obtain. Therefore, from the
perspective of the scientist, IC functions as a principle of indiffer-
ence with respect to the different ways virtues rank the competing
theories. Of course if one were to assume a different probability dis-
tribution, then one would expect the probability of majority cycles
occurring to change. But as far as we can see, there is no reason
to assume that a different probability distribution (for example, one
where different virtues were less likely to submit the same ranking
as one another than is assumed in IC) would increase the probability
of majority cycles. Moreover, it’s difficult to see how such a proba-
bility distribution could be justified from the ex ante perspective of
the scientist, before she has elicited the rankings of the theories by
virtues.
3.4.3 How many alternatives?
Returning to the problem of theory choice, the numbers presented
in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that if a theory choice situation is placed
in the upper left corner - 3 to 5 virtues and 3 to 5 theories, then the
threat of Okasha’s Arrovian result is quite small. And consequently,
11 Interestingly, it has been proven that as the number of voters tends to infinity, any
deviation from impartial culture will reduce the probability of majority cycles, as
long as the deviation isn’t in favour of a distribution that assumes the Condorcet
paradox from the start (Tsetlin et al., 2003). However, since we are working in a
context with a finite, relatively small number of virtues (voters) we cannot rely on
this result to motivate impartial culture here.
12 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for encouraging us to motivate this
assumption.
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moving to a degree notion of rationality would save the rationality
of theory choice (at least in that choice situation). But as we are
moving away from the upper left corner, and especially if we
are increasing the number of theories under consideration, the
likelihood of there being a Condorcet winner in a theory choice
situation becomes so low that one can no longer make the claim
that theory choice is rational enough.
If this model is supposed to capture the kind of theory choice Kuhn
was considering, i.e. the choice between different paradigms, then
it should only care about very few theories. However, most of the
theory choice situations Kuhn discusses are binary, such as the move
from the Ptolemaic to the Copernican model of the Solar system or
the shift from Newtonian to relativistic physics. These are situations
in which Arrow’s theorem does not create any problems. Okasha
identifies this as a challenge and suggests that, in fact, we should be
interested in more realistic theory choice situations such as:
"statistical estimation, where a researcher might want to
estimate the value of a real-valued parameter in the unit
interval; the alternatives that must be chosen between
are uncountably many. So focusing exclusively on binary
choice, as a way of trying to avoid the Arrovian predica-
ment, is at odds with scientific practice." (p. 95)
Although we have no way of gauging how many alternatives are
usually in play in theory choice situations, the scenario Okasha
sketches above is not one that we consider worrisome for the re-
sults in this paper. The reason for this is simple. The choice of
a real-value parameter is not a multi-criterial one. Such a choice is
one in which there is a single criterion: accuracy.13 Nothing changes
13 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that if this involves
Bayesian statistical model selection that the criterion might not be accuracy, but
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in terms of simplicity, scope, etc. when a real-valued parameter is
assigned a different value.
3.5 conclusion
This paper contrasted the view that scientific rationality is an
all-or-nothing notion with the view that scientific rationality comes
in degrees. We showed that the choice between these two views can
have significant implications to how rational we think theory choice
is in the face of Okasha’s Arrovian challenge.
There may be some for whom the mere possibility, irrespective
of how small, of the virtues leaving them without an ordering is
enough to make them doubt the possibility of using the virtues to
select between competing theories. To them we can only respond
that the purpose of this paper was to gauge the threat Okasha raised
and evaluate what the prospects of rational theory choice remain in
the aftermath of applying Arrow’s impossibility theorem to theory
choice.
rather posterior probability. However, as Okasha (2011, pp.105-110) notes such an
approach to model selection is immune from the Arrovian challenge.
4
S U B J E C T I V I T Y, A M B I G U I T Y A N D R AT I O N A L I T Y
If theory choice were purely an objective matter, then this would be
a significant problem. But Okasha fails to pay attention to Kuhn’s
claims about the subjective elements involved in theory choice; in
particular, the role scientists play in disambiguating the scientific
virtues. We demonstrate how to do this in the framework Okasha
proposes, and show via simulation that this blunts the threat posed
significantly.
We proceed as follows. In Section 4.1 we discuss the subjective
elements involved in the context of theory choice, i.e. the ambi-
guity of scientific virtues. In Section 4.2 we argue that Okasha’s
proposed way of dealing with this in the social choice framework is
unsatisfactory. In Section 4.3 we propose an alternative treatment
which we then feed into the definition of rationality, in Section 6.
Finally, in Section 7 we demonstrate that with this in place, the
impossibility result can be bypassed. Perhaps counter-intuitively,
the subjectivity involved in disambiguating scientific virtues turns
out to be a good thing.
In contrast to these authors, rather than attempting to reformulate
the conditions, our focus is on one of Okasha’s modelling assump-
tions. Once profiles of competing theories ranked by virtues are
provided, for the purposes of this paper we can grant that Okasha’s
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result kicks in. What we question instead is whether or not the
virtues provide such rankings. If theory choice were perfectly objec-
tive then this would be a natural assumption to make. But if Kuhn
is correct, then rational theory choice involves subjective elements
as well. In particular, at least for our current purposes, subjective
elements are required to disambiguate between different ways the
same virtue would evaluate competing theories. And if virtues are
ambiguous in the sense to be outlined in Section 4.1, then particular
theory choice situations do not supply a unique profile with which
to augment a theory choice function. And as we demonstrate in
Section 4.5, if enough virtues are assumed ambiguous to a certain
extent, the threat posed by Okasha’s argument dissolves.
4.1 subjectivity and ambiguity
Kuhn (1972) goes at great lengths to explain the impact of sub-
jective as well as objective factors in his model of theory change.
According to Kuhn, the way scientists evaluate the adequacy of
scientific theories is guided by the scientific virtues. These form a
shared and, in Kuhn’s view, objective list of adequacy conditions
according to which every scientist evaluates every theory. Therefore
when confronted with a list of competing theories, scientists will
produce rankings of these theories according to the virtues taken
into consideration.
Prima facie, each scientific virtue i supplies a unique preference rank-
ing ≺i. So for a given theory choice situation, a scientist who starts
the aggregation procedure is faced with one and only one profile
from which to generate an all-things-considered ranking. This is a
natural assumption to make in the context of orthodox social choice
theory, but it fails to capture the appropriate notion of ambiguity of
scientific virtues. Kuhn claims that:
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‘Individually the [virtues] are imprecise: individuals may
legitimately differ about their application to concrete
cases’ (1972, p. 357)
and relatedly:
‘Individuals must then still choose and be guided by the
[virtues] when they [choose]. For that purpose, however,
each must first flesh [them] out ... and each will do so in
a somewhat different way’ (1972, p. 364).
This is the sense in which subjective elements, according to Kuhn,
enter into the way scientists choose among competing theories, mod-
els or hypotheses.1 For example, two scientists may disagree with
respect to how to interpret ‘simplicity’. Suppose the competitors
are hypotheses in the form of mathematical equations, polynomials
for instance. One scientist might believe that equation x is simpler
than equation y if and only if x contains strictly fewer parameters
than y. Another might use the order (the largest exponent) of the
equations as their guide to simplicity. A third might use the com-
putational labour required to generate solutions to the equations).
Alternatively, suppose the competing theories consist of qualitative
statements that consist of equal numbers of universally quantified
conjunctions. One way of comparing them with respect to accu-
racy would be to simply count the number of strictly true conjuncts.
1 There is another natural way of thinking about the subjectivity involved in choos-
ing between competing scientific theories (Kuhn, 1972, p. 358). When trying to
arrive at an all-things-considered ranking of the theories presented with, differ-
ent scientists may assign different weights to how much the virtues ‘count’ for
the final ranking. For instance, radical empiricists will most likely assign a very
high importance to accuracy to the detriment of all the other virtues, whereas
others might be interested in a mix of accuracy and simplicity. So, although the
virtues form a common template according to which theories are being evalu-
ated, different scientists may disagree to how important some of them are. This
second sense in which subjectivity appears in the context of theory choice raises
interesting problems, but we will not address it in this paper.
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Another would be to compare the absolute number of falsifying in-
stances (by summing the number of falsifiers across the conjunction).
These may plausibly deliver different results. Irrespective of the dif-
ferent reasons for taking virtues to be ambiguous, Kuhn believes
that:
‘The considerable effectiveness of [scientific virtues] does
not . . . depend on their being sufficiently articulated to
dictate the choice of each individual who subscribes to
them’ (1972, p. 362).
Therefore, although the virtues according to which decisions
are being made are objective and shared by every member of a
particular scientific community, the way each virtue ranks theories
is not a matter of fact. There are three senses in which this could
be the case, mapping to three different ways of understanding
the “concrete cases" Kuhn talks about. First, the same scientist is
free to adopt a different interpretation in different theory choice
scenarios (i.e. where choosing among different sets of competing
theories, models, or hypotheses). Second, the same scientist is free
to adopt a different interpretation in different theory application
scenarios (i.e. where the theories in question are fixed, but applied
to different target systems). In some of these scenarios she may
interpret simplicity in one way (number of parameters say), and
in another she may adopt a different interpretation (computational
labour required to make predictions say). In other words, there is
no threat of irrationality stemming from this kind of inter-context
inconsistency with respect to the interpretation of a virtue.
But more significantly from our current perspective, even in a
particular theory choice scenario, where the pertinent virtues,
competitors, and application are fixed, different scientists may
legitimately disagree about how to interpret each scientific virtue
in that context. Such different interpretations can presumably lead
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to different orderings of theories, and therefore different profiles
with respect to which to apply an aggregation procedure. In
this sense, even in a particular theory choice context, there is no
‘matter of fact’ with respect to how a scientific virtue orders the
competing theories. Different rankings can be equally ‘correct’,
and thus a scientific virtue can be ambiguous between them.
To explain why someone ranks theories in a particular context
according to simplicity, is a question for the sociologist and psychol-
ogist, thinks Kuhn, and not for the analytical philosopher of science.
So, to sum up. In particular theory choice contexts, scientific virtues
can be ambiguous across multiple orderings of the competitors. Dif-
ferent sociological and psychological facts about the scientists in-
volved can legitimately lead them to disambiguate a virtue in a dif-
ferent manner. Ambiguity thus allows for some freedom of move-
ment between different rankings. How much freedom of movement
differs from context to context and also depends on the subjective
reasons guiding individual scientists towards particular rankings.
In this paper we model this space of movement and investigate the
impact this extra dimension of theory choice has on the notion of
scientific rationality and ultimately on bypassing the impossibility
Okasha discusses.
4.2 okasha’s treatment
Okasha claims that ‘[d]isambiguation can always be carried out
by sub-dividing an ambiguous [virtue]’ (2011, p. 85) into non-
ambiguous distinct preference rankings, each of which are included
in the profile of rankings that a theory choice function takes as an
argument. So if, for example, simplicity is ambiguous between two
distinct rankings ≺si and ≺si′ , then both are included in the profile.
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This approach is unsatisfactory as it does not capture Kuhn’s claims
about legitimate disagreement with respect to how virtues apply to
concrete cases. Rather than modelling ≺si and ≺si′ as competing
disambiguations of simplicity, Okasha’s approach treats them as
being compatible alternatives. So multiple scientists who disagreed
with respect to how to disambiguate simplicity in a concrete
instance of theory choice would be treated as agreeing that each
disambiguation should be used for the purpose of generating an
all-things-considered ranking. Okasha’s approach thus multiplies
the objective element of theory choice – an additional virtue for
each disambiguation of a virtue – rather than recognising Kuhn’s
claim that there is a subjective element involved in turning these
less than fully articulated notions into ones that can guide choice.
We therefore believe that an alternative account of ambiguity in the-
ory choice is worth pursuing. We propose such an account below
and argue that it formally captures the idea that virtues are ambigu-
ous in Kuhn’s sense, thus capturing the subjective element involved
in theory choice, and that it blunts the threat posed by Okasha’s
argument.
4.3 a kuhnian construal of ambiguity
We have argued that on Kuhn’s construal of theory choice scientific
virtues cannot provide an objective (or in any sense ‘true’) ordering
of theories. Therefore, given their ambiguity scientists can have
some freedom of movement in between different orderings of the
same set of theories under the same virtue. How different can
two rankings be so that a scientist treats them as being different
disambiguations of the same virtue? This is sensitive to how many
different ways there are to rank the alternatives, which is sensitive
to the size of the choice set under consideration. For n alternatives,
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there are n! distinct (strict) rankings over them. So, with respect to
our example of choosing between T = {x, y, z}, there are 6 possible
rankings over T. A virtue that specified a precise ranking would be
unambiguous. A virtue which was maximally ambiguous between
all of these 6 would be uninformative. Between these two extremes,
there are multiple ways of setting a sensible threshold.
One obvious way to proceed is to define a notion of ‘closeness’ be-
tween two rankings in terms of the number of their pairwise dis-
agreements. Two rankings are ‘close’, for instance, if and only if
they differ on only one pair of alternatives. To understand this no-
tion of ‘closeness’ better assume T = {x, y, z, u, v} and consider the
four rankings which are close to the ranking v ≺i u ≺i z ≺i y ≺i x.
x y
z x
y z
u u
v v
x
y
dd ::
z
u
yy %%vx x
y y
u z
z v
v u
Figure 1: Example of close rankings
This notion can be extended in a natural way to profiles. To il-
lustrate this consider the following example. Suppose a scientific
community is faced with the choice out of T = {x, y, z, u, v}, by
means of 3 virtues, i, j, k and that x ≺j v ≺j u ≺j z ≺j y and
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y ≺k x ≺k v ≺k u ≺k z. In the below set all profiles are close to
the profile in which v ≺i u ≺i z ≺i y ≺i x.
<vuzyx , xvuzy , yxvuz>,<vuyzx , xvuzy , yxvuz>,<vuzxy , xvuzy , yxvuz>,<vzuyx , xvuzy , yxvuz>,<uvzyx , xvuzy , yxvuz>

Figure 2: Example of close profiles
There are two different ways in which the definition of ‘closeness’
can be relaxed. Firstly, we have so far assumed two rankings
are ‘close’ if they differ in at most the ordering of a single pair
of theories. This makes more sense if the set of alternatives is
small than it does for larger sets. Consequently, in general, we
may consider two rankings as being close even if they differ in the
ordering of β pairs of alternatives. In the example presented in Fig.
1 β = 1, which meant that for any given ranking there are four
others which are close to it. But if β = 2 then this grows to include
9 more additional rankings. And if β = 10 then this corresponds
to a trivial notion of closeness in the sense that any way of ranking
the alternatives is close to any other. In general, for a set of n
alternatives, the maximum value β can take is n(n−1)2 . As before,
this generalized relation of closeness can be naturally extended to
deliver a notion of closeness for profiles.
Secondly, there is no reason why closeness between profiles be
judged in reference to only one virtue. That is, for a given profile
there may be profiles which are close to it in the sense in which
they differ from the original with respect to pairwise disagreements
on multiple virtues (or one which disagrees on virtue i and another
that disagrees on virtue j). We will use α to denote the number of
virtues assumed in the definition of closeness. In the example in
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Fig.2, α = 1, and this delivered four profiles. If α = 2 then there
would be 20 additional profiles.
We can combine the two generalisations and obtain the notion of
α-β-closeness. As α and β grow the size of the set of profiles close
to a particular profile grows as well.2 This notion of closeness can
help us model Kuhn’s idea of ambiguity.
If virtues really are ambiguous, as Kuhn suggests they are, then
can the profiles which majority voting3 maps to an intransitive
relation be avoided by replacing them with other profiles α-β-close
to them? Such a move would be permissible since, as per Kuhn, the
ranking of competing theories based on scientific virtues is not set
in stone, and each virtue may be disambiguated in different ways,
where different disambiguations may result for reasons specific to
each individual scientist. The point then, is that although a scientist
may have well justified (sociological or psychological) reasons to
disambiguate each virtue the way that she does, she cannot hold
each disambiguation at the same time, on pain of her favoured
aggregation function mapping to an intransitive/incomplete result.
But, if she cannot hold each disambiguation at the same time, then
this provides evidence that something has ‘gone wrong’ in the way
that she has disambiguated the virtues, at least when considered
together. And thus, there is nothing stopping her from revisiting
2 Notice that if we increase α and β too much, i.e to α = m and β = n(n−1)2 , then
this set collapses into the domain that profile belongs to.
3 Pairwise majority voting can be defined thus: for a set of virtues V, let ∆+ =d f
{i ∈ V : y ≺i x}, ∆− =d f {i ∈ V : x ≺i y}. Then: y ≺ x if and only if
|∆+| ≥ |∆−|. For the remainder of this paper we will focus on pairwise majority
voting and assume there is an odd number of virtues. This means that the output
of the aggregation, under pairwise majority, will always be a strict ordering (if an
ordering, at all). We use pairwise majority vote for its simplicity in illustrating our
argument. We do not thereby suggest that it be the actual aggregation function
used; clearly, for example, one may want to weight different virtues differently.
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them and adopting alternative close disambiguations for (at least
some) of the virtues.
It bears noting here that we are not claiming that our notion of
closeness, in terms of pairwise disagreements with the original
disambiguations, is the only (or even the best) way of thinking
about ambiguity in the formal framework under consideration. This
(similar to our choice of focusing on pairwise majority voting) is a
modelling assumption, and it would be an interesting question to
consider different ways of capturing how a scientific virtue could be
ambiguous over multiple rankings. However, it does seem plausible
that if a scientist were to be forced to revisit how she disambiguated
a certain scientific virtue in a given theory choice situation, then
adopting an alternative disambiguation that radically disagreed
with her original one would be undesirable. It could even be
taken as a sign that her initial attempt at interpreting the virtue
was not sufficiently well grounded. Alternatively, the sociological
or psychological reasons that led to the original disambiguation
might be seen as having an ‘anchoring’ effect. The claim is that
when faced with an intransitive/incomplete all-things-considered
value, alternative disambiguations that largely agree (in terms of
pairwise disagreements) with the original disambiguations are to
be preferred.
To illustrate the potential of such an approach to bypass Arrow’s
impossibility result, consider the following case: assume three
virtues are used to rank three alternatives. It is trivial that majority
voting maps some profile 3-3-close to any Condorcet-like profile4
into a transitive ranking, since any element of the domain under
consideration is 3-3-close to any other (so think of the profile in
4 A Condorcet profile is simply a profile that pairwise majority voting maps to an
intransitive value.
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which all virtues agree). This is not very useful as these particular
large values of α and β do not appear plausible for such a small
number of theories and virtues.
Nevertheless as the number of competing theories and virtues
grow, higher values of α and β become intuitively plausible, since
for more competitors and virtues, fixed values of α and β span
proportionally less of the corresponding universal domain. A virtue
faced with a large number of theories may be such that multiple
pairwise disagreements between competing disambiguations are
allowed. And if there are a larger number of virtues we may
allow for more of them to be ambiguous.5 Notice we are not
suggesting replacing the troublesome profiles (those that instantiate
a Condorcet-pattern of preferences) with simply any other profile
in the domain. We want to restrain the possible replacements as
much as possible, and we do so by only looking at profiles which
are α-β-close to the troublesome ones, for plausible values of α and
β.
But what precisely are plausible values? This is a difficult question
to answer in the abstract for two reasons. First, as noted above, it
does seem reasonable to assume that the plausibility of certain val-
ues of α and β depends on the number of alternatives (n) and virtues
(m) involved in the theory choice situation. Secondly, and more im-
portantly, even fixing the numbers n and m, whether or not partic-
ular values of α and β are plausible will still presumably depend
on the particular field of research in question, and the individual
scientist doing the aggregation. A scientist with deeply entrenched
5 We conjecture, that for each domain, there are minimal values of α and β such
that majority voting will succeed somewhere in each neighbourhood of profiles,
and that the values of α and β are low enough to make the rationality of theory
choice nontrivial. Proving this conjecture is beyond the scope of this paper, but is
a viable avenue for future research.
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reasons for disambiguating in a way that led her favoured aggrega-
tion function delivering an intransitive/incomplete value may well
resist considering alternative disambiguations which disagreed sig-
nificantly with her original disambiguation (thereby restricting the
value of β). And she may well resist the idea that she has to revisit a
large number of the virtues she has been using to guide her choice
(thereby restricting the value of α). As such, a detailed discussion of
which α and β are plausible would require a detailed discussion of
particular theory choice scenarios, which we cannot do in this paper.
Instead, we aim to offer a proof of concept highlighting the viability
of such an approach to the conceptualisation of scientific rationality
and show that it blunts the threat raised by Okasha. In the following
section we explain how α-β-closeness can lead to a weakened notion
of rationality in the context of theory choice. And then we present
some results obtained by applying this relaxed notion of rationality
to several simple theory choice scenarios.
4.4 weak rationality
Suppose that scientific virtues, such as simplicity, accuracy, scope,
etc. do deliver complete rankings of competing theories. Then, for
any scientist, a theory choice situation can be represented by a pro-
file collecting all the ranking of theories according to the individual
virtues. Okasha construes the rationality of theory choice in the
following way:
rationality Theory choice is rational only if there exists a func-
tion that respects UD, WP, ND, IIA and that takes every profile
in UD to a transitive and complete all-things-considered order-
ing.
If one were to accept Okasha’s principles governing theory choice
discussed in Section 2, then Arrow’s result indeed shows that theory
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choice is irrational. In other words, there is no such function that
outputs a transitive and complete all-things-considered ordering no
matter what rankings the virtues supply. Using the notion of α-
β-closeness introduced in the previous section, we aim to offer a
double-tier weakening of Rationality.
weak rationality Theory choice is rational only if there exists
a function that respects U, WP, ND, IIA and that for at least γ
profiles, takes those profiles, or profiles α-β-close to them, into
transitive and complete, all-things-considered orderings.
Rationality and Weak Rationality differ in two respects. Firstly,
whereas Rationality stipulates that the aggregation function ought
to deliver a transitive and complete all-things-considered ranking
for any profile, Weak Rationality is concerned only with γ profiles.
For simplicity, we will express γ as a percentage of profiles in the
domain for which Weak Rationality holds. Secondly, Weak Rationality
not only checks the behaviour of a function applied to a profile, but
also its behaviour applied to all profiles α-β-close to it. So, in case
we try to apply pairwise majority voting, say, to a Condorcet profile,
Weak Rationality will be satisfied if pairwise majority voting can
deliver, for at least one profile α-β-close to the Condorcet profile,
a transitive, all-things-considered ranking. In contrast, Condorcet
profiles represent the counterexamples to satisfying Rationality with
pairwise majority voting.
The first weakening is motivated by the following idea. Arrow’s
theorem tells us that theory choice is not rational according to
Rationality because for any function there will be at least one
profile that function will not map to a transitive and complete
all-things-considered ordering. But what if there really is a single
such profile for a particular function? Let f denote your favourite
aggregation function. There is a sense in which f would be less
‘rational’ (in an intuitive sense) if it generated a transitive and
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complete all-things-considered ordering from only 1 out of 216
profiles (the space of all profiles formed out of three virtues ranking
over three theories), than it would be if it did so from 215. If a
scientist used the function in the former case she would be acting
‘irrationally.’ But she wouldn’t if she did so in the latter. In fact, not
using f in such a scenario simply because of the threat posed by the
single profile f fails to map to an ordering, would be ‘irrationally’
cautious. Suppose a bookie offered you a choice between two bets.
the first bet returns £100 with probability 1, the second £200 with
probability .5 and £0 otherwise. Preferring the first bet in this
instance seems rational. However, as the probability of winning
£200 increases, the second bet becomes more appealing. There
seems to be a point at which preferring the first to the second bet
becomes irrationally cautious. Analogously, a scientist refraining
from using f because of its failure in only 1 out of 216 cases appears
irrationally cautious. As such, rationality can be treated as a matter
of degree.
The second weakening is inspired by Kuhn’s idea that the way in
which virtues rank theories is subjective. We understand this as
saying that in case a particular profile delivers, under an aggrega-
tion function, an intransitive (or incomplete) all-things-considered
relation, moving to an α-β-close profile is permissible. We have dis-
cussed Kuhn’s idea of ambiguity in Section 3 and the meaning of
α-β-closeness in Section 5. The issue of what values α and β should
take is still beyond the scope of this paper, but in the next section
we present a proof of the viability of this proposal for saving the
rationality of theory choice, if this is construed as Weak Rationality.
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4.5 ambiguity to the rescue
To illustrate the viability of moving from Rationality to Weak
Rationality, consider a very simple theory choice scenario. Take α
and β to be 1. That is, treat two profiles as being close if they differ
in how they rank only one pair of adjacent theories according to
a single virtue. Also take majority voting to be the method used
to aggregate the individual rankings supplied by the virtues into
an all-things-considered ranking. Then, for three virtues and three
theories every Condorcet-like profile is close to a profile for which
majority voting succeeds in mapping that profile to a transitive and
complete all-things-considered ranking.
What this means is that scientists who are willing to revise the way
one ambiguous virtue ranks a pair of theories then the intransitive
all-thing-considered ranking can be avoided. Given that the val-
ues of α and β are minimal and γ=1 in this case, the theory choice
among 3 theories based on 3 virtues appears to be Weakly Rational.
And pairwise majority voting is the witness of this result. The be-
low table documents some more values as a function of the number
of theories and virtues under consideration (note that we have not
included the, plausibly common, instance of choosing between only
two competitors. As Okasha (2011, pp. 94-95) notes, the Arrovian
result does not hold in this case).6
6 These numbers were computed using Mathematica 10. Contact the authors for the
notebooks used.
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n
3 4 5
m
3 1 .9826 .8836
5 .9907 .9375
Table 3: Proportion of profiles which are 1-1-close to a successful profile
under majority voting for m virtues and n theories
The columns in the above table denote the number of theories
which need to be ranked, whereas the rows denote the number
of virtues according to which these theories are assessed. Every
cell contains the proportion of 1-1-close to at least one profile that
majority votes maps to a transitive ordering.
Notice that for other cases than three theories ranked according to
three virtues (so cases of more virtues or more theories) the be-
haviour of majority voting is not as ‘nice’. Only .88 of the profiles
comprised of 3 virtues ranking 5 theories will be such that they are
at most 1-1-close to a profile that maps to a transitive all-things-
considered ranking under majority voting. Is this value of γ good
enough for claiming that theory choice using 3 virtues to rank 5
theories is Weakly Rational? This seems like a subjective decision
inherent in theory choice and we do not wish to argue either way.
Instead, it is more fruitful to observe that the situation of majority
voting is improved if we relax the definition of closeness. The below
tables document these improvements:
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3 virtues α
4 theories 1 2 3
β
1 .9826 1 1
2 1 1 1
3 1 1 1
Table 4: Proportion of profiles which
are α-β-close to a successful
profile under majority vot-
ing for 3 virtues and 4 the-
ories
3 virtues α
5 theories 1 2 3
β
1 .8836 .9385 .9539
2 .9748 1 1
3 .9972 1 1
Table 5: Proportion of profiles which
are α-β-close to a successful
profile under majority vot-
ing for 3 virtues and 5 the-
ories
5 virtues α
3 theories 1 2 3
β
1 .9907 1 1
2 1 1 1
3 1 1 1
Table 6: Proportion of profiles which
are α-β-close to a successful
profile under majority vot-
ing for 5 virtues and 3 the-
ories
5 virtues α
4 theories 1 2 3
β
1 .9375 .9831 .9935
2 .9805 .9995 1
3 .9982 1 1
Table 7: Proportion of profiles which
are α-β-close to a successful
profile under majority vot-
ing for 5 virtues and 4 the-
ories
Each table above corresponds to a cell in Table 3 except for the top
left cell. So, Table 4 corresponds to the case of three virtues ranking
four theories, Table 5 three virtues ranking five theories, and so
on. The columns in these tables denote the number of ambigu-
ous virtues considered, whereas the rows denote the number of
pairwise disagreements allowed. The numbers in the cells denote
the proportion of profiles in the appropriate domain which have
at least one profile, α-β close to them for which majority voting
delivers a transitive all-things-considered ranking. For the case of
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1 ambiguous virtue and 1 pairwise disagreement the numbers are
identical to those in Table 3. However, as we move away from that
cell, γ increases and also reaches 1 in each instance.
For a more interesting example, consider Table 5. Here we record
the results for the case in which we need to rank 5 competing
theories by means of 3 scientific virtues. Now, narrow in on the
intersection of row 2 and column 1 in this table. This cell represents
the situation in which we construe two profiles as being close if they
differ in the rankings of at most 1 virtue (α = 1) and on this virtue
the difference between the two profiles can be in the ordering of at
most two pairs of adjacent theories (β = 2). The value in this cell is
.9748. This tells us that only 2% of all profiles of 5 theories ranked
by 3 virtues do not have a 1-2-close profile for which majority
voting delivers an overall transitive ranking. Allow two profiles to
be close even if they differ with respect to the ordering of two pairs
of adjacent theories, i.e. move a column to the right, and all profiles
in the space have a profile 2-2-close to them for which majority
voting delivers an overall transitive ranking.
In other words, assuming closeness is lax enough, all of the simple
cases of theory choice are such that all profiles (even the problematic
ones) will have at least one profile close to them that is mapped
to a transitive all-things-considered ranking under majority voting.
And notice that this possibility result has been achieved without
trivialising the definition of closeness, i.e. for small values of α and
β. For instance, in the case of 4 theories and 3 virtues (Table 2) as
well as in the case of 3 theories and 5 virtues (Table 4), this is the
case for any value of α and β greater than 1. In the case of 5 theories
and 3 virtues (Table 3), an α > 1 and a β > 1 are sufficient. The
case of 4 theories and 5 virtues (Table 5) is more demanding, but
since there are also more virtues and theories, slightly higher values
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for α and β are still non-trivial. Finally, even in cases in which
there are still profiles which are not close to any profiles for which
pairwise majority voting delivers an overall transitive ranking (such
as Table 5, line 1), the probability of ending up with a non-transitive
profile is much lower (under any construal of closeness, i.e. any
values of α and β) than in the case in which we take virtues to be
non-ambiguous.
The interpretation we assign to this result is that as long as com-
munities of scientists include enough subjective disagreement about
how to disambiguate the shared and objective virtues, then at least
some of them will be able to rationally aggregate the competing al-
ternatives. And theory choice ends up being rational, albeit weakly
so.
4.6 conclusion
Okasha (2011) aims to prove that the situation of theory choice, if we
are to construe it in Kuhnian terms, is even worse than Kuhn antic-
ipated. It is not the case the objective elements of theory choice
alone do not supply an unique algorithm for arriving at an all-
things-considered ranking of theories, but rather they supply no
such algorithm at all. This poses a threat to the objectivity of theory
choice. In this paper we argue that Kuhn’s ideas regarding the sub-
jectivity of the rankings generated by the ambiguous virtues offer
a solution to Okasha’s challenge. Taking the ambiguity of scientific
virtues seriously, what Okasha shows is that across the universal
domain, regardless of the function used, it is not the case that every
disambiguation will yield a rational choice. But he doesn’t show
that no disambigutation will do this. We investigate some simple
cases of theory choice and prove that rational aggregation is possi-
ble as long as the definition of ambiguity is sufficiently relaxed and
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more virtues are treated as being ambiguous. It therefore seems that
the considerable effectiveness of scientific virtues depends on them
being sufficiently unarticulated.
5
S C I E N T I F I C C O N S E N S U S W I T H O U T
I N C O N S I S T E N C Y
5.1 introduction
Academic disciplines are increasingly fragmented, and this natu-
rally leads to diverse areas of expertise within them. But if the state
of a discipline as a whole is supposed to depend on the beliefs
of its experts in a certain way, then we arrive at an impossibility
result similar to Sen’s Liberal Paradox (1970). Just as Sen’s Lewd
and Prude were forced into inconsistency by their decisiveness
over their own personal spheres, a discipline may be forced into
inconsistency if experts are taken to be decisive over their respective
areas of expertise. At least this will be the case if we require that
the scientific consensus in the discipline – i.e what the discipline
as a whole tell us about the world – be generated by a suitably-
constrained function on the beliefs of scientists. We show this
by importing Dietrich and List (2008)’s result from the context of
aggregating individual judgements to that of aggregating scientific
expert judgements. If this is the correct way of thinking about what
fragmented scientific disciplines tell us about the world, it seems
that science cannot protect itself from inconsistencies. Insofar as we
think that Nature is free of inconsistency, and we want our scientific
consensus to reflect this, something has to give. Building on the
ideas of Gibbard (1974) we suggest that the best way of avoiding
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inconsistencies is for experts to waive their expertise and contribute
beliefs on a par with everyone else’s. As such we argue against the
hegemony of experts.
The structure of this paper is as follows. We begin by outlining
the notions of fragmentation and expertise we have in mind. We
discuss how scientists from different fields may try to come to a
consensus about what science as a whole tells us about the world.
We then present Dietrich and List’s model and impossibility result,
along with an interpretation in terms of aggregating the beliefs of
scientists. We incorporate the idea of waiving expertise into the
model, prove a possibility result, and argue that that the principles
that the result requires are highly plausible in the contexts under
consideration.
5.2 fragmentation of knowledge
Most, if not all, of modern academic disciplines exhibit a huge
degree of fragmentation and specialisation. By this we mean
that individuals working within them work on diverse topics
of investigation, and that individuals working on a topic X are
experts on topic X. We take it for granted that this is the case in
philosophy.1 But our primary interest here is the fragmentation and
specialisation of science. For it is here where the stakes are at their
highest.
Modern science is a massively broad field. The classical categori-
sation of physics, chemistry, biology (and possibly social science)
1 We doubt that anyone would dispute this. But if they do, we point them to
Rescher’s recent editorial for the American Philosophical Quarterly. Rescher docu-
ments the growth in philosophical output, including the tendency for increased
specialisation, and notes that the ‘discipline’s topical fragmentation [has] far out-
paced its population growth’ (2014).
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provides one level of fragmentation. A physicist working on
Quantum Field Theory may have little to say to a doctor conducting
randomized control trials to test the efficacy of a newly developed
medicine. This also provides our first level of specialisation. Very
few scientists make valuable contributions to different disciplines.
Different scientists are experts over different areas.
The same observations apply when we ‘zoom in’. Within scientific
disciplines, at the level associated with a university faculty for
example, there is further fragmentation. A chemist working
on the the nature of covalent bonds is far removed from one
synthesising artificial molecules capable of transmitting genetic
information. Again, this fragmentation leads to individuals being
considered as experts over their respective areas of research. And
we needn’t stop there. The same considerations apply when we
‘zoom in’ further, to specific university departments, or further
still, to particular areas of research of the sort an international
conference might be dedicated to. At each level of grain we find
fragmentation accompanied by expertise. Obviously, this will
not hold all the way down. Our point is that it holds for many
areas of research which are still considered to be the same discipline.
For the most part, the fragmentation of any field into sub-disciplines
is seen as a desirable, and even natural, phenomenon. Kitcher sug-
gests that communities of scientists who diversify their cognitive
labour are far more likely to find the truth (Kitcher (1990), recently
discussed in Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) and McKenzie Alexan-
der et al. (2015)). And the sheer breadth of science demands that
individuals focus on narrower areas of research.
But this invites questions concerning the state of the discipline
as a whole. If we want to know what ‘science’ tells us about the
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natural world, then we need a way of aggregating the beliefs of
experts coherently. The same applies if we want to know what
‘physics’ tells us, or what ‘molecular chemistry’ tells us, and so
on. For any suitably fragmented discipline X, if we want to
know what X tells us about the world, we need to aggregate the
beliefs of experts working on sub-fields of X. One may question
whether what science tells us about the natural world relies only
on what individual scientists believe at a time. In the philosophy of
science literature, it has been proposed that the way science forms
consensus is influenced by institutions, history, or power relations
(see Okruhlik (1994) for some intriguing examples). We grant these
influences on what science tells us about the world. However, we
believe these considerations do not feed into the project we are
interested in. Rather, they arise further upstream and concern how
individual scientists form their beliefs. Once this is fixed (regardless
how), the question we are interested in arises. How should we
aggregate these beliefs to deliver what the discipline as a whole
tells us?
It seems innocuous to suggest the following requirements: the state
of a discipline should depend on what the disparate specialists
within it believe; specialists should determine what the discipline be-
lieves about their area of expertise; and whenever everyone agrees
on something, the discipline as a whole should agree on that too.
However, results from Dietrich and List (2008) building on the lib-
eral paradox introduced by Sen (1970), show that if this is indeed the
case, then we cannot guarantee that the resulting consensus will be
free of inconsistency. For any suitably fragmented discipline, there
will be cases where individually consistent experts will, collectively,
deliver inconsistent claims. And, insofar as inconsistencies do not
arise in the world, we take it for granted that an inconsistent science
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would require correction. The question is, can this be done whilst
still respecting scientific expertise?
5.3 the impossibility of consistent expert consensus
In this paper we adopt a formal model for aggregating judgements
over sentences, supplied by Dietrich and List (2008) (but also List
and Pettit (2002); Dietrich (2006); Dietrich and List (2007, 2013)
amongst others). In this section we outline the model and provide
an interpretation in terms of aggregating the beliefs of scientists
working in a fragmented discipline. Begin by considering a group
of individuals, N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2, and a set of sentences,
L, closed under negation: ϕ ∈ L if and only if ¬ϕ ∈ L. A set of
sentences from L is consistent if and only if it has a model in the
specified logic.2 For instance, {p, p → q,¬q} is inconsistent in
classical propositional logic, and {p, q} is not. With respect to
the intended use of this (idealised) model, we will take the set of
individuals to supply the set of scientists working in a fragmented
discipline and the set L to consist of all the meaningful claims from
that discipline.
Individuals in our model formulate judgements over sentences in
an agenda. An agenda is a finite nonempty set X ⊆ L closed under
negation.3 Define a position on ϕ ∈ X as either ϕ or ¬ϕ. Then call
an agenda X connected if and only if for any two sentences ϕ and
ψ, there is a set of sentences Y ⊆ X such that some position on
ϕ and some position on ψ are each individually consistent with
2 We restrict our focus to monotonic logics, i.e. ones in which any subset of a
consistent set of sentences in the logic is consistent.
3 More accurately, we understand an agenda as consisting not of sentences, but
rather equivalence classes of sentences modulo logical equivalence. As a conse-
quence ϕ and ¬¬ϕ are treated as the same element of X. For simplicity, we restrict
our focus to finite agendas throughout but see fn.6.
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Y, but jointly inconsistent with Y. An agenda is a set of claims
a group of scientists are attempting to reach a consensus on, and
we assume that it is connected. Although scientific fields are
fragmented, the fragments are not logically disconnected from one
another. We think that this holds even at the most general level.
Interdisciplinary work shows that the classical categories overlap,
and the literature on inter-theoretic reduction supports the thesis
that an overarching agenda consisting of sentences from each of
these categories would remain connected (Dizadji-Bahmani et al.,
2010). Those uncomfortable with the general claim should note that
the connectedness of agendas becomes even more plausible when
we ‘zoom into’ more narrow fields, and the results discussed in this
paper hold there as well.
The belief set of an individual i is a consistent set Ai ⊆ X. A profile
of belief sets is an n-tuple of belief sets (A1, . . . , An). When it comes
to forming a consensus, we need a judgement aggregation function F
that takes profiles to belief sets. The input of the function are the
sentences of the agenda individually believed by scientists. The
value is the scientific consensus: the set of sentences agreed upon
by the discipline as a whole.
To account for the idea of expertise, we introduce the notion of
an expert rights system. An expert rights system is an n-tuple
(R1, ..., Rn), where each Ri is a (possibly empty) subset of X closed
under negation. For each individual i, Ri contains the sentences
concerning her area of expertise. Call an individual i decisive on a
set of sentences Z ⊆ X if and only if F(A1, . . . , An) ∩ Z = Ai ∩ Z.
Fragmented disciplines contain scientists who are experts over
certain areas of research. The sentences (and their negations) from
those areas go into the scientists’ expert rights sets. Since they
are the experts over these sentences, they should be decisive over
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whether or not science as a whole should adopt them. We assume
throughout that all rights sets in a rights system are disjoint. So for
any sentence under consideration there corresponds at most one
expert (think of her as the representative of her sub-discipline if
you like). If the same sentence appears in multiple rights sets, the
impossibility result to come would be trivial.4
The idea that the beliefs of a discipline should depend on the beliefs
of the scientists within that discipline is captured by the require-
ment of a judgement aggregation function. The following condi-
tion on the function demands that regardless of what the individual
scientists believe (as long as they are individually consistent), they
should be able to attempt to reach consensus following the agreed
aggregation method:
universal domain The domain of F is the set of all possible pro-
files of consistent judgement sets.
The definition of Universal Domain differs slightly from the defini-
tion of Dietrich and List (2008, p. 63). They require the function F
to be defined over the set of all possible profiles of consistent and
complete judgement sets. Requiring completeness does not seem
intuitive for scientists trying to arrive at a consensus on what the
discipline tells us about nature. We needn’t restrict ourselves to
cases where every scientist involved in the aggregation procedure
has an opinion on every sentence in the agenda. As we explain
later in this section, this variation makes no difference to the
impossibility result to come.
4 There are ways of generalising the below to allow for expert rights of groups. We
suppress them here for brevity, but see Dietrich and List (2008, pp. 64-65) for
details.
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The below is a formally precise formulation of the suggestion that
experts should determine what the discipline believes regarding
their respective areas of expertise:
minimal expert rights There are at least two individuals i, j
who are respectively decisive over non-empty Ri and Rj.
While the fact that whenever everyone agrees on something it
should be believed by the discipline as a whole is given by:
unanimity principle For any profile (A1, ..., An) in the domain
of F and any sentence ϕ ∈ X, if ϕ ∈ Ai for all individuals i,
then ϕ ∈ F(A1, ..., An).
With this technical apparatus at hand, we can now present Dietrich
and List’s result establishing that a fragmented science that arrives
at consensus via an aggregation function that respects the above con-
ditions cannot protect itself against an inconsistent view of nature:
Theorem 1. If the agenda is connected, there exists no aggregation func-
tion (generating consistent collective judgement sets) that satisfies univer-
sal domain, minimal expert rights, and the unanimity principle.
Proof. See Dietrich and List (2008, pp. 72-73). Notice that they re-
strict their focus to a proper subset of the universal domain as we
define it, i.e. the set of consistent and complete profiles. But if there
is no function that satisfies minimal expert rights and the unanim-
ity principle over their domain, then, a fortiori there is no function
that satisfies them over a superset of that domain (our universal
domain).
The following example should make this clear (Dietrich and List,
2008, p. 60). Let the agenda under consideration consist of the
following sentences (including their negations):
p: Carbon dioxide emissions are above a critical threshold.
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p → q: If carbon dioxide emissions are above a critical thresh-
old, then global warming is occurring.
q: Global warming is occurring.
Let individual m be the expert on carbon dioxide emissions and
n the expert on global warming. Thus Rm = {p,¬p} and Rn =
{q,¬q}. Suppose that m believes that carbon dioxide emissions are
above the threshold, and that if they are, then global warming is
occurring. Suppose that n believes the conditional, but denies that
global warming is occurring. Thus Am = {p, p → q, q} and An =
{¬q, p → q,¬p}. By universal domain, F must be defined over the
profile (Am, An). By unanimity p → q ∈ F(Am, An). By minimal
expert rights p,¬q ∈ F(Am, An). Thus, F(Am, An), a very small, but
very important, part of the scientific consensus is inconsistent.
5.4 scientific consensus without inconsistency
Dietrich and List’s result shows that allowing individuals to exer-
cise their expertise may lead to inconsistent collective beliefs. The
problem arises when the beliefs of experts come into conflict with
the beliefs of other experts via unanimity. The question becomes
what to do in such situations? We suggest that the experts over
the claims that generated the conflict should waive their expert
status with regards to those claims. This attitude in front of a
collective inconsistent set of beliefs is one of intellectual modesty.
Experts should take the conflict arising between their beliefs as
evidence that a mistake has entered into one of their belief sets.
Further, since all of them are peers, and there is no reason to
suspect anyone (including oneself) over the others, they should
all agree to waive their expert rights over the sentences that led
to the inconsistency, and agree to perform the aggregation as if
none of them were experts over these sentences (this does not
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preclude retaining expertise over some elements in the agenda,
though). Finding a consistent belief set does not provide cer-
tainty that the result of the aggregation is the ultimate truth on
the issues on the agenda. But finding an inconsistent collective
belief set is evidence that at least one of them entertains a falsehood.
To capture this move towards intellectual modesty when confronted
with an inconsistency we introduce an alternative notion of expertise
in the spirit of Gibbard (1974). We define an individual i’s waiver set
Wi ⊆ Ri as follows:
1. Define a set Ψ (relative to a given profile and rights system):
Ψ =d f {ψ ∈ X : [∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n} : ψ ∈ Ak]∨ [∃k ∈ {1, . . . , n} : ψ ∈ (Ak∩Rk)]}
2. For any sentence ϕ ∈ Ri:
ϕ ∈Wi ⇔ ∃Ψ′ ⊆ Ψ : [Ψ′ is consistent ]∧ [Ψ′∪{ϕ} is inconsistent]
Ψ is the set of sentences endorsed by the community in the sense
that they would be guaranteed to go into the collective judgement
set by unanimity or minimal expert rights, should they hold. The
waiver set of an individual i, Wi, is the set of claims that if i were to
exercise her right over them, they would generate collective incon-
sistency when combined with a consistent subset of Ψ (if everyone
else also exercised their rights over their fields of expertise).
This provides the following alternative in place of minimal expert
rights:
alienable expert rights For every profile, and every individ-
ual i, if i is an expert over ϕ, i accepts ϕ, and ϕ is not
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waived, then ϕ is included in the scientific consensus, i.e. if
ϕ ∈ (Ai ∩ Ri \Wi), then ϕ ∈ F(A1, . . . , An).
Notice that this condition is analogous to what Dietrich and
List (2008, 64) call positive decisiveness which requires that an
individual i is positively decisive over their rights set if and only
if (Ai ∩ Ri) ⊆ F(A1, . . . , An), rather than negative decisiveness,
which requires F(A1, . . . , An) ⊆ (Ai ∩ Ri)5 In the context under
consideration we take the positive, rather than negative, aspect of
this notion to capture the relevant sense of expertise: if an expert
believes a sentence then, assuming it is not waived, it should be
part of the scientific consensus. To briefly motivate this, consider
the case in which an expert avoids taking a position on a sentence
from their area of expertise (i.e. neither believes it nor its negation)
– the sentence could correspond to an ‘open problem’ in their field –
then through negative decisiveness that sentence could not become
part of the scientific consensus. But it seems unintuitive to prevent
scientists working in related fields from settling the question.
However, the below result continues to hold when the condition is
strengthened to demand that if the group accepts ϕ, and ϕ is in Rk
for some k, then Ak (the analogue of negative decisiveness).
With this in place, we provide the following possibility result:
Theorem 2. For any connected agenda and any rights system, there exists
an aggregation function (generating consistent collective judgement sets)
that satisfies universal domain, alienable expert rights, and the unanimity
principle.
5 We say ‘analogous to’ as the introduction of the waiver condition entails that
we cannot use decisiveness in the sense of Dietrich and List (2008, 63-64), since
in alienable expert rights, what experts are ‘decisive over’ varies from profile to
profile. Also notice that Theorem 1 holds when minimal expert rights is weakened
to positively minimal expert rights (Dietrich and List, 2008, 64).
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Proof. The following function, F, respects universal domain, una-
nimity, and alienable expert rights by construction:
F(A1, . . . An) =
n⋂
i
Ai ∪
n⋃
i
(Ai ∩ Ri \Wi)
It remains to demonstrate that it is guaranteed to generate a con-
sistent collective judgement set. We show this by induction on its
subsets, for some arbitrary profile. To begin with,
⋂n
i Ai is consis-
tent by the consistency of every individual judgement set. Suppose
then Ω is a subset of
⋃n
i (Ai ∩ Ri \Wi) such that
⋂n
i Ai ∪Ω is consis-
tent. The inductive step is that if
⋂n
i Ai ∪Ω is consistent then so is⋂n
i Ai ∪Ω ∪ {ϕ}, for any ϕ ∈
⋃n
i (Ai ∩ Ri \Wi). Assume towards a
contradiction that this is not the case, i.e.
⋂n
i Ai ∪Ω∪{ϕ} is inconsis-
tent, for some ϕ (1). Notice that
⋂n
i Ai ∪Ω is a consistent subset of Ψ
(2). Since ϕ ∈ ⋃ni (Ai ∩ Ri \Wi), then there must exist a unique k (by
the disjointness of the rights system), such that ϕ ∈ (Ak ∩ Rk \Wk).
But (Ak ∩ Rk \Wk) ⊆ (Ak ∩ Rk) and hence ϕ ∈ (Ak ∩ Rk) (3). From
(1), (2), and (3): ϕ ∈ Wk and ϕ 6∈ ⋃ni (Ai ∩ Ri \Wi). This con-
tradicts our assumption and since our choice of ϕ was arbitrary,⋂n
i Ai ∪Ω ∪ {ϕ} is consistent for any ϕ ∈
⋃n
i (Ai ∩ Ri \Wi).6 This
concludes the proof that F always generates a consistent collective
judgment set.
In a fragmented discipline where the expert rights system and sci-
entists’ beliefs are such that respecting these rights (and unanimity)
will yield an inconsistent result, the discipline has gone wrong
somewhere. Even if the scientists’ expert rights sets are disjoint, if
there are enough logical connections between the sentences under
consideration, then an inconsistency may be generated. Alienable
expert rights suggests that whenever a discipline finds itself in
6 Recall our initial assumption that the agenda is finite. In consequence, the set⋃n
i (Ai ∩ Ri \Wi) will also be finite. If we were to relax our assumption, the proof
would follow along the same lines, but we would have to make an additional
assumption that the underlying logic is compact.
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such a situation, every expert should waive their expertise over
claims which contribute to the inconsistency (which needn’t be
all of them). And in doing so they contribute to what goes into
the consensus on an equal footing. And this is how it should
be. The discipline has made a mistake. Assuming unanimity,
the expertise of some individuals cannot be respected whilst
respecting the expertise of others. So, if scientists were to be intel-
lectually modest, the extent of this expertise should be reconsidered.
Notice that the notion of alienable expert rights is quite demanding:
it requires that every scientist who is an expert over any sentence
contributing to the inconsistency waive their expertise over those
sentences. Some may consider this to be too strong, after all, some
scientists may not consider others to be their epistemic peers, and
the former may balk at the idea of having to waive their expertise
on account of the latter. One way of justifying this attitude would
be to note that the evidential basis in some sub-disciplines may
be objectively more secure than in others (e.g. should someone
working in thermodynamics waive their expertise just because it
conflicts with the beliefs of a string theorist?). What this highlights
is that different sub-disciplines may place different demands on
whether an individual should include a sentence in their belief set,
and this may be salient when it comes to deciding who should
waive their expertise (i.e. perhaps individuals with less secure evi-
dence for their beliefs should waive before individuals with more
secure evidence). Since our model does not include a parameter
measuring strength of evidence, it is insensitive to such concerns;
we simply assume that all scientists are epistemic peers. However,
this is not to say that the model could not be further developed to
take this into account, and moreover, we think there is an important
distinction between the questions of how to justify the beliefs of an
individual, and how to aggregate beliefs, once they have already
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been taken as justified by everyone in the community. Our model
only addresses the latter question.
Moreover, we want to point out here that we are not suggesting that
F, as defined above, be the method scientists should use when form-
ing scientific consensus. It is plausible that the collective belief sets
it delivers will be rather limited in many cases. For any sentence
ϕ that is not universally agreed upon, or in someone’s area of ex-
pertise, ϕ won’t be in the value of F. And we can imagine cases
involving a group of extraordinarily timid experts who do not take
any position on the sentences they are experts over, and moreover
do not unanimously agree on any sentence in the agenda. In such
a case, F will deliver the empty set. And this would indeed be too
restrictive. Our claim is that any acceptable aggregation function
should be such that its value for any profile be a superset of the
value of F on that profile.7 Another way of putting it is that we take
universal domain, alienable expert rights, and unanimity to be nec-
essary conditions on any acceptable aggregation function, but they
needn’t be sufficient. Exploring additional conditions strikes us as
an potentially fruitful avenue for future research, but in this paper
we are only interested in providing a possibility result.
5.5 against the hegemony of experts
The upshot of requiring alienable expert rights of a judgement
aggregation function is that the beliefs of all scientists will be
respected. Every scientist can still contribute their beliefs to the
aggregation function and none of them have to reconsider anything
in order to successfully form an inconsistency-free consensus. This
7 Notice that if alienable expert rights is strengthened to include the analogue of
negative decisiveness as discussed above, then this will place an additional con-
straint on any expansion of F.
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is achieved by asking scientists to waive their expert status over
those sentences which would otherwise lead to an inconsistent
collective judgement set.
It is in this respect that Theorem 2 provides a more plausible possi-
bility result than others suggested in the literature, mainly by Diet-
rich and List. They show that by restricting the domain to profiles
that contain at least one deferring individual (where i is deferring in
a profile (A1, ..., An) if and only if Ai ∩ Rj = Aj ∩ Rj for every j 6= i),
or at least one agnostic individual (where i is agnostic in a profile
(A1, ..., An) if and only if Ai is consistent with every set of the form
B1 ∪ ... ∪ Bi−1 ∪ Bi+1 ∪ ...Bn for each j 6= i, Bj ⊆ Rj, then a possibility
result can be generated by setting the value of the aggregation
function to the belief set of the deferring or agnostic individual (in
the latter case combined with the other experts’ beliefs regarding
their areas of expertise).8
Comparing our approach to Dietrich and List’s highlights what we
take to be the take home message of our possibility result. The
correct attitude when arriving at an inconsistent judgement set
should not be venerating expertise at the expense of the beliefs of
individual experts, but relinquishing it. Dietrich and List’s results
require fragmented disciplines where at least one scientist simply
will not disagree with what the experts say about their respective
areas of expertise. A problem with this is that if there does not
exist such a scientist (which seems likely, just because a scientist is
an expert over area X does not preclude them from having beliefs
about areas related to X), we are not told how to shift into a profile
where there is one. Furthermore, the most plausible way of doing
8 They also investigate a possibility result regarding severely restricted agendas
and expert rights systems, but assuming the scientists are aiming to achieve a
consensus which could contain logically connected sentences, the type of result
List and Dietrich have in mind is implausible in this context.
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this requires that at least one scientist change their mind in a fairly
radical way. Such a scientist has to either defer to every other expert,
or withhold judgement over any sentence in someone else’s expert
rights set, and there is no guarantee that such a scientist will be
found. A further problem is that the way the possibility results are
generated does suggest that scientists might be motivated to defer,
or remain agnostic, since in doing so their belief set determines
the value of the aggregation function (Dietrich and List, 2008, 74).
Although they do not act as a dictator in the Arrovian sense (the
same named individual determines the value of the function for
any profile), they do determine whether or not any sentence not in
anyone’s rights set goes into the collective judgement set. And this
is not a desirable result.
The possibility results considered in this paper suggests a trade off.
On the one hand, we can respect the notion of expertise, which
comes with the cost of demanding belief revision and generating
a quasi-dictator. On the other, we can respect the beliefs of all sci-
entists involved, but this comes with the cost that experts must be
modest in the sense they they relinquish their expert status over
troublesome sentences. Alienable rights provides a way of doing
the latter, whilst still retaining the idea of expertise for all sentences
which do not contribute to the inconsistency. No individual is forced
to change her mind, and she may still contribute her entire belief set
to the aggregation function, albeit without expert status in certain
cases. It is for this reason that we take it to be the most plausible
way of ridding scientific consensus of any inconsistencies. And it is
for this reason that we think our result shows that the hegemony of
the experts should not be saved at any cost.
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5.6 conclusion
Despite its apparent desirability, the fragmentation and specialisa-
tion of many, if not all, academic disciplines poses a problem. How
are we to determine the state of the discipline as a whole? When
the discipline in question is science, or a suitably fragmented sub-
field thereof, this concerns what our best scientists believe about the
natural world. Under certain plausible assumptions, Dietrich and
List’s impossibility result shows that this cannot be answered with-
out the threat of inconsistency. We proved that this can be avoided
by replacing expert rights with alienable expert rights, when an ex-
pert right is alienable when it conflicts with expert beliefs and the
beliefs unanimously accepted. We argued that this provides a more
plausible way of avoiding inconsistency in the scientific consensus
about the natural world than the idea of venerating expertise at the
expense of respecting the beliefs of the individuals involved.

Part III
I N D I V I D U A L R AT I O N A L I T Y

6
I N T R O D U C T I O N
In this part of the thesis I turn my attention to several proposals
for enriching the standard view on rationality beyond the mere
satisfaction of the Kolmogorovian axioms.
In Chapter 7 I focus on Elga’s (2004) restricted principle of indiffer-
ence (RPI) for self-locating belief and in Chapter 8 on Titelbaum’s
(2013) defense of RPI. I show that both Elga’s and Titelbaum’s
arguments in support of RPI fail for the same reason the argument
for ‘staying’ in the Monty Hall problem fails. To wit, both Elga and
Titelbaum fail to appropriately model the probabilistic scenarios
their arguments rely on. In the appropriate sophisticated models of
their scenarios Elga’s and Titelbaum’s conclusions no longer follow.
Elga’s and Titelbaum’s mistake in constructing the correct prob-
ability models for their scenarios is traced back to an old and
often overlooked discussion by Glenn Shafer (1985) who argues
that in order for Bayesian conditionalisation to be a good formal
counterpart to learning, one ought to specify a partition of events
which an agent can conditionalise upon. Luc Bovens and Jose
Luis Ferreira (2010) interpret Shafer’s insight as “[w]hen we are
informed of some proposition, we do not only learn the proposition
in question, but also that we have learned the proposition as
one of the many propositions that we might have learned. The
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information is generated by a protocol, which determines the
various propositions that we might learn." This point can be found
in the formal literature on bayesian epistemology such as in the
works of Pearl (1988) and Halpern (2003), but is often ignored by
philosophers. When we model the scenarios of Elga and Titelbaum
in light of Shafer’s insight, their arguments become significantly
weaker.
Before proceeding it is important to clarify the status of RPI accord-
ing to Elga (2004). Here is a statement of the principle:
rpi A rational agent ought to assign equal credence to worlds that
agree on all uncentred propositions and are centred on agents
whose experiences are indistinguishable.1
Initially, RPI was introduced by Elga (2000) as part of his argument
for the Thirder answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem.
sleeping beauty Some researchers are going to put
you to sleep. During the two days that your sleep will
last, they will briefly wake you up either once or twice,
depending on the toss of a fair coin (Heads: once; Tails:
twice). After each waking, they will put you to back
to sleep with a drug that makes you forget that waking.
When you are first awakened, to what degree ought you
believe that the outcome of the coin toss is Heads? (Elga,
2000, p. 143)
Trying to answer this question Elga reasons:
1 This is an elaboration of Elga (2004, p. 387)’s Indifference. The way I formulate
this principle here: 1) brings to the fore that it is imposing a constraint on the
credal state of any rational agent; and 2) elucidates the scope of the principle. See
Weatherson (2005, p. 614) for a detailed discussion.
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"If (upon first awakening) you were to learn that the toss
outcome is Tails, that would amount to your learning
that you are in either T1 ["The coin came out Tails and
it’s Monday"] or T2 ["The coin came out Tails and it’s
Tuesday"]. Since being in T1 is subjectively just like be-
ing in T2, and since exactly the same propositions are
true whether you are in T1 or T2, even a highly restricted
principle of indifference yields that you ought then to have
equal credence in each." (Elga, 2000, p. 144, my empha-
sis)
Elga only needs a further premise to the one in the above quote
to be able to conclude that upon awakening, the probability of the
coin having landed heads is 13 . Assume Beauty were to learn upon
awakening that it is Monday. Then, she should divide her credence
between a ‘Monday and Heads’ (call this M1) world and a ‘Monday
and Tails’ equally (T1). After all, the coin was fair. But if M1 and
T1 should receive equal probability and T1 and T2 (upon the above
argument) should also receive equal probability, it means that all
three worlds are equally likely. Since these jointly form the entire
sample space, then Beauty should assign 13 to each.
Therefore RPI appears to be essential to Elga’s argument for the
Thirder answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. Moreover, one of
the early defenders of Elga’s Thirder answer, i.e. Dorr (2002, p.
294), also makes RPI an integral part of his argument. This suggests
that if RPI is shown to fail, this can affect at least some of the best
known Thirder arguments.
But what is the status of RPI, according to Elga? Elga might take
RPI to merely be rationally permissible. At least in certain cases
(and perhaps Sleeping Beauty is among them), an agent can align
her subjective credences according to RPI and assign equal credence
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to worlds that agree on all uncentred propositions and are centred
on agents whose experiences are indistinguishable (e.g. to being
Monday or Tuesday). Alternatively, Elga might endorse the view
that RPI is rationally mandated and that any rational agent ought
to align her credences according to RPI. I contend Elga (2004) offers
an argument for RPI and that Elga (at least in that paper) endorses
the latter view: RPI is rationally mandated. Here is what Elga says:
My defense of [RPI] has two parts. I’ll describe a ba-
sic case involving an agent who divides his credence be-
tween a pair of similar centered worlds, and argue that
he ought to assign those worlds equal credence. And
I’ll say how that argument can be generalized. But since
the controversial parts of the argument arise even in the
basic case, I relegate the generalization to the Appendix.
(Elga, 2004, p. 388)
Moreover, Titelbaum writes:
Elga defends [RPI] by defending this result for Duplica-
tion.2 It’s fairly easy to generalize his arguments about
Duplication to analogous situations with arbitrary (finite)
numbers of duplicates, and Elga does so in an appendix.
The generalization is uncontroversial, so we’ll confine
our attention to Elga’s argument concerning the original
Duplication case (Titelbaum, 2013, p. 253) . . . I have three
objections to Elga’s argument for [RPI] (Titelbaum, 2013,
p. 254)
In other words, Elga (2004) isn’t an illustration of the consequences
of adopting RPI but an argument in defense of it. Therefore, RPI is
taken by Elga to be a proper enrichment of our theory of rationality.
2 See the next chapter for a discussion of this puzzle.
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Finally, in Chapters 9 and 10 extend the above discussion by
showing how the the formal mistake Elga and Titelbaum make
when constructing the probability models for their scenarios is
more widespread and I highlight it in Christensen’s (2010) ar-
gument against an intuitive reflection principle and in Mahtani’s
(forthcoming) discussion of the opaque proposition principle. These
last two chapters also engage with two proposals for extending our
understanding of rationality, however, they are primarily meant as
a further illustration of the importance of constructing a precise
probabilistic model when analysing probabilistic scenarios. To sum
up, in appropriate sophisticated models, the conclusions of both
Christensen and Mahtani no longer go through.

7
E L G A’ S R E S T R I C T E D P R I N C I P L E O F
I N D I F F E R E N C E
The Restricted Principle of Indifference (RPI) states that "similar cen-
tred worlds deserve equal credence" (Elga, 2004, p. 387). I under-
stand this principle as making the following claim:
rpi A rational agent ought to assign equal credence to worlds that
agree on all uncentred propositions and are centred on agents
whose experiences are indistinguishable.
RPI is restricted in two ways. Firstly, it is more restricted than usual
principles of indifference from the philosophy of probability litera-
ture as it only applies to centred worlds. Secondly, it only applies
to centred worlds that agree on all uncentred propositions. In other
words, RPI wouldn’t apply in the following case: suppose W is the
actual world centred on you and W’ is a Matrix-like world in which
one of the people connected to machines has the exact same subjec-
tive experiences you have in W. RPI does not recommend assigning
equal credence to W and W’. Elga labels a principle of indifference
that would apply in such a situation the "absurd claim that I don’t
endorse." (Elga, 2004, p. 387) Elga’s argument for why he wouldn’t
endorse such a claim is that if RPI would cover cases in which the
uncertainty spans over individuals located in different worlds, then
RPI would collapse into a full-blown principle of indifference and
would no longer be resricted:
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let AT be the actual world, centered on you, now. Let
VAT be a world centered on a brain in a vat who
is in a state subjectively indistinguishable from yours.
ABSURD-CLAIM-THATI-DON’T-ENDORSE entails that
you ought to assign AT and VAT equal credence. (Elga,
2004, p. 387-8)
As the above discussion shows, there are meaningful senses of
self-locating indifference that don’t seem to fall under RPI and one
can find even more in Weatherson (2005). This may be a problem as
even if we establish RPI, we are still falling short of accomplishing
the goal of offering a comprehensive principle of indifference for
self-locating belief. Nevertheless, the focus of this chapter is on RPI
alone and not on any possible variations of it.
In this chapter I show that Elga’s argument for RPI is not valid.
In Section 1, I begin by gauging the relevance RPI has in the
literature on self-locating beliefs and I argue that RPI is not only
a common place, but that moreover it plays an integral part in
many argumentative strategies. I then introduce Elga’s argument
in favour of RPI (Section 2). In Section 3 I present the Monty Hall
problem and explain what lessons we can draw from it for one
of the scenarios instrumental to Elga’s argument (Section 4). I
conclude that Elga’s argument is not valid (Section 5).
rmation accrues toThe following chapter will prove that the only
other justification of RPI, viz. Titelbaum’s (2013), relies on the same
fallacy. I end by remarking that despite its widespread use, to date
we have no reason for accepting RPI.
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7.1 the relevance of rpi
In this section I attempt to gauge the relevance RPI has in the
literature on self-locating beliefs. I show that RPI plays an integral
part in many argumentative strategies even if all papers mentioned
in this section (and many others I leave out due to brevity consider-
ations) do not attempt to justify the principle and instead direct the
reader to Elga (2004).
Firstly, it isn’t just Thirders that rely on RPI. Some Halfers also rely
on RPI in their arguments. For instance, Lewis (2001) writes:
Elga writes, "Since being in T1 is subjectively just like
being in T2, and since exactly the same propositions are
true whether you are in T1 or T2, even a highly restricted
principle of indifference yields that you ought then to
have equal credence in each" (144). By ‘proposition’ he
means an uncentred possibility. The reason the same
propositions are true whether Beauty is in T1 or T2 is
that the centred worlds that are members of T1 are col-
located with the corresponding members of T2. I accept
Elga’s ‘highly restricted principle of indifference’. So we
have a further point of agreement. (p. 172)
This is not a trivial point of agreement. Lewis acknowledges that
in order to derive his solution to the Sleeping Beauty, viz. what
Lewis calls proposition L2 (Lewis, 2001, p. 174), he requires the
following to hold (I preserve Lewis’s numbering and his nota-
tion where P−(·) is Beauty’s credence before being put to sleep
and P(·) her credence upon waking up): (1) P(T1) = P(T2), (5)
P−(HEADS) = 1/2 = P−(TAILS) and (6) Beauty gains no new
uncentred evidence relevant to HEADS vs. TAILS between the
time she has credence function P−(·) and the time when she has
credence function P(·). (Lewis, 2001, p. 173) Proposition (1) is
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Elga’s RPI and without it Lewis’s conclusion wouldn’t follow.
Secondly, Ross (2010) argues Thirders in the Sleeping Beauty prob-
lem are committed to what he calls a ‘rational dilemma’. An agent is
faced with a rational dilemma if they find two (or more) principles
that conflict with one another equally plausible and hence are forced
to continue accepting them both. The rational dilemma thirders are
faced with is between a Generalized Thirder Principle and the prin-
ciple of Countable Additivity. For Ross’s argument to go through,
however, he has to argue that dropping any of these two principles
is not a plausible way of defusing the tension between them. The
part of the argument we are interested in for the purposes of this
chapter is why we cannot drop the Generalized Thirder Principle,
and more specifically, why the fact that the principle relies on an
indifference principle is not enough to warrant its rejection. Ross
writes
Since several of the arguments for the [Generalized
Thirder Principle] appeal, implicitly or explicitly, to a
finitistic principle of indifference, one could reject these
arguments so long as one denies that such indifference
principles apply even in finitistic cases. One might claim
instead that when Beauty awakens, she could rationally
have more credence in Tails and Monday than in Tails and
Tuesday , or viceversa, or else one might claim that she
should not have precise credences in these possibilities
at all. (...) These moves, however, involve considerable
costs. (Ross, 2010, p. 443)
To explain the costs of rejecting the ‘finististic principle of indiffer-
ence’ Ross simply points the reader to Elga (2004) (see fn. 28). This
is an implicit acknowledgement of the validity of Elga’s argument.
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Finally, Leitgeb and Bradley (2006) argue that there are cases in
which betting odds and rational beliefs come apart. They present
the following scenario modelled after the Sleeping Beauty problem:
Suppose that if the coin lands Tails, you will be offered
two real bets on Heads (of the same flip), one after the
other. There is no funny business here. But if the coin
lands Heads, you will be offered a real bet on Heads and
you will also hallucinate being offered a bet on Heads.
You won’t know whether the hallucination occurs at the
first stage or the second stage. You do know that one
of the bets will be real and one will be a hallucination.
Whether or not you accept the hallucinatory bet, you will
later wake up and find your wallet untouched. (Leitgeb
and Bradley, 2006, pp. 123-4)
In this example, the agent thinks she is offered four bets (out of
which only three are real). Let’s assume the stake is s. If the coin
comes up Tails the outcome of the first bet (a) is −s, as the coin has
actually landed Tails and not Heads. By the same reasoning, the
outcome of the second bet (b) is also −s. If, however, the coin lands
Heads, then the real bet (c) will have an outcome of s, whereas the
hallucinatory one (d) will have an outcome of 0 (nothing is gambled,
nothing is won). To get more precision in the calculation, Leitgeb
and Bradley invoke Elga’s principle:
How do we divide these probabilities up further between
(a) and (b) (and (c) and (d))? Using Elga’s (2004) Re-
stricted Principle of Indifference, accepted by all con-
cerned including Hitchcock (and implicitly used earlier),
each of these 4 possibilities gets a probability of 25% (p.
124)
This is not a totally innocous use of RPI. If instead of being 12 , the
probability of ‘Stage 1 and Heads’ plus the probability of ‘Stage 1
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and Tails’ is in fact 1, the expected utility of the bet becomes 0, and
Beauty would no longer be Dutch-bookable. A natural response to
this would be that any other probability assignment except for 1
would support Leitgeb and Bradley’s conclusion, and there seems
to be something irrational about such a probability assignment.
This may be so, but without RIP, Leitgeb and Bradley requires a
further premise to their argument which is not easy to motivate
(even if it feels very intuitive). Moreover, anticipating our argument
later in the next chapter, if one were to claim that in such cases as
those invoked by Leitgeb and Bradley, the events ‘Heads and Stage
1’ and ‘Heads and Stage 2’ (and likewise for the events ‘Tails and
Stage 1’ and ‘Tails and Stage 2’) are actually non-measurable, the
argument put forward by Leitgeb and Bradley would have to be
more substantially revised.
What this section purports to show is that Elga’s argument for RPI
plays an integral role in many arguments in the literature on self-
locating belief. If it is shown that the argument is fallacious this, in
effect, affects 1) Elga’s and Dorr’s arguments for the Thirder answer
to Sleeping Beauty, 2) Lewis’s Halfer answer to the same problem,
3) Ross’s argument that there are such things as rational dilemmas,
and finally 4) Leitgeb and Bradley’s argument that sometimes bet-
ting odds and credences come apart. Can these arguments be saved
even if RPI fails? Perhaps. But I shall not attempt to do so in this
thesis. My focus, instead, will be on the validity of Elga’s and Titel-
baum’s arguments to which I dedicate the following two chapters.
7.2 dr . evil and rpi
Elga’s defense of RPI proceeds from the story of Dr. Evil. Weath-
erson summarizes Elga’s argumentative strategy as follows: “Elga
argues for [RPI] by arguing it holds in a special case, and then ar-
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guing that the special case is effectively arbitrary, so if it holds there
it holds everywhere." (Weatherson, 2005, p. 627). In this section
I present Elga’s argument as it unfolds in his paper; later in this
chapter I offer a more structured reconstruction of Elga’s argument.
dr . evil Safe in an impregnable battlestation on the
moon, Dr. Evil had planned to launch a bomb that would
destroy the Earth. In response, the Philosophy Defense
Force (PDF) sent Dr. Evil the following message: ‘Dear
Sir, (. . . ) We have just created a duplicate of Dr. Evil.
The duplicate - call him "Dup" - is inhabiting a replica
of Dr. Evil’s battlestation that we have installed in our
skepticism lab. At each moment Dup has experiences
indistinguishable from those of Dr. Evil. For example,
at this moment both Dr. Evil and Dup are reading this
message. We are in control of Dup’s environment. If
in the next ten minutes Dup performs actions that corre-
spond to deactivating the battlestation and surrendering,
we will treat him well. Otherwise we will torture him.
Best regards, The PDF’ (Elga, 2004, p. 383)
Elga argues that upon receiving this message, Dr. Evil should
assign equal credence to being himself and to being Dup. In
this section I rationally reconstruct Elga’s argument, while in the
remaining sections in this chapter I show that it relies on the kind
of mistaken reasoning that recommends the ‘staying’ strategy in the
Monty Hall problem.
Consider the following variation of Dr. Evil:
comatose dr . evil Just like Dr. Evil, only that the
scientists tell Dr. Evil they will flip a coin with bias .9
towards Tails and that the laws of nature do not allow
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for two subjectively indistinguishable consciousnesses to
exist at the same time. If the coin lands Heads, only Evil
wakes up. If the coin lands Tails, only Dup wakes up.1
If the coin lands Heads, Dr. Evil is reading the message from PDF.
If the coin lands Tails, Dr. Evil is in a coma on the Moon and Dup
is reading the message back in the skepticism lab. In Comatose Dr.
Evil, Elga argues Dr. Evil ought to align his credence that he is
Dr. Evil to the bias of the coin. In other words, upon reading the
message, Dr. Evil’s degree of belief in being Dr. Evil ought to be .1.2
Consider now another variation of Dr. Evil:
coin toss dr . evil Just like Dr. Evil, only that the
scientists tell Dr. Evil that while they were duplicating
him they flipped a coin with bias .9 towards Tails. But
they assure him the coin toss had no impact on the du-
plication process.
1 This is a variation of Coma in Elga (2004, pp. 390-1). Elga in fact moves away
from Dr. Evil and develops his entire argument for RPI based on a completely
analogous set of scenarios involving Al and his Duplicate. Nevertheless, there is
no need to do that, and I will present his reasoning as it applies to Dr. Evil.
2 Those familiar with Elga (2000)’s discussion of the Sleeping Beauty problem may
find surprising what he says about Dr. Evil’s degrees of belief in Comatose Dr.
Evil. Such a view goes against the Thirder answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem.
Titelbaum (2013) has already noticed this tension:
it was Elga himself who originally argued for the 1/3 answer to
the Sleeping Beauty Problem, an answer that is incompatible with
the Relevance-Limiting Thesis’s position on the irrelevance of cen-
tered evidence to uncentered propositions. A thirder about Sleeping
Beauty can’t just assume that [Dr. Evil] should assign a degree of
belief of 0.10 to heads when he awakens in [Comatose Dr. Evil]!
(Titelbaum, 2013, 353)
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In Coin Toss Dr. Evil, upon receiving the message from PDF, Dr.
Evil should assign probability .1 to the coin having landed Heads
(H, and T for Tails). Secondly, since the coin toss is independent
from the duplication process, he should assign the same probability
conditional on him being Dr. Evil (E, and D for Dup). That is:
P(H) = .1 (1)
P(H|E) = .1 (2)
Suppose in Coin Toss Dr. Evil, PDF were to send Dr. Evil a second
message saying that if the coin landed Heads then Dup fell in a coma
and Dr. Evil is now reading the message and if the coin landed Tails,
Dup is reading the message and Dr. Evil is in a coma on the Moon,
that is (H&E) ∨ (T&D). Elga argues that in such case, Dr. Evil’s
credal state in Coin Toss Dr. Evil upon reading the second message
should align with his credal state in Comatose Dr. Evil upon reading
the message of that scenario.3 In other words,
P(H|(H&E) ∨ (T&D)) = .1 (3)
(1)-(3) are enough to derive Dr. Evil’s degree of belief in being Dr.
Evil in Coin Toss Dr. Evil after being told about the coin toss but
before being announced that (H&E) ∨ (T&D):
From (2) and (3) : P(H|(H&E) ∨ (T&D)) = P(H|E)
By def. of cond. prob. :
P(H&E)
P(H&E) + P(T&D)
=
P(H&E)
P(H&E) + P(T&E)
By simplification : P(T&D) = P(T&E)
By independence : P(T)P(D) = P(T)P(E)
By simplification : P(D) = P(E)
3 "So when [Evil] wakes up in the [Comatose Dr. Evil] case, he has just the evidence
about the coin toss as he would have if he had been awakened in [Coin Toss Dr.
Evil] and then been told [(H&E) ∨ (T&D)]." (Elga, 2004, p. 391)
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Therefore, Dr. Evil should assign equal credence to being Dr. Evil
and to being Dup in Coin Toss Dr. Evil, after being told about the
duplication, but before being told that (H&E) ∨ (T&D). Since
the coin toss in Coin Toss Dr. Evil has no causal impact on the
duplication process, Dr. Evil’s credal state after being told about
the duplication and the coin toss (but before receiving the second
message) is the same as his credal state in Dr. Evil upon simply
being told he had been duplicated. It is true that in Coin Toss
Dr. Evil the scientists tell Dr. Evil more than in Dr. Evil, but that
additional information has no bearing on whether he is Dup or Dr.
Evil. Therefore, in Dr. Evil he should divide his credence equally
between being Dr. Evil and being Dup upon receiving the message
about duplication from the scientists.
Finally, Dr. Evil is taken by Elga to be a prototypical example of
a rational agent contemplating worlds that agree on all uncentred
propositions and are centred on agents whose experiences are
indistinguishable. Consequently the move from ‘a rational agent’
to Dr. Evil is done without loss of generality. That means that
whatever rational requirements bind Dr. Evil’s credal state, they
ought to bind, on pain of irrationality, any agent. In particular, if Dr.
Evil is rationally required to assign equal credence to the centred
worlds he is contemplating, so should any agent. Since the above
argument establishes, according to Elga, that Dr. Evil should indeed
be indifferent between the world centred on Dr. Evil and the one
centred on Dup, so should any other rational agent, and RPI follows.
In the remainder of this chapter I show that the problem with Elga’s
argument for RIP lies in the formal modelling of Dr. Evil and its
accompanying variations. In particular, Elga’s reasoning makes an
implicit assumption about the probability with which information is
passed on to Dr. Evil and I prove that if that information is explicitly
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introduced in the formal model, Elga’s conclusion no longer follows.
This is in effect the lesson we learnt via Shafer (1985); Bovens and
Ferreira (2010); Halpern (2004) from Monty Hall. The following sec-
tion explains why this is so.
7.3 the monty hall problem
At the same time PDF is trying to thwart Dr. Evil’s plans, on some
TV set Monty Hall attempts to trick a contestant into making the
losing choice in a game show:
monty hall Monty presents a game contestant with
three doors. Behind two of these doors there is a goat.
One of the doors, however, hides a brand new car. The
contestant is asked to pick a door. Monty then opens one
of the other two doors such that he doesn’t give the prize
away. Afterwards he asks the contestant which door she
wants to open - the one she initially chose, or the other
remaining closed door.
Suppose the door behind which the car is hidden is chosen at ran-
dom. Suppose further that the contestant first picks Door 1. Monty
hopes the contestant will reason in the following way:
‘initially, there was a 13 chance the car was behind Door
1. Now that Monty opened one door hiding a goat, there
are only two possible locations the car could be in, i.e.
behind Door 1 or behind the door Monty left unopened.
Therefore the probability the car is behind the Door 1 se-
lected increased to 12 and the probability the car is behind
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the other unopened door is also 12 . So there is no reason
for me to switch.’4
As it is well known, however, this reasoning is incorrect. Bovens
and Ferreira (2010, pp. 474-6), following Sneed (1985)’s discussion
of Shafer (1985), explain the mistake in terms of the fact that when
we are informed of some proposition "we do not only learn the
proposition in question, but also that we have learned the propo-
sition as one of the many propositions that we might have learned."
(Bovens and Ferreira, 2010, p. 474) The difference between updating
on some proposition rather than updating on learning that propo-
sition is nicely highlighted by Halpern, following an example first
introduced by (Howson, 1995, p. 9). I discuss this example in detail
in a later chapter.
If I think my wife is much more clever than I, then I
might be convinced that I will never learn of her infi-
delity should she be unfaithful. So, my conditional prob-
ability for Y, ’I will learn that my wife is cheating on me’,
given X, ’She will cheat on me’, is very low. Yet, the prob-
ability of Y if I actually learn X is clearly 1. (Halpern,
2004, pp. 128-9)
Applying this insight to Monty Hall Bovens and Ferreira explain the
contestant’s mistaken reasoning by the fact that she updated only
on the content of the information Monty gave her when he opened
Door 2 and revealed a goat. If she instead were to consider how
the information Monty can pass on to her is constrained she would
notice that the probability Monty would open a particular door is
not the same irrespective of the state of world.
4 This last step is usually assumed in the discussions of this puzzle, but notice it
relies on a type of conservativism: a rational agent should not revise her strategy,
unless she has a positive reason to do so.
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This is easy to see: assume the car is behind Door 3, then the goats
are behind Doors 1 and 2. Monty cannot open the former, as this is
the one the contestant chose at the beginning of the round. There-
fore Monty is forced to open Door 2. An analogous reasoning ap-
plies if the car is behind Door 2. But if the car is behind Door 1,
then Monty can open either Door 2 or Door 3. So the probability
with which he would open Door 2, say, in this case can be lower
than 1. This asymmetry in how Monty can communicate with the
contestant is made clear by considering the protocol under which
information can accrue to the contestant. A conditional probability
table, such as Table 8 can be used to specify a protocol.
Car 1 Car 2 Car 3
"Goat 2" 12 0 1
"Goat 3" 12 1 0
Table 8: Protocol 1 for Monty Hall
In this table, each row corresponds to possible item of information
the contestant could receive. Each cell corresponds to the probability
the contestant will learn that item of information at each possible
world. This table can be used to construct a sophisticated event
space in which we take into consideration every piece of information
the agent could receive. Such a space would contain four atomic
events with non-zero probability: (Car 1, “Goat 2”), (Car 1, “Goat
3”), (Car 2, “Goat 3”), (Car 3, “Goat 2”). We can now calculate
how the contestant should change her degrees of belief upon Monty
opening Door 2, say, and revealing a goat.
P(Car 1|“Goat 2”)
=
P(“Goat 2”|Car 1)P(Car 1)
P(“Goat 2”|Car 1)P(Car 1) + P(“Goat 2”|Car 2)P(Car 2) + P(“Goat 2”|Car 3)P(Car 3)
=
1
2 × 13
( 12 × 13 ) + (0× 13 ) + (1× 13 )
=
1
3
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Therefore, taking into account the asymmetry of the way in which
information may accrue to her, the contestant learns something new
about where the car may be. Is this the only protocol that would
make sense in Monty Hall? Although the puzzle is quite detailed
with respect to how information is being delivered to the contestant,
the scenario does not say Monty flips a fair coin in order to choose
which door to open when the car is behind Door 1. Another protocol
compatible with the story would be:
Car 1 Car 2 Car 3
"Goat 2" 34 0 1
"Goat 3" 14 1 0
Table 9: Protocol 2 for Monty Hall
This represents a situation in which Monty would have a preference
for opening Door 2 when the car is behind Door 1 and the contes-
tant chooses Door 1 at the beginning of the game. In this case, upon
learning that Door 2 hides a goat, the contestant’s credence in the
car being behind Door 1 should go from 13 to
3
7 .
So what is the correct answer then: 13 or
3
7? The analysis of Monty
Hall in terms of protocols shows that the answer to this question
is sensitive to what the structure of the interaction between Monty
and the contestant is. The puzzle is silent on some of the details
and hence we cannot talk of a ‘right’ answer to this question.
Are we rationally required, though, to take protocols into account?
Bovens and Ferreira (2010, p. 480) and Shafer (1985, p. 264) claim
it is implicit in the Principle of Total Evidence that an agent’s prob-
ability model should give probabilities for all the different ways her
learning may turn out. The motivation for this goes back to the ob-
servation that when you receive some information Y, you don’t only
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learn the propositional content of Y, but also that you have received
Y instead of Y’. So, insofar as Y represents your evidence, so does
the fact that you learned Y instead of Y’. Therefore if you take the
Principle of Total Evidence as a requirement for forming rational
beliefs, then protocols should be taken into account.
7.4 the protocol of coin toss dr . evil
So what would a protocol for Coin Toss Dr. Evil look like? There are
four possible states of the world: either the person reading the mes-
sage from PDF is Dr. Evil or he is Dup; and either the coin landed
Heads or it landed Tails. Then Elga tells Dr. Evil the PDF could send
a second message saying "(H&E) ∨ (T&D)". We don’t know any-
thing else about what other information the scientists could include
in that second message. Consider the following protocol, where a
and b are arbitrary parameters:
H&E T&E H&D T&D
"(H&E) ∨ (T&D)" a 0 0 d
...
...
...
...
...
Table 10: Protocol 1 for Coin Toss Dr. Evil
Given this protocol, the probability of the coin having landed Heads
given the scientists’ message is:
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P(H|”(H&E) ∨ (T&D)”) =
=
P(”(H&E) ∨ (T&D)”|H)P(H)
P(”(H&E) ∨ (T&D)”|(H&E))P(H&E) + P(”(H&E) ∨ (T&D)”|(T&E))P(T&E)+
(”(H&E) ∨ (T&D)”|(H&D))P(H&D) + P(”(H&E) ∨ (T&D)”|(T&D))P(T&D)
=
P(”(H&E) ∨ (T&D)”|(H&E) ∨ (H&D))P((H&E) ∨ (H&D))
aP(H&E) + bP(T&D)
=
P(”(H&E)∨(T&D)”&((H&E)∨(H&D)))P((H&E)∨(H&D))
P((H&E)∨(H&D))
aP(H&E) + bP(T&D)
=
P((”(H&E) ∨ (T&D)”&(H&E)) ∨ (”(H&E) ∨ (T&D)”&(H&D)))
aP(H&E) + bP(T&D)
=
P((”(H&E) ∨ (T&D)”&(H&E))) + P((”(H&E) ∨ (T&D)”&(H&D)))
aP(H&E) + bP(T&D)
=
P((”(H&E) ∨ (T&D)”&(H&E))
aP(H&E) + bP(T&D)
=
P(”(H&E) ∨ (T&D)”|(H&E))P(H&E)
aP(H&E) + bP(T&D)
=
aP(H)P(E)
aP(H)P(E) + bP(T)P(D)
=
aP(E)
aP(E) + 9bP(D)
Elga claims that P(H|”(H&E) ∨ (T&D)”) should be equal to the
probability of Heads, that is .1. Solving the equation
aP(E)
aP(E) + 9bP(D)
= .1,
we obtain that
aP(E) = bP(D).
Therefore (assuming there are no extreme values) the probability of
being Dr. Evil is equal to the probability of being Dup if and only if
a=b. In other words, the agent should consider it equally likely to
be told ”(H&E) ∨ (T&D)” in a Heads world in which he is Dr. Evil
as in a Tails world in which he is Dup. This is by no means certain.
One could easily assume something like the protocol in Table 11
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H&E T&E H&D T&D
"(H&E) ∨ (T&D)" 12 0 0 1
"(H&D) ∨ (T&E)" 0 12 12 0
"(H&E) ∨ (T&E) ∨ (H&D)" 12 12 12 0
Table 11: Protocol 2 for Coin Toss Dr. Evil
underwrites the exchange in Coin Toss Dr. Evil.
In this case, PDF can send three messages to Dr. Evil and they have
different likelihoods based on the possible world that obtains. The
relevant asymmetry is that the scientists will definitely announce
”(H&E) ∨ (T&D)” whenever (T&D) obtains but will only announce
it with probability 12 when (H&E) obtains. In this case, even if one
were to accept Elga’s claim that P(H|”(H&E) ∨ (T&D)”) = .1, then
P(E) = 2P(D), which means that the agent would consider it twice
more likely to be Dr. Evil than Dup.
Nevertheless, the assumption that a = b is not incompatible with
Elga’s Coin Toss Dr. Evil (the scenario underdetermines the differ-
ent messages PDF could send to Dr. Evil). So prima facie it may
seem that Elga’s argument simply requires an additional innocuous
assumption about the protocol underlying Coin Toss Dr. Evil for the
conclusion that p(E) = p(D) to go through.
7.5 elga’s argument, carefully
The fact that the conditional probability of the scientists’ announce-
ment in (H&E) has to be equal to the conditional probability in
(T&D) spells trouble for Elga’s argument for RPI. Recall, Elga’s ar-
gumentative strategy:
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claim a Dr. Evil’s credal state after receiving the message from
PDF in Comatose Dr. Evil is identical to his credal state in Coin Toss Dr.
Evil after being told he has been duplicated and learning “(H&E) ∨
(T&D)”.
claim b Therefore Dr. Evil should assign equal credences to be-
ing Dr. Evil and being Dup upon being told he has been duplicated
in Coin Toss Dr. Evil (and before receiving the second message).5
claim c But upon learning he has been duplicated in Coin Toss
Dr. Evil (and before the receiving the second message), his credal
state is identical to his credal state in Dr. Evil (modulo the irrele-
vant difference that he now knows a coin toss independent of his
duplication has been flipped).
claim d Therefore, in Dr. Evil, he should assign equal credences
to being Dr. Evil and being Dup.
claim e Given Dr. Evil is a prototypical scenario for the re-
stricted principle of indifference for self-locating beliefs, RPI holds.
Consider Claim A. The argument in the previous section establishes
that Claim A only holds if a particular restriction is placed on the
protocol under which information is passed to Dr.Evil/Dup by the
scientists. Not all possible learning scenarios will support Claim
A. So if Claim A were to hold, then the scientists should follow a
protocol compatible with a = d, and both Dr. Evil and Dup should
be aware of this protocol.
One could reply to this that there is nothing preventing us from
tweaking Coin Toss Dr. Evil in order to account for this proto-
col. Assume we come up with a story that makes the receipt
5 This follows from (1)-(3), above.
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of the second message from PDF equally likely in (H&E) as
in (T&D). Let’s call this new scenario Coin Toss Dr Evil+. Claim
A only holds if we replace Coin Toss Dr. Evil with Coin Toss Dr. Evil+.
Now, consider Claim C. If Claim C were to hold, then the same
knowledge of the protocol which is now embedded into Coin Toss
Dr. Evil+ should obtain in Dr. Evil. Dr. Evil should be aware that
the scientists could flip a fair coin independently of the duplication
process, and if they do flip it, they could announce that the coin
came up heads to Dr. Evil or that the coin came up tails to Dup.
Finally, Dr. Evil should also be aware that it is as likely for them to
announce this if he indeed is Dr. Evil and the coin came up heads
as it is if he is in fact Dup and the coin came up tails. So, for Claim
C to hold Dr. Evil has to be replaced with Dr. Evil+.
However, Dr. Evil’s credal state in Dr. Evil+ contains this protocol
and hence his credal state is no longer a prototypical credal state of
an agent faced with worlds that agree on all uncentred propositions
and are centred on agents whose experiences are indistinguishable.
Hence, Dr. Evil can no longer serve as the instantiation of an
arbitrary rational agent as the move from a general instance of RPI
to Dr. Evil+ cannot be done without loss of generality. To wit, Dr.
Evil assigns a credence of 12 to being Dr. Evil not in a prototypical
case of RPI, but in a case in which information accrues to him
according to a particular protocol. In consequence, the step back
from Dr. Evil to establishing RPI is no longer warranted.
To sum up, either Elga’s argument fails at the very outset when
credences from Comatose Dr. Evil are imported to Coin Toss Dr. Evil,
or at the last step when Dr. Evil’s credences cannot be attributed
to an arbitrary rational agent dealing with worlds agreeing on all
uncentred propositions and centred on agents whose experiences
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are indistinguishable.
Before concluding, here is another way of making the same argu-
ment as in the above pages. Suppose Elga’s argument is correct and
hence:
In [Coin Toss Dr. Evil], the coin toss is irrelevant to
whether and how the duplication occurs. So [Evil]’s state
of opinion (when he awakens) as to whether he is [Evil]
or the duplicate ought to be the same in [Coin Toss Dr.
Evil] as it is in [Dr. Evil] (Elga, 2004, p. 388)
Consider now a variation of Coin Toss Dr. Evil in which it is made
clear that Protocol 2 underwrites the informational exchange be-
tween PDF and Evil and Evil knows this. In such a scenario the
toss of the coin would also be "irrelevant to whether and how the
duplication occurs". Therefore, by Elga’s reasoning, Evil’s credence
function in Dr. Evil ought to match his credence function in this
modified scenario, too. But as we saw above, with Protocol 2 in
place, P(E) = 2P(D). Consequently in Dr. Evil, Evil ought to be-
lieve both that the probability of being himself is equal to that of
being Dup and equal to 1/2, and that it is twice the probability of
being Dup. This would make Evil probabilistically incoherent.
7.6 conclusion
In this chapter I show that Elga’s argument for RPI fails. This
failure is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, the restricted principle
of indifference is part of both the halfer and thirder answers to
the Sleeping Beauty problem as well as part and parcel of several
arguments in the literature on self-location. This is so despite the
fact that Weatherson (2005) already provides a criticism to Elga.
His main argument, though, attacks the way Dr. Evil’s degree of
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belief in Heads in Comatose Dr. Evil is determined. This amounts
to challenging the soundness of Elga’s argument – is the first
premise that Dr. Evil should assign the same probability to Heads
before and after awakening in Comatose Dr. Evil true? This is a
substantial question and one that is reminiscent of Sleeping Beauty.
As Titelbaum already noticed (see fn. 3), answering this question in
the positive assumes a halfer strategy. Weatherson disagrees with
this, but “think[s] the rest of Elga’s argument is right” (Weatherson,
2005, p. 628). In this paper I show that irrespective of how this
question is answered, Elga’s argument is not valid and thus fails no
matter what one’s intuitions about the halfer/thirder debate may
be. So in this respect this paper shows that there is a need for a new
grounding of a principle of indifference for self-locating beliefs if
we are to have one at all. The next chapter will look at Titelbaum’s
attempt to save Elga’s argument and can be construed as an attempt
to offer a solid grounding to RPI (although Titelbaum stops short of
claiming this).
Secondly, the mistake in Elga’s argument is in itself interesting, as
it illustrates the need for specifying a precise sample space when
applying conditionalization. In this respect, this chapter shows that
Monty Hall still has important lessons to teach us. The following
chapters in this part of the thesis will make this point over and over
again.

8
T E C H N I C O L O R E V I L A N D T H E M O N T Y H A L L
P R O B L E M R E D U X
In the previous chapter we saw that if the informational context
in which the scientists make the announcements to Dr. Evil is
explicitly modelled, Elga’s argument for the Restricted Principle
of Indifference (RPI) fails. In a recent book, Michael Titelbaum
(2013, Section 11.1.2) expresses misgivings with Elga’s argument
and offers a new justification for Evil’s indifference with respect his
identity in Dr. Evil. In this section I will show the same reason why
Elga’s argument is not valid applies against Titelbaum’s argument
too.
Titelbaum runs his argument for indifference in Dr. Evil in a quasi-
bayesian framework which he calls the Certainty-Loss Framework
(CLF). In this chapter I first show how Titelbaum’s conclusions can
be obtained in an orthodox Bayesian framework if we explicitly
take into account the informational context. Secondly, I argue that
his argument in favour of RPI fails as well and I explain why I
believe CLF doesn’t have the resources to overcome the criticism
articulated in this chapter.
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8.1 from dr . evil to technicolor evil and back
Titelbaum introduces the following variation to the story of Dr. Evil:
technicolor evil The same as Dr. Evil, except Dr.
Evil has a spy in the PDF. After the duplication, the spy
flips a fair coin (without revealing the result to Evil). If
the coin comes up heads, he will show Evil a piece of red
paper and show Dup a piece of blue paper. If the coin
comes up tails the colours are reversed. Both Dr. Evil
and Dup know this.1(Titelbaum, 2013, p. 255)
Let t0 be the time before the duplication, t1 the time after Dr. Evil
was duplicated but before seeing any piece of paper, and t2 the time
after Evil sees the coloured paper. Titelbaum claims the following
hold of Technicolor Evil: Dr. Evil’s t2 credence he is Evil should be
1/2; his t1 credence he is Evil conditional on seeing the red paper is
also 1/2; and his unconditional t1 credence he is Evil is once again
1/2. Finally, his unconditional t1 credence he is Evil in Technicolor
Evil should be the same as his unconditional credence that he is Evil
in Dr. Evil after he learns of the duplication (Titelbaum, 2013, see p.
255). If Elga is right that Dr. Evil is a general case of self-location
ignorance, RPI holds.2
Titelbaum argues in favour of the above claims using CLF. Below I
show how they can be derived from an orthodox Bayesian model
1 Titelbaum, too, follows Elga and discusses the puzzle of Dr. Evil in terms of
Al and his Duplicate. I follow the strategy of the previous chapter and I adapt
Titelbaum’s argument to the problem of Evil. Nothing is lost in this translation.
2 Note, however, that Titelbaum isn’t convinced Dr. Evil is general enough to play
this role. One of his criticism to Elga is that this scenario represents a prototypical
case of a transitional story only - from self-location certainty to ignorance. A story
in which certainty about one’s location was never had would presumably also fall
under the remit of RPI, but could not be argued for through the story of Dr. Evil.
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which takes into account the protocol the scientists and the spy fol-
low.3 Let’s first rationally reconstruct Titelbaum’s argument. For
this purpose assume the following notation: E stands for the propo-
sition "I am Dr. Evil" (and D for "I am Dup"), Red for "I see a piece
of red paper" (and Blue for "I see a piece of blue paper"), H for "the
coin came up heads" (and T for tails) and let q capture Dr. Evil’s
credence function in Technicolor Evil (and let p continue to be his
credence function in Dr. Evil).
claim 1 q1(E|Red) = q1(H|Red)
claim 2 q1(E|Red) = q1(E)
claim 3 q2(H) = 12
claim 4 q1(E) = 12
claim 5 p1(E) = q1(E)
Let’s now carefully model Technicolor Evil in a Bayesian framework
that explicitly models the information that can be passed on to the
agent. First, just like in the case of Dr. Evil, there are 4 ways the
world could be like: either the coin lands head or it lands tails and
either the agent performing the reasoning after the duplication is Dr.
Evil or he is Dup. In addition to this, the agent believes he could
receive two announcements from his spy in PDF, either Red (in head
worlds if he is Evil and tail worlds if he is Dup) or Blue (in tail
worlds if he is Evil and head worlds if he is Dup). This generates
the following protocol (which in turn determines a sophisticated
probability space, as briefly discussed in the previous chapter):
Technicolor Evil is similar to Coin Toss Dr. Evil but differs from
the latter in two significant ways. Firstly, it makes explicit what
3 This raises some doubts regarding the need for the complicated and non-standard
apparatus of CLF. Although I won’t engage in a full proof of the expressive
poverty of CLF, I will formulate some additional reasons why we should be wary
of using this framework for de se conditionalisation.
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H&E T&E H&D T&D
Red 1 0 0 1
Blue 0 1 1 0
Table 12: Protocol 1 for Technicolor Evil
information Evil could receive after the duplication, i.e. Red or
Blue and with which probabilities. As such, Titelbaum’s puzzle
is a combined version of Coin Toss Dr. Evil and Comatose Dr. Evil.
Secondly, as opposed to the set-up envisaged by Elga, this puzzle
uses a fair (as opposed to a biased) coin.
Given Protocol 1 for Technicolor Evil, we can assess Titelbaum’s ar-
gument. I will look at the first four claims in the remainder of this
section and dedicate the next to evaluating his fifth claim.
claim 1 Given Protocol 1 above, the first claim can be easily
shown to hold in the case of Technicolor Evil:
q1(H|Red) = q1(Red|H)q1(H)q1(Red)
=
q1(Red∩H)
q1(H)
× q1(E)
q1(Red|H&E)q1(H&E) + q1(Red|T&D)q1(T&D)
=
q1(Red ∩ {H&E, H&D})
q1(Red|H&E)q1(H&E) + q1(Red|T&D)q1(T&D)
=
q1(Red|H&E)q1(H&E) + q1(Red|H&D)q1(H&D)
q1(H&E) + q1(T&D)
=
q1(H&E)
q1(H&E) + q1(T&D)
And
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q1(E|Red) = q1(Red|E)q1(E)q1(Red)
=
q1(Red∩E)
q1(E)
× q1(E)
q1(Red|H&E)q1(H&E) + q1(Red|T&D)q1(T&D)
=
q1(Red ∩ {H&E, T&E})
q1(Red|H&E)q1(H&E) + q1(Red|T&D)q1(T&D)
=
q1(Red|H&E)q1(H&E) + q1(Red|T&E)q1(T&E)
q1(H&E) + q1(T&D)
=
q1(H&E)
q1(H&E) + q1(T&D)
This establishes that Evil’s t2 credence he is Evil should match his
credence that the coin came up heads in the case in which between
t1 and t2 he sees the red piece of paper4. This holds for a coin
with an arbitrary bias, but relies on the probabilities in Protocol 1
being what they are. To see this, consider an alternative protocol
corresponding to a variation of Technicolor Beauty in which the spy
flips a fair coin to decide whether to show Dr. Evil the red or the
blue piece of paper.
H&E T&E H&D T&D
Red 1/2 1/2 0 1
Blue 1/2 1/2 1 0
Table 13: Protocol 2 for Technicolor Evil
Under Protocol 2,
q1(H|Red) =
1
2 × q1(H&E)
q1(H&E) + q1(T&D)
, but
q1(E|Red) =
1
2(q1(H&E) + q1(T&E))
q1(H&E) + q1(T&D)
4 I assume without loss of generality that Dr. Evil will see the red piece of paper.
122 technicolor evil and the monty hall problem redux
These can only be equal if Evil’s t1 credence that he is himself is 0.
This seems implausible. What this exercise shows is that Titelbaum’s
first claim relies on the actual details of the protocol underwriting
Technicolor Evil. If we were to make a change to it (like the one in
Protocol 2), the claim would no longer hold.
claim 2 Given Protocol 1, we can also determine the connection
between Evil’s unconditional t1 credence in E and his credence in E
conditional on seeing the red piece of paper.
q1(E|Red) = q1(H&E)q1(H&E) + q1(T&D)
=
q1(H)q1(E)
q1(H)q1(E) + (1− q1(H))(1− q1(E))
If (and only if) q1(H) = 12 , then:
q1(E|Red) =
1
2 × q1(E)
1
2 × q1(E) + 12 × (1− q1(E))
= q1(E)
In other words, given Protocol 1 his unconditional t1 credence in E
matches Evil’s conditional credence in E given Red if and only if the
bias of the coin is 1/2. So in the presence of Protocol 1, it is only a
fair coin that allows us to derive Claim 2.
claim 3 Claim 3 doesn’t have the same status as the first two
in the sense that it isn’t derivable from the scenario using the prob-
ability calculus, though it is compatible with it. As such it isn’t an
endogenous constraint on Evil’s credence function, but it could be
stipulated as an exogenous constraint on it. Making an exogenous
stipulation on an agent’s credence function is not forbidden by
Bayesianism as long it does not violate the laws of probabilistic
coherence - and the suggested stipulation in Claim 3 doesn’t do
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that. Moreover exogenous constraints are acceptable to some extent
by all Bayesians as even the strictest form of Bayesianism requires
agents to fix their priors and the event space on which to define
them in an exogenous way. What is less trivial about the current
stipulation is that it makes demands of how an agent ought to shift
her credences given that she learns new information. And some
Bayesians would like these shifts to be done fully endogenously.
For our present purposes we will simply adhere to the position of
the moderate Bayesians and allow any exogenous shifts that do not
violate probabilistic coherence.5
One reason why we might endorse this particular exogenous con-
straint on Evil’s credence function is the Relevance-Limiting Thesis:
"it is never rational for an agent who learns only self-locating infor-
mation to respond by altering a non-self-locating degree of belief."
(Titelbaum, 2013, p. 232) This is a principle that halfers usually es-
pouse in reasoning about the Sleeping Beauty Problem and Elga
relies on when discussing Evil’s rational credences in Comatose Dr.
Evil, above. Nevertheless, irrespective of the reason for supporting
Claim 3, supposing that Evil’s t2 credence in H should match his t1
credence in the same proposition is not creating any problem for the
agent’s probabilistic coherence.
claim 4 Given Claims 1,2 and 3, Claim 4 follows.
To wit, Titelbaum’s arguments for Claims 1 to 4 can be reconstructed
in a standard Bayesian model. We showed how this is done and on
what aspects of the story of Technicolor Evil, each argument relies.
Three key aspects were identified: the relevance-limiting thesis, or
something providing a similar exogenous constraint on Evil’s cre-
5 For further discussion of exogenous and endogenous requirements on rationality
according to Bayesianism see Urbach and Howson (1993, p. 285), Miller (2016, p.
773) and Schoenfield (forthcoming)
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dence function6 (without which Claim 3 wouldn’t be justified), the
bias of the coin (without which Claim 2 wouldn’t hold), and finally
the protocol (without which Claim 1 wouldn’t hold). A change in
any of them and one part of the overall argument delivering that
q1(E) = 12 would fail. So far, so good. In the next section we evalu-
ate Titelbaum’s fifth claim which purports to deliver RPI7 based on
the story of Technicolor Evil.
8.2 titelbaum’s argument for claim 5 , carefully
Titelbaum argues for Claim 5 in the following way:
We now want to argue that [Evil’s] required t1 degree
of belief that he’s [Evil] in [Technicolor Evil] equals his
required degree of belief that he’s [Evil] in the original
[Dr. Evil] story. This seems justified on the grounds that
[Evil’s] relevant evidence is identical in the two circum-
stances (. . . ) at t1 [Evil] hasn’t seen any colored papers
yet. The only information he has at t1 in [Technicolor
Dr. Evil] that he doesn’t have after the duplication in
[Dr. Evil] is that his [spy] has been doing some stuff with
papers and coins in another room, and that a colored
paper will shortly be revealed to him. Surely this informa-
tion doesn’t provide [Evil] with any evidence in either direction
about his identity. So he is left to set his degree of belief
that he’s [Evil] based on whatever considerations were
6 I will not mention this assumption in the next section. The reason for this will
become apparent when I discuss below the merits of CLF, below.
7 Recall that Titelbaum isn’t convinced it does indeed provide the general princi-
ple Elga wishes as the story of Dr. Evil only models a transitional story from
self-location certainty to ignorance. Nevertheless, if Titelbaum’s argument is cor-
rect Elga, or someone sympathetic to his position, could claim RPI to have been
vindicated.
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appropriate in the original case. (Titelbaum, 2013, p. 257,
my emphasis)
The discussion in the preceding section shows that in fact the ex-
tra information that is contained in Technicolor Beauty does provide
evidence with respect to Evil’s identity. Change the way informa-
tion accrues to Dr. Evil between t1 and t2 and he will no longer be
indifferent between being himself or being Dup. Change the bias
of the coin his spy is flipping and the same thing would happen.
In other words, Evil’s t1 credence in being himself is 1/2 only in a
model in which he knows "his spy has been doing some stuff with
papers and" a fair "coin in another room, and that a colored paper
will shortly be revealed to him" following a particular protocol. Evil’s
credal state after learning of his duplication in Dr. Evil contains
none of this information and it cannot be identical to Evil’s credal
state in Technicolor Beauty. Suppose, nevertheless, that it is. Then we
can concoct the following puzzle:
contradiction dr . evil The same as Technicolor
Evil except that 1) the spy flips a coin with bias 2/5 to-
wards heads; and 2) if the coin comes up heads, he will
show Evil either a red piece of paper or a green piece of
paper (he will decide which by flipping a second, and in-
dependent, fair coin), and he will show Dup a blue piece
of paper. If however, the coin comes of tails, he will show
Evil a blue piece of paper and Dup either a red or a green
piece of paper (he will decide which by flipping a third
and independent coin with bias 1/3 towards red). Both
Evil and Dup are aware of this.
The following protocol underwrites this new puzzle.
In this new scenario Evil’s posterior credence in being himself upon
seeing a red piece of paper matches his posterior credence in the
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H&E T&E H&D T&D
Red 1/2 0 0 1/3
Blue 0 1 1 0
Green 1/2 0 0 2/3
Table 14: Protocol for Contradiction Dr. Evil
coin having landed heads. Let r(·) denote Evil’s credence function
in Contradiction Dr. Evil.
r1(H|Red) = r1(Red|H)r1(H)r1(Red)
=
r1(Red∩H)
r1(H)
× r1(E)
r1(Red|H&E)r1(H&E) + r1(Red|T&D)r1(T&D)
=
r1(Red ∩ {H&E, H&D})
r1(Red|H&E)r1(H&E) + r1(Red|T&D)r1(T&D)
=
r1(Red|H&E)r1(H&E) + r1(Red|H&D)r1(H&D)
r1(Red|H&E)r1(H&E) + r1(Red|T&D)r1(T&D)
=
1
2 × r1(H&E)
1
2 × r1(H&E) + 13 × r1(T&D)
And
r1(E|Red) = r1(Red|E)r1(E)r1(Red)
=
r1(Red∩E)
r1(E)
× r1(E)
r1(Red|H&E)r1(H&E) + r1(Red|T&D)r1(T&D)
=
r1(Red ∩ {H&E, T&E})
r1(Red|H&E)r1(H&E) + r1(Red|T&D)r1(T&D)
=
r1(Red|H&E)r1(H&E) + r1(Red|T&E)r1(T&E)
r1(H&E) + r1(T&D)
=
1
2 × r1(H&E)
1
2 × r1(H&E) + 13 × r1(T&D)
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Moreover, his t1 credence in being himself conditional on seeing the
red piece of paper is equal to his unconditional t1 credence that he
is himself.
r1(E|Red) =
1
2 × r1(H&E)
1
2 × r1(H&E) + 13 × r1(T&D)
=
1
2 × 25 × r1(E)
1
2 × 25 × r1(E) + 13 × 35 × r1(D)
=
r1(E)
r1(E) + 1− r1(E)
= r1(E)
Furthermore we can again impose exogenously that r2(H) = r1(H)
as this doesn’t create any internal tensions for the agent, and it
could also be justified via an independent somewhat substantial
constraint on rationality, like the relevance-limiting thesis. Con-
sequently, r1(E) = 25 . Therefore, Evil’s unconditional t1 credence
in being himself in Contradiction Evil is 2/5. But if Titelbaum’s
argument for Claim 5 is correct an analogous reasoning would
require Evil’s credence in being himself upon learning of the
duplication in Dr. Evil to be 2/5. Thus, by Titelbaum’s lights, Evil
should believe he is himself in Dr. Evil with probability 1/2 and
2/5. This proves Claim 5 doesn’t hold.
Nevertheless, one could argue that this contradiction obtains pre-
cisely because of the poverty of the the standard Bayesian frame-
work for dealing with self-location. Titelbaum’s analysis is carried
out in CLF and perhaps this framework has the internal resources
for overcoming the criticism presented here. In the following sec-
tion I outline the basics of CLF. After that I show that Titelbaum’s
analysis of Technicolor Evil in CLF is open to the same criticism.
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8.3 titelbaum’s certainty-loss framework
In this section I will attempt to give the reader a crash course in the
intricacies of CLF. In doing so I am not endorsing this framework
as offering the correct account of de se conditionalisation, which is
what Titelbaum claims of it. As I remark extensively below, I think
CLF fails this task. Rather, I quickly present it and apply it to two
puzzles simply as a reply to a critic who might believe the above
challenge to Titelbaum’s argument can be overcome when we move
to CLF. In writing the below sections, I tried to remain as faithful as
possible to Titelbaum’s presentation and analysis, and as such they
are addressed to someone (a critic) sympathetic to Titelbaum’s ap-
proach and who might believe CLF offers the correct answer to cases
of de se conditionalisation. Had I wanted to defend CLF for a non-
believer, I would have spent much more time investigating some of
the technical machinery that underpins CLF, which Titelbaum never
clearly explains.
8.3.1 The formal framework
The motivation for developing a new framework for accounting for
rational belief change stems from the following observation: on the
standard Bayesian picture, agents rationally change their beliefs
by becoming certain of more and more facts. If we were to read
this normatively, we would have to contend that it is irrational to
forget. The CLF is meant to offer the Bayesian answer to problems
involving memory loss and, what is more, to problems exhibiting
context-sensitivity.
The CLF comprises a model together with some systematic and
extrasystematic constraints and an interpretation. A model consists
of a set of time points (T) and a modelling language (L). Over this
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set of time points and the set of sentences, Titelbaum defines a
probability function capturing the agent’s credences at time i (Pi).
The extrasystematic constraints stipulate that the model assigns an
agent a credence of 1 in a claim iff the story implies that the agent is
certain of the truth of that claim or if the claim is a consequence of
some of the agent’s certainties. The extrasystematic constraints are
meant to be determined by each particular story, and the systematic
constraints are meant to be the same in all CLF models. The first
systematic constraint requires credences to be finitely additive. The
second is the ratio formula (if Pi(¬y) < 1, then Pi(x|y) = Pi(x&y)Pi(y) ).
The third and the fourth constraints do the most interesting work
in the CLF: Generalized Conditionalization (GC) and the Proper Ex-
pansion Principle (PEP). These are supposed to offer a direct re-
sponse to how learning context-sensitive facts can affect an agent’s
credences in context-insensitive ones. I shall discuss each in turn.
(gc) For any tj, tk ∈ T and any x ∈ L, if Pj(¬〈Ck −
Cj〉) < 1 and Pk(¬〈Cj − Ck〉) < 1, then Pj(x|〈Ck − Cj〉) =
Pk(x|〈Cj − Ck〉).
(GC) is a clever modification of the usual conditionalization formula.
First, Cj is the set of certainties an agent entertains at time point
tj. Second, 〈Ck − Cj〉 is the conjunction of all the certainties the
agent gains between tj and tk (j < k). If the agent’s certainties do
not change, then 〈Ck − Cj〉 = > (the set of tautologies). The final
equality is supposed to capture the intuition that "when you lose
information, your resulting doxastic state should be such that were
you to regain that information you would return to the doxastic
state in which you began" (Titelbaum, 2013, p. 127). For instance,
assume that from tj to tk the agent becomes certain that a and does
not lose any of the certainties he entertained at tj. Then for any
arbitrary sentence x, Pj(x|a) = Pk(x|>). If the agent does not learn
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any new information between tj and tk, but instead forgets b, then
for any arbitrary x, Pj(x|>) = Pk(x|b).
Despite its wide scope, (GC) does not generate any verdicts in
models in which context-sensitivity plays a crucial role (Titelbaum,
2013, Ch. 8.1.1). The reason is that if an agent’s belief in sentence
x goes from 1 to 0 (or vice versa) between tj and tk, then Cj ∪ Ck is
inconsistent and in consequence the antecedent of (GC) will be false
(Titelbaum, 2013, Appendix 6, Theorem C.9). Therefore, Titelbaum
suggests a way of obtaining a context-insensitive reduction of a
context-sensitive CLF model which can offer us information about
the initial context-sensitive model. A reduction of a model M, is a
model M− with the same time points modelled and with a reduced
language L− ⊆ L such that the analogue of any extrasystematic
constraint in M− is an extrasystematic constraint in M. If M is
context sensitive, then we cannot apply (GC), but (GC) can be used
on a context-insensitive reduction of M.
(PEP) tells us we can trust that any verdicts of the reduction of a
model M apply to the original model if and only if
(∀y ∈ L)(∀ti ∈ T)(∃x ∈ L−)(Pi(x ≡ y) = 1).
According to (PEP), the reduction can inform the initial model if
for every sentence in the original context-sensitive model and for
every time point, there exists a (context-insensitive) sentence in the
language of the reduction which is equivalent to it.
Lastly, Titelbaum is very precise in how CLF models should be in-
terpreted:
[i]f a model’s verdicts contradict each other, that model
indicates that the agent’s doxastic evolution violates the
requirements of ideal rationality. If contradictory ver-
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dicts cannot be derived, no violation is indicated. (Titel-
baum, 2013, p.s 56)
In other words, if no contradiction can be derived from a model
then the agent’s credences are ideally rational. And more impor-
tantly, judgments of ideal rationality always have to be made within
a particular CLF model.
Before moving to its application to Technicolor Beauty, I would like
to highlight a difference between the CLF and standard Bayesian-
ism. In the usual Bayesian set-up, conditionalization functions as
a guide to how beliefs are to be rationally changed in response to
new information. In consequence, after learning new facts, an agent
is prompted to conditionalize his old beliefs on the newly gathered
information and derive his new credal function. This new function
will assign certainty to some facts, while other facts will receive a
probability of 0, and still others will be assigned an intermediate
probability. However, this is not the case with (GC). (GC) can only
be applied if the agent already knows what he is certain of. In other
words, (GC) is no longer a guide to how to modify beliefs in re-
sponse to new information, but a way of aligning your non-extreme
beliefs given that you know how your certainty set has changed. But
the certainty set itself does not change through (generalized) conditional-
ization.
8.3.2 CLF and Technicolor Evil
In this section I apply CLF to Technicolor Evil and derive the verdict
that Evil’s t1 credence he is himself in that scenario ought to be 1/2.
Then I show how to apply CLF to a variation of Contradiction Dr.
Evil and prove that in this framework we can derive that Evil’s t1
credence in being himself in that scenario ought to be 1/3. So, if
Titelbaum’s Claim 5 holds, Evil credence he is himself in Dr. Evil
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ought to be both 1/2 and 1/3, which is contradictory. CLF offers no
antidote to the problem I present above.
Titelbaum models Technicolor Evil in two steps. First he builds
two models, call them Red A02 and Blue A02, for time points
T = {t0, t2}. The appropriate language for describing Evil’s credal
state at those points is L1 = {E, H, Red}. Table 15 shows the ex-
trasystematic constrains placed on Evil’s credence function in the
case in which Evil sees the red piece of paper (Red A02), whereas
Table 16 presents the case in which Evil sees the blue piece of pa-
per (Blue A02). p0 is Evil’s credence function at t0, whereas p2 his
credence function at t2.
p0 p2
E 1 <1
Red 1/2 1
H 1/2 <1
Red ≡ H 1 <1
E ≡ H <1 1
Table 15: Extrasystematic con-
straints for Red A02
p0 p2
E 1 <1
Blue 1/2 1
T 1/2 <1
Blue ≡ T 1 <1
E ≡ T <1 1
Table 16: Extrasystematic con-
straints for Blue A02
Focus on Table 15 which codes Evil’s loss of certainty between time
points t0 and t2. At t0 he is certain he is Evil, he knows that he will
see the red piece of paper only when the coin comes up heads, that
the probability of the coin coming up heads is 1/2, and that he will
see the red paper if and only if the coin comes up heads. At t2, Evil
loses the certainty regarding his identity. But he is now certain he
has seen a red piece of paper and that his identity is tied to the
outcome of the coin toss. Titelbaum then invites us to consider the
reductions of Red A02 and Blue A02, call them Red A02− and Blue
A02−, which eliminate all context-sensitive propositions from the
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language of Red/Blue A02 (i.e. propositions containing indexicals).
Red A02− and Blue A02− will model the same time points but will
only contain one proposition in the language, i.e. L2 = {H}. Tables
17, 18 presents their respective extrasystematic constraints.
p−0 p
−
2
H 1/2 <1
Table 17: Extrasystematic con-
straints for Red A02−
p−0 p
−
2
T 1/2 <1
Table 18: Extrasystematic con-
straints for Blue A02−
Since no certainty is gained or lost, Evil’s credence in H between t0
and t2 ought to remain the same in both models and hence, accord-
ing to (GC):
p−2 (H) = p
−
0 (H)
We establish that Red A02− is a proper reduction of Red A02 by
noticing that:
p0(E ≡ >) = 1 and p2(E ≡ H) = 1
p0(Red ≡ H) = 1 and p2(Red ≡ >) = 1
And then, by (PEP):
p2(H) = p0(H)
From this we can derive that p2(H) = 1/2, too, and finally since
p2(E ≡ H) = 1:
p2(E) = 1/2
A completely analogous reasoning in the case in which Evil sees
the blue piece of paper (and based on Tables 16 and 18) delivers
the same rational t2 credence. This concludes the first step in
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Titelbaum’s analysis.
The second step is to build two models for time points t1 and
t2. Titelbaum’s models Red A12 and Blue A12 use the same
language as Red A02 and Blue A02, viz. L1, and place the following
extrasystematic constraints on Evil’s credence function:
p1 p2
E <1 <1
Red <1 1
H <1 <1
E ≡ H <1 1
Table 19: Extrasystematic con-
straints for Red A12
p1 p2
E <1 <1
Blue <1 1
T <1 <1
E ≡ T <1 1
Table 20: Extrasystematic con-
straints for Blue A12
At t1 Evil has been informed of the duplication but hasn’t yet seen
the piece of paper. Therefore, he is no longer certain with respect
to his identity, he isn’t certain what piece of paper he will see and
whether the probability of seeing the red piece of paper, say, is
connected to the coin coming up heads (this would only be so if
he were indeed Evil, but he isn’t sure of this fact). Finally, the
probability he assigns to the coin coming up heads is no longer 1/2,
as the fact of hearing about the duplication could presumably alter
this belief, but he doesn’t know in which direction he should revise,
if at all. At t2, he knows he has seen the red (or the blue) piece of
paper and that he is evil if and only if the coin came up heads (or
tails, in the case in which he sees the blue piece of paper).
According to Red A12, between t1 and t2 Evil gains certainty in two
propositions: Red and E≡T, therefore p2(E|>) = p1(E|Red&(E ≡
H)). But, at t2, after seeing the red piece of paper Evil knows that
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he is himself if the coin came up heads. So Red implies that E≡H.
With this simplification we get that
p2(E) = p1(E|Red)
Importing the verdict of model Red A02 regarding p2(E):
1/2 = p1(E|Red)
An analogous reasoning carried out in the case in which Evil sees
the blue piece of paper, that is in model Blue A12 (and based on
Table 20) would deliver:
1/2 = p1(E|Blue)
Importing this last result into Red A12 as a further extrasystematic
constraint, we obtain that whatever information Dr. Evil receives
(either Red or Blue), he ought to shift his credences being himself
at t1 to 12 . Therefore, by CLF systematic constraints, p1(E) = 1/2.
Given Claim 5, then Dr. Evil’s rational credence upon learning of
his duplication in Dr. Evil ought to be 12 . This concludes Titelbaum’s
proof.
8.3.3 A quick appraisal of CLF
The previous section presented the CLF solution to Technicolor
Evil. In this section I wish to raise some methodological problems
with CLF before going further to explaining how one can derive
contradictory verdicts about Evil’s rational credences in Dr. Evil
in the next section. These comments are intended to provide a
motivation for being wary of applying CLF as your modelling
strategy for accounting for the doxastic evolution of an agent in a
scenario involving self-location.
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Firstly, note CLF fails to offer any useful insights if applied to the
entirety of scenario. In order to be able to successfully apply it to
the story of Technicolor Evil we had to make a very careful choice
with regards to which time points to model (t1 and t2, and t0 and t2).
Titelbaum’s answer to this criticism (Titelbaum, 2013, Ch. 8, fn.
23) is that the doxastic evolution of an agent is captured by (GC)
and that this rule is spelled out only in terms of the difference
of certainties in-between time points. But, no matter how we
model the different time points of a story, the agent’s certainties
at those time points are always the same and hence we will never
obtain clashing verdicts. This is because, in the CLF, an agent’s
certainties at a time point are not obtained from conditioning on
the information the agent had at the previous time point and the
information received in between. They are directly inferred from
the story as extrasystematic constraints.
I accept Titelbaum’s point, but the situation is, nevertheless, surpris-
ing. On the one hand, Bayesians have argued convincingly that in
order to obtain the correct results from their formal models we need
to follow the principle of Total Evidence and plug into the model
all the aspects of the story we seek to understand. Titelbaum, on
the other hand, tells us that his quasi-Bayesian framework functions
by restricting the evidence we take into consideration. I am willing
to follow Titelbaum’s cue, but, in contrast with the methodological
precision of the rest of the book, he is not forthcoming with
indications of when and how to restrict the evidence we should
take into consideration. Given his analysis of the Technicolor Evil,
his proposed restrictions seem ad hoc.
Secondly, there is the question of how we derive the verdict that
Evil’s t1 credence in being himself should be 12 . Titelbaum says
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that we simply patch together the verdicts of Red A02, namely
p2(H) = 1/2 and p2(E) = 1/2, Blue A02, namely p2(T) = 1/2
and p2(E) = 1/2, A12, namely p2(E) = p1(E|Red) and Blue A12,
namely p2(E) = p1(E|Blue). But in order for something to be a re-
quirement of ideal rationality in his framework, it has to be a verdict
of a model. Now, p1(E) = 12 cannot be a verdict of an A02 model,
since it doesn’t contain the relevant time point. Therefore it has to be
a verdict of one of the A12 ones. However, it cannot be a verdict of
Red A12 or Blue A12, since none of them contain enough informa-
tion to derive it and furthermore their respective languages aren’t
rich enough to express seeing the color the other model is intended
to model (there is no proposition Blue in the language of Red A12
for instance). Titelbaum strategy is to use the verict of Red A02 as
an extrasystematic constraint in Red A12. Then the verdict of Blue
A02 as an extrasystematic constraint in Blue A12. And moreover
use the verdict of Blue A12 as an extrasystematic constraint in Red
A12. Finally, he also presumably imposes extrasystematically that
Red and Blue are exhaustive, so as to obtain systematically that if
conditioned on any of them the probability of being Evil is 1/2 then
it ought to be that unconditionally. Figure 3 presents the interdepen-
dencies between the various models in Titelbaum’s analysis.
RedA02 // RedA12 // p1(E) = 12
BlueA02 // BlueA12
OO
Figure 3: Dependencies between Titelbaum’s various models for Techni-
color Evil
This modelling strategy demands great care from the modeller not
only in terms of how she groups the different time points in a story
when applying the CLF to it, but also in terms of the order in which
she analyses the resulting CLF models of the different time points
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of a story is relevant. Without Red A02, Red A12 cannot yield
the desired verdict. Without Blue A12, Red A12 cannot yield that
p1(E) = 12 .
These two problems show that there is a lot of work to be done at
an intuitive level when applying the CLF, and this gives the impres-
sion of ad hocness. However, what Titelbaum’s framework achieves
quite naturally is a justification for why Evil ought to assign 1/2
to the coin having landed heads at t2. And it indeed manages to
do so without invoking anything like the relevance-limiting thesis.
Moreover, this is an endogenous contraint on Evil’s credence in CLF.
8.3.4 CLF and Contradiction Dr. Evil: Part II
In this section I show that CLF doesn’t overcome the criticism of
section 7.2. To do so, I will follow Titelbaum’s solution to Technicolor
Beauty closely, making the appropriate changes along the way. Un-
fortunately, CLF doesn’t generate any verdicts in Contradiction Dr.
Evil8, so we will need to investigate a close variation of it, Contradic-
tion Dr. Evil: Part II:
contradiction dr . evil : part ii The same as
Contradiction Dr. Evil except that the bias of the coin
flipped by the spy is 2/3 towards heads and 1/3 towards
tails (instead of 2/5 and 3/5).
The first thing to notice is that we now require three models, one
for each piece of coloured paper the spy can show Evil, let’s call
8 I will not explain here in detail neither why that is the case, nor why this isn’t a
problem with CLF. I will accept that it isn’t for the sake of argument. The purpose
of this chapter isn’t to engage in the exegesis of Titelbaum’s CLF, but to show that
it doesn’t provide a way out of the challenge I mount against Claim 5 in section
7.2.
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them Red B02, Blue B02 and Green B02. Each of these three mod-
els will contain two time points, t0 and t2, and assign credences (I
will use p again to represent them) over the following set of proposi-
tions L′ = {E, Red, H, h1, h2}. The only difference from Titelbaum’s
language he used to model Technicolor Beauty is the inclusion of
two new propositions, h1: "The second coin the spy flips comes up
heads", and h2: "The third coin the spy flips comes up heads". Re-
call, in Contradiction Dr. Evil, if the spy is trying to signal to Evil in a
heads-world he will use a fair coin to decide whether to show him
the red or green pieces of paper (this is captured by h1/t1), and if he
is signalling to Dup in a tails-world he will use a coin with bias 1/3
towards choosing the red piece of paper (this is captured by h2/t2);
this carries over in Contradiction Dr. Evil: Part II. The below tables
encode the extrasystematic constraints at play in the three models.
p0 p2
E 1 <1
Red <1 1
h1 1/2 <1
h2 1/3 <1
H 2/3 <1
Red ≡ H ∧h1 1 <1
E ≡ H ∧h1 <1 1
Table 21: Extrasystematic con-
straints for Red B02
p0 p2
E 1 <1
Blue <1 1
h1 1/2 <1
h2 1/3 <1
T 1/3 <1
Blue ≡ T 1 <1
E ≡ T <1 1
Table 22: Extrasystematic con-
straints for Blue B02
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p0 p2
E 1 <1
Green <1 1
t1 1/2 <1
h2 1/3 <1
H 2/3 <1
Green ≡ H ∧t1 1 <1
E ≡ H ∧t1 <1 1
Table 23: Extrasystematic constraints
for Green B02
Let me explain the above probability assignments in more detail.
Firstly, at time t0 Evil knows his identity and so he knows the
Red paper will be shown if the first coin comes up heads AND
if the second coin turns up heads. If the second coin comes up
tails he will see the green paper. The outcome of the third coin is
not relevant for his credence in Red in this situation. At the same
time point, he knows he will see the Green piece of paper if the
outcome of the first coin is heads AND the outcome of the second
coin is tails. The second coin is again irrelevant to him at t0 when
he is certain he is Evil. Secondly, assume that at time t2 he sees
the red piece of paper. He would thus know the proposition that
he is Evil is now equivalent to the first coin having landed heads
AND the second coin having landed heads. If he sees a blue piece
of paper, the outcomes of the second and third coins are irrelevant
and the proposition he is Evil is equivalent just to the proposition
the first coin landed tails, whereas if he sees a green piece of paper
he knows that the proposition he is Evil is equivalent to the first
coin having landed heads AND the second having landed tails.
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With these in place, the following equations establish that models
Red B02−, Blue B02−, and Green B02− built over the language
L′− = {H, h1, h2} are proper reductions of models Red B02, Blue
B02, and Green B02, respectively.
p0(E ≡ >) = 1 and p2(E ≡ H ∧ h1) = 1
p0(Red ≡ H ∧ h1) = 1 and p2(Red ≡ >) = 1, and
p0(E ≡ >) = 1 and p2(E ≡ T) = 1
p0(Blue ≡ T) = 1 and p2(Blue ≡ >) = 1, and
p0(E ≡ >) = 1 and p2(E ≡ H ∧ t1) = 1
p0(Green ≡ H ∧ t1) = 1 and p2(Green ≡ >) = 1.
p−0 p
−
2
H 2/3 <1
h1 1/2 <1
h2 1/3 <1
Table 24: Extrasys-
tematic
constraints
for Red B02−
p−0 p
−
2
T 1/3 <1
h1 1/2 <1
h2 1/3 <1
Table 25: Extrasys-
tematic
constraints
for Blue B02−
p−0 p
−
2
H 2/3 <1
t1 1/2 <1
h2 1/3 <1
Table 26: Extrasystem-
atic constraints
for Green B02−
Given that the propositions H, and h1 (and h2 for that matter, but
that proposition is irrelevant when thinking about the probability
of being Evil) neither gain nor lose certainty between t0 and t2, then
by (GC) we can derive that in Red B02−, p−2 (H) = p
−
0 (H) =
2
3
and p−2 (h1) = p
−
0 (h1) =
1
2 . By (PEP) p2(H) = p0(H) =
2
3 and
p2(h1) = p0(h1) = 12 . Since in Red B02, at t2 the proposition E is
equivalent to the conjunction H ∧ h1 then p2(E) = 23 × 12 = 13 .
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Another application of (GC) in Green B02− yields that in that
model, too, p−2 (H) = p
−
0 (H) =
2
3 and that p
−
2 (t1) = p
−
0 (t1) =
1
2 . By
(PEP) p2(H) = p0(H) = 23 , and p2(t1) = p0(t1) =
1
2 . Since in Green
B02, at t2 the proposition E is equivalent to the conjunction H ∧ t1
then p2(E) = 23 × 12 = 13 .
Finally, applying (GC) in Blue B02− we get that p−2 (T) = 1/3 and
p−2 (h1) =
1
2 . By (PEP) this becomes a verdict of Blue B02 and hence
p2(T) = 1/3. Since at t2 the proposition E is equivalent to the
proposition T, then it’s also the case p2(E) = 13 .
The second step is to investigate models Red B12, Blue B12 and
Green B12. Tables 27, 28, and 29 encode their respective extrasys-
tematic constraints in Contradiction Dr. Evil: Part II.
p1 p2
E <1 <1
Red <1 1
H <1 <1
h1 <1 <1
h2 <1 <1
E ≡ H ∧h1 <1 1
Table 27: Extrasys-
tematic
constraints
for Red B12
p1 p2
E <1 <1
Blue <1 1
T <1 <1
h1 <1 <1
h2 <1 <1
E ≡ T <1 1
Table 28: Extrasys-
tematic
constraints
for Blue B12
p1 p2
E <1 <1
Green <1 1
H <1 <1
t1 <1 <1
h2 <1 <1
E ≡ H ∧t1 <1 1
Table 29: Extrasys-
tematic
constraints
for Green B12
Focus on Red B12. In this model, Evil doesn’t lose any certainties
between t1 and t2, but he gains certainty in two propositions, namely
in Red and E≡ H∧h1. So, by applying (GC) to Red B12 we get that:
p2(E) = p1(E|Red ∧ (E ≡ H ∧ h1))
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But at t1, Evil knows that if he sees the red piece of paper then the
proposition E becomes equivalent to H∧h1 so we can simplify the
above equation to p2(E) = p1(E|Red). Importing the verdict that
p2(E) = 13 from Red B02 into Red B12, we obtain that:
1
3
= p1(E|Red)
An analogous reasoning run on Blue B12 and Green B12, will result
in
1
3
= p1(E|Blue), in model Blue B12
1
3
= p1(E|Green), in model Green B12
Importing the latter two results into Red B12 (and presumably fix-
ing extrasystematically that Evil can only see these three pieces of
paper), we obtain that whatever information Dr. Evil receives (Red,
Blue, or Green), he ought to shift his credence in being himself at t1
to 13 . Therefore, by CLF’s systematic constraints, p1(E) = 1/3. Given
Claim 5, then Dr. Evil’s rational credence upon learning of his du-
plication in Dr. Evil ought to be 13 . But together with Titelbaum’s
analysis of Technicolor Evil this shows that by CLF and Claim 5’s
lights, Dr. Evil ought to assign a credence in being himself in Dr.
Evil after he learns of the duplication of both 1/2 and 1/3. This
shows that Claim 5 cannot hold if we believe the correct modelling
strategy for these scenarios is CLF. Alternatively we could infer from
this that CLF’s strategy for de se conditionalisation is not correct. In
either case, Titelbaum’s argument fails to offer a new justification
for Elga’s verdict in Dr. Evil and eo ipso to RPI.
8.4 conclusion
To sum up, despite the omnipresence of RPI in the literature on self-
location and its crucial role in both the Halfer and Thirder answers
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to the Sleeping Beauty Problem, none of the arguments purporting
to justify it work. What is more, the reason why they fail is the
same reason that undermines the ‘staying’ strategy in the Monty
Hall Problem.
9
T H E U N M A R K E D C L O C K A N D T H O M A S O N C A S E S
R E D U X
In the previous two chapters we have seen how thinking carefully
about the probability with which evidence accrues to an agent
depending on the state of the world she is in, can be used to clarify
some of the puzzles discussed in the literature engaging with Elga’s
Restricted Principle of Indifference. In this chapter and the next,
I show that ignoring protocols is not a malady of the literature
on self-location but a problem which is more widespread. To this
purpose I discuss two puzzles from the literature on Reflection
Principles and defeating higher-order evidence, viz. Christensen’s
(2010) Unmarked Clock, and Mahtani’s (forthcoming) World’s Smallest
Lottery.
Christensen (2010) formulates a quasi-formal argument against an
intuitive principle purporting to bridge our first-order beliefs about
the world to our higher-order beliefs about our own abilities as rea-
soners that he dubs RatRef. According to RatRef if we were to learn
what the maximally rational credence in a proposition ought to be
in our current situation, we would be irrational not to adopt that
credence. Nevertheless, Christensen argues, a rational agent ought
to violate RatRef on pain of probabilistic incoherence in simple sce-
narios such as the Unmarked Clock. Therefore, RatRef doesn’t ap-
pear to be a viable rational requirement on an agent’s credal state.
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In this chapter I show that the argument Christensen formulates
involves a common mistake in applying conditionalisation (Shafer,
1985; Sneed, 1985; Pearl, 1988; Halpern, 2004; Bovens and Ferreira,
2010; Halpern, 2015) and that a sophisticated probabilistic model of
the Unmarked Clock could, if we were to make certain assumptions
about the underlying informational protocol in the scenario, satisfy
RatRef.
9.1 rational reflection and the unmarked clock
Christensen contends that intuitively there should be some connec-
tion between "what one is rational to believe, and what one is ratio-
nal to believe one is rational to believe" (Christensen, 2010, p. 121).
And a natural first contender for such a bridge principle is Rational
Reflection (RatRef from now on)
ratref Cr(A|Pr(A) = n) = n, where Cr(·) is an agent’s credence
function, and Pr(·) is her maximally rational credence.
In other words, when one learns that her rational credence in
proposition A is n she would be irrational not to change her current
credence in A into n. Note that the formula Christensen uses to
formally describe RatRef is not well defined. In Kolmogorovian
probability theory, probability functions are defined over subsets of
the sample space and not over functions. Therefore we cannot take
"Pr(a)=n" to be a function but the name of a subset of the sample
space. But which one? Christensen doesn’t offer any precise formal
definition. See Rédei and Gyenis (2016); Gyenis and Rédei (2017)
for a discussion of how principles such as RatRef, though intuitive,
require more careful development.
That being said, Christensen believes RatRef runs into (a different
set of) problems and invites us to consider the following scenario:
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unmarked clock Chloe walks into a room and no-
tices an unmarked clock on the wall. The minute hand of
the clock seems to her to be in the lower right quadrant,
a bit under the place where the hour 4 should be marked.
But she cannot be sure of this, however, as, alas, the clock
is unmarked.1 What should Chloe’s rational credal state
be upon seeing the clock?
Chloe cannot be certain of any hand position, but suppose it looks to
her as if the hand shows minute 21. Let Pi stand for the proposition
"the hand is showing minute i". Christensen claims her rational pos-
terior credence function might be such that P21 receives probability
.3, say, P20 and P22 probability .2 and P19 and P23 probability .15.
Assume these credences are indeed the maximally rational ones and
that moreover, this probability distribution would be the maximally
rational one irrespective on the state of the world Pi, except that for
each Pi the distribution would be centred around it. That is, if the
hand of the clock shows minute 15, then Chloe’s maximally rational
credence in P15 would be .3, in P16 and P14 would be .2 and in
P13 and P17 .15. This generates a table of all of Chloe’s maximally
rational credence functions, which Christensen calls Chloe’s Chart.
1 We assume throughout the minute hand moves in one-minute increments so it
never rests between two minute positions.
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P0 · · · P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 · · · P59
P0 .3 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 · · · .2
...
... · · · ... ... ... ... ... · · · ...
P19 0 · · · .3 .2 .15 0 0 · · · 0
P20 0 · · · .2 .3 .2 .15 0 · · · 0
P21 0 · · · .15 .2 .3 .2 .15 · · · 0
P22 0 · · · 0 .15 .2 .3 .2 · · · 0
P19 0 · · · 0 0 .15 .2 .3 · · · 0
...
... · · · ... ... ... ... ... · · · ...
P59 .2 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 · · · .3
Table 30: Chloe’s Chart 1
Here is how to read Chloe’s Chart. Each column represents a possi-
ble world. Each row represents the worlds Chloe entertains as pos-
sible at each possible column-world. Every cell contains the prob-
ability Chloe assigns to the worlds she thinks are possible at each
possible world. Now, according to Christensen, if she were to be
shown her Chart she would thereby learn her posterior credences
are the maximally rational ones and contradiction would ensue if
RatRef were to hold. Here is Christensen’s argument.2
given certainty about the Chart, Chloe will be certain that
that
a)Pr(P21) = .3 iff P21
2 Note that Christensen doesn’t offer the sample space on which the below prob-
ability functions are defined nor the definition of “Pr(P21)=.3" (see above why it
cannot formally be a function as the notation would suggest). Therefore the below
calculations are a presentation of Christensen’s argument as he envisages it. My
criticism of Christensen, developed later in this chapter, will be that he doesn’t
properly define his probability space. I do so later and show how his conclusion
no longer follows.
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But certainty of this guarantees (modulo coherence) that:
b)Cr(P21/Pr(P21) = .3) = Cr(P21/P21)
Clearly, the right-hand side of (b) must be 1. But RatRef
says that the left hand side should be .3. (Christensen,
2010, p. 124)
Christensen’s argument can be reconstructed thus. Let Chart1 be the
proposition P21 ↔ Pr(P21) = .3 and assume for simplicity that by
seeing her chart, Chloe only learns proposition Chart1. If Cr(·) is
Chloe’s credence function before seeing her chart, then Christensen
claims
Cr(P21|Pr(P21) = .3∩ Chart1) = 1.
It is easy to check this is the case:3
Cr(P21|Pr(P21) = .3∩ Chart1) =
=
Cr(P21∩ (Pr(P21) = .3∩ Chart1))
Cr(Pr(P21) = .3∩ Chart1)
=
Cr(P21∩ (Pr(P21) = .3∩ (P21↔ Pr(P21) = .3)))
Cr(Pr(P21) = .3∩ (P21↔ Pr(P21) = .3))
=
Cr(P21∩ (Pr(P21) = .3∩ ((P21∩ Pr(P21) = .3) ∪ (¬P21∩ ¬Pr(P21) = .3))))
Cr(Pr(P21) = .3∩ ((P21∩ Pr(P21) = .3) ∪ (¬P21∩ ¬Pr(P21) = .3)))
=
Cr(P21∩ ((Pr(P21) = .3∩ (P21∩ Pr(P21) = .3)) ∪ (Pr(P21) = .3∩ (¬P21∩ ¬Pr(P21) = .3))))
Cr((Pr(P21) = .3∩ (P21∩ Pr(P21) = .3) ∪ (Pr(P21) = .3∩ (¬P21∩ ¬Pr(P21) = .3)))
=
Cr(P21∩ (P21∩ Pr(P21) = .3))
Cr(Pr(P21) = .3∩ (P21∩ Pr(P21) = .3))
=
Cr(P21∩ Pr(P21) = .3)
Cr(P21∩ Pr(P21) = .3)
= 1
3 The only way to make sense of Christensen’s argument in the absence of a precise
probability model is to assume “Pr(P21)=.3" is a set of possible worlds, namely all
the worlds in which the probability of P21 is .3.
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This seems to establish that RatRef cannot be taken as a rational
constraint on an agent’s credences.4 Nevertheless, I believe Chris-
tensen’s argument against RatRef deserves a new discussion. The
reason is that the argument commits the same fallacy as the one I
noted in chapters 6 and 7 and will note again in the next chapter. It
is also the mistake Sneed (1985) noted in the reasoning recommend-
ing the ‘staying’ in the Monty Hall problem, Pearl (1988) noted in the
mistaken reasoning in the 3 Prisoners and Bovens and Ferreira (2010)
noted in Bovens (2010). In other words, it is a very common mistake
in probabilistic modelling and it is worth pointing it once again in
this context. It may not be the only reason why Christensen’s ar-
gument fails, but it is one we should also draw a lesson from. To
understand the fallacy I first present it in a different context. In the
next section I will introduce an example due to Howson (1995) and
meant to challenge the use of conditionalisation. I explain carefully
how to overcome the challenge and what that teaches us about the
Unmarked Clock. I conclude with a discussion of whether RatRef
holds.
4 A reader familiar with the discussion on Lewis’s Principal Principle might object
here that Christensen’s argument relies on an assumption regarding the admissi-
bility of Chloe’s chart. Christensen considers this possible objection and replies
that:
in the case of RatRef, the expert function Pr seems by definition
to take into account all of the agent’s evidence that bears on the
matter in question, and to do so in the maximally rational manner.
So motivating restrictions will be more tricky [than in the Principal
Principle case]. That said, it’s certainly possible that some more
sophisticated relative of RatRef might allow us to avoid puzzlement
in Chloe’s case. (Christensen, 2010, p. 135)
I will not pursue this line of argumentation in the present chapter as I take the
flaw in Christensen’s argument to reside somewhere else and hence applies even
if a strong argument for the admissibility of Chloe’s chart can be constructed.
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9.2 thomason cases
Howson (1995) argues that conditionalisation shouldn’t always be
the way through which we update our beliefs in the face of new
evidence. He makes his case based on an example he attributes to
Richmond Thomason.
thomason case A husband announces ‘if my wife
is unfaithful, I shall never know’; – the wife being known
to be an expert in deception. The corresponding condi-
tional probability he ascribes to his not knowing that his
wife is unfaithful, given his wife’s infidelity, is presum-
ably 1 or near 1. Yet learning that his wife was unfaithful
he could scarcely consistently assign probability close to
1 to not knowing what he has just learnt (Howson, 1995,
p. 9)
Take pi(·) to represent the husband’s credences over the two time
points the example refers to, viz. t1 before the husband learns
anything about the wife’s unfaithfulness and t2 after the husband
learns about the wife’s unfaithfulness. Let U stand for "the wife is
unfaithful". Then the Thomason Case purports to show that p2(U)
differs from p1(U|U): it seems intuitive the former ought to be very
low, whereas the latter ought to be 1.
The example is intriguing but I contend all it shows is that con-
ditionalisation can only deliver the correct result in a particular
scenario if we model the scenario appropriately. This is a lesson
that many have drawn in relation to other problematic cases such
as Monty Hall (Shafer, 1985; Sneed, 1985; Halpern, 2003; Bovens and
Ferreira, 2010), Sleeping Beauty (Halpern, 2004; Bovens and Ferreira,
2010; Halpern, 2015), 3 Prisoners (Pearl, 1988) and the Doomsday
Argument (Halpern, 2015). Halpern (2004) explicitly mentions the
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Thomason Case as a further example of this but doesn’t offer a formal
analysis to it.
What is the appropriate model for the Thomason Case? Firstly, it
should account for the fact that the wife could be unfaithful or not.
But the model should also account for the husband receiving evi-
dence that seems to suggest she is unfaithful. Let X stand for "evi-
dence that suggests the wife is unfaithful".The following conditional
probability table provides a simple visualisation of a possible prob-
ability model for this scenario.
U ¬ U
X .1 .2
¬ X .9 .8
Table 31: Protocol 1 for the Thomason Case
The table should be read in the following way. Each column
represents a possible state of the world: either the wife is unfaithful
or she is faithful. Each row represents a possible evidential state
the husband could be in: either he receives evidence that she is
unfaithful or he doesn’t. Each cell represents the probability the
husband is in the row-evidential state given the column-possible
world. Following the details of the scenario, the wife is a master
deceiver so assuming that she is unfaithful it is very unlikely for the
husband to obtain any evidence that she is cheating (.1). However,
let’s assume for the sake of the argument (nothing of theoretic
importance hinges on this) that if she is faithful she will have no
reason to try to deceive and so it is a bit more likely for her to
do so something that makes her husband suspect she may in fact
be unfaithful (.2). Let’s assume that the husband believes prior to
receiving any evidence about her faithfulness that she is equally
likely to be faithful as it is for her not to be faithful. I will relax
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this assumption below, but let’s reason based on it for now. This
table induces the following sophisticated space (Halpern, 2003)
for the Thomason Case, S = {(U, X), (¬U, X), (¬U, X), (¬U,¬X)}.
We can take the algebra over which the husband’s credences are
defined to be 2S, and we can define his credence function as follows:
p1({(U, X)}) = 120 , p1({(¬U, X)}) = 920 , p1({(¬U, X)}) = 110 ,
p1({(¬U,¬X)}) = 25 .
With this model we can calculate the husband’s conditional cre-
dences:
p1(X|U) = p1(X ∩U)p1(U) =
1
20
1
2
=
1
10
Whereas,
p1(U|X) = p1(X ∩U)p1(X) =
1
20
3
20
=
1
3
That is, the likelihood that the husband will receive evidence
that his wife is unfaithful, given she is, is 1/10. And conditional
on receiving evidence she is unfaithful the husband’s posterior
credence in his wife’s infidelity goes down from 1/2 to 1/3. So,
if we take p2(·) = p1(·|U) then p2(U)=1 which is counterintuitive.
But if we take p2(·) = p1(·|X) then p2(U) = 1/3 6= 1.
However, if instead of being initially indifferent between U and ¬U,
the husband starts off by assuming the wife is faithful, and hence
p′1(U) = .1 then:
p′1(U|X) =
p′1(X ∩U)
p′1(X)
=
1
100
19
100
=
1
19
<< 1
In other words, the husband believes that it is very unlikely he
will be in an evidential state that would suggest that his wife is
being unfaithful if she really were unfaithful, i.e. 110 . Nevertheless,
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he believes his credence in his wife being unfaithful if he were to
receive evidence she were is even lower now, i.e. 119 . So if we were
to take p′2(·) = p′1(·|X) then p′2(U) = 1/19 (very low).
Finally, assume the protocol underwriting the Thomason Case is:
U ¬ U
X .1 0
¬ X .9 1
Table 32: Protocol 2 for the Thomason Case
In this case, irrespective of the husband’s prior probability distribu-
tion:
p′′1 (U|X) =
p′′1 (X ∩U)
p′′1 (X)
= 1 = p′′1 (X|X)
So, if we were to take p′′2 (·) = p′′1 (·|X) then p′′2 (X) = 1. What is
then the rational credence the husband ought to adopt: pi, p′i or p
′′
i ?
I contend there is no answer to the question. The Thomason Case is
missing relevant information for making this determination. The
first credence function is rational given Protocol 1 and equiprobabil-
ity over U and ¬ U. The second is rational given the same protocol
but a non-equiprobable prior distribution. The last one is rational
given Protocol 2. Since the scenario doesn’t fix either the protocol
or the husband’s prior over the wife’s faithfulness, it is impossible
to tell what he ought to believe. Nevertheless, the above shows that
there are plausible ways of filling in the story and modelling it in
a Bayesian framework so that we get Howson’s desired result, e.g.
p2′(U) is very low, whereas p′1(U|U) = 1.
What was the problem with Howson’s formalisation of the Thoma-
son Case? Howson modeled the event of the husband learning
that his wife is unfaithful as conditionalising on proposition U, i.e.
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p2(·) = p1(·|U). However, this is known to lead us into trouble.
See elsewhere in the thesis how this strategy lead to problems both
in Monty Hall and the 3 Prisoners. Therefore, in order to overcome
this difficulty, I introduced another proposition in the model for
the Thomason Case to stand for the husband’s learning of his wife
(un)faithfulness. With this additional proposition I showed that con-
ditionalisation no longer leads us astray. The lesson to be drawn
from this example is that whenever applying conditionalisation to
model learning, we need to pay attention to the likelihood with
which an agent believes a particular piece of information can accrue
to them and to what other information he thinks he might learn (in
the present case the information that his wife is faithful). If this is
left out of the formal model, counterintuitive results ensue. As in
the Monty Hall problem in the Thomason Case.
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How are we to import this insight gained from looking at the Thoma-
son Case to the Unmarked Clock? First, here is a formally precise
way of reconstructing Christensen’s argument. Let Cr0(·) be Chloe’s
prior credence function before learning anything about her chart or
any rational credence she ought to hold in the Unmarked Clock (but
after seeing the clock). Then let Cr1(·) = Cr0(·|Pr(P21) = .3). Then
Cr1(P21|Chart1) = 1. The discussion above, however, suggests we
shouldn’t simply model Chloe’s learning of her chart as her condi-
tionalising on the proposition Chart1 but rather on her learning/re-
ceiving evidence that Chart1. To emphasise the importance of doing
this, consider an alternative to Chart1, call it Chart2.
156 the unmarked clock and thomason cases redux
P0 · · · P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 · · · P59
P0 .3 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 · · · .3
...
... · · · ... ... ... ... ... · · · ...
P19 0 · · · .3 .3 .05 0 0 · · · 0
P20 0 · · · .3 .3 .3 .05 0 · · · 0
P21 0 · · · .05 .3 .3 .3 .05 · · · 0
P22 0 · · · 0 .05 .3 .3 .3 · · · 0
P19 0 · · · 0 0 .05 .3 .3 · · · 0
...
... · · · ... ... ... ... ... · · · ...
P59 .3 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 · · · .3
Table 33: Chloe’s Chart 2
In Chart2, Chloe’s rational credence upon seeing the clock is to as-
sign a .9 credence to the hand showing a position within one minute
of the actual time. How could we have two charts? How could
Chloe have a probability distribution over the maximally rational
credences in her situation? One simple story to motivate this would
be that her visual acuity is influenced by environmental conditions:
light, distance to the clock, tiredness, etc. Chloe cannot quantify any
of these contextual factors. But she knows that for certain constella-
tions of factors a maximally rational agent would assign credences
in a particular way, whereas for another she would assign them dif-
ferently. We simplify things and assume there are only two such
ways. The first encoded in Chart1, the second in Chart2. Now, with
this second chart in play we could wonder what chart Chloe consid-
ers receiving. The below represents a possible protocol underwrit-
ing the Unmarked Clock.
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P0 · · · P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 · · · P59
”Chart1” 1/2 · · · 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 · · · 1/2
”Chart2” 1/2 · · · 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 · · · 1/2
Table 34: Protocol 1 for the Unmarked Clock
What this protocol says is that Chloe considers it equally likely to be
informed between t1 and t2 that Chart1 holds or that Chart2 holds.
So what should Chloe’s credence in P21 be given the "information
that Chart1 holds" (let’s designate this by "Chart1")?
Cr1(P21|”Chart1”) = Cr1(”Chart1”|P21)Cr1(P21)Cr1(”Chart1”)
=
1
2 × Cr1(P21)
1
2
= Cr1(P21) 6= 1
Recall that Cr1(·) = Cr0(·|Pr(P21) = .3), so Cr1(P21) =
Cr0(P21|Pr(P21) = .3). If RatRef holds, then Cr1(P21) = .3 and
then Cr2(P21) = .3. In this construal, the threat of the Unmarked
Clock to RatRef has been blunted and the scenario no longer repre-
sents a counterexample to RatRef. Are there other protocols that
make sense in this context? The answer is YES. Consider the follow-
ing protocol that could be underwriting the informational exchange
Christensen has in mind.
P0 · · · P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 · · · P59
”Chart1” 0 · · · 1/3 0 1/3 1/3 1/3 · · · 1/3
”Chart2” 1 · · · 2/3 1 2/3 2/3 2/3 · · · 2/3
Table 35: Protocol 2 for the Unmarked Clock
The story behind this protocol is that whenever the clock’s hand is
pointing towards one of the minutes which usually are marked on a
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regular clock, Chloe becomes better at discriminating what time it is.
When the hand falls in between locations which are usually marked,
Chloe’s rational distribution has fat tails. With this new protocol:
Cr1(P21|”Chart1”) = Cr1(”Chart1”|P21)Cr1(P21)Cr1(”Chart1”)
=
1
3 × Cr1(P21)
1
3 (Cr1(P1) + Cr1(P2) + Cr1(P3) + Cr1(P4) + Cr1(P6) + . . .)
=
Cr1(P21)
(Cr1(P1) + Cr1(P2) + Cr1(P3) + Cr1(P4) + Cr1(P6) + . . .)
We cannot say anything more about Cr2(P21) in this context with-
out making further stipulations about what Cr1(P1), Cr1(P2), . . .
are. Recall that Cr1(·) = Cr0(·|Pr(P21) = .3). Now, even if we were
to assume RatRef held, we could only infer Cr1(P21) = .3. But we
still wouldn’t know anything about Cr1(P1), etc. as RatRef remains
silent on Cr0(Pi|Pr(P21) = .3), where i 6= 21.
Where does this leave us with respect to the Unmarked Clock? We
assumed that Chloe is considering two possible charts before be-
ing told anything about what a maximally rational agent ought to
believe in her situation. We then looked at two possible protocols
Chloe could be entertaining in her situation and remarked that both
are compatible with the scenario given that Christensen remains
silent on how information about the chart accrues to Chloe. Just
as in the Thomason Case what this shows is that in order to fully
analyse the Unmarked Clock we require more information than it is
offered. And there are ways of complementing the scenario accord-
ing to which the challenge it is meant to mount disappears: assum-
ing Protocol 1, the Unmarked Clock no longer violates RatRef. At
the same time there are ways of complementing the scenario, viz.
Protocol 2, for which cannot draw any conclusion. This shows the
Unmarked Clock doesn’t deliver on its promise. Just like the other
scenarios I looked at in previous sections, it offers too little informa-
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tion to allow a precise probabilistic analysis. This isn’t to say that
an informationally richer version of the same scenario couldn’t be
turned into a counterexample of RatRef, but the conclusion Chris-
tense wants to derive from the scenario is, as I have tried to show in
this section, too quick.

10
T H E O PA Q U E P R O P O S I T I O N P R I N C I P L E A N D
I N F O R M AT I O N - G AT H E R I N G P R O C E S S E S
In a recent paper, Anna Mahtani (forthcoming) introduces a simple
probabilistic puzzle which she claims carries a lesson for a generali-
sation of the Expert Deference Principle (Elga, 2007), viz. The Opaque
Proposition Principle (OP). In this paper we show that the puzzle she
introduces is equivalent to a generalisation of the 3 Prisoners Problem
and explain how her analysis maps onto its intuitive, but neverthe-
less, mistaken solution. In other words, when employing the correct
probabilistic model for understanding Mahtani’s puzzle, the alleged
challenge to OP disappears. We conclude by drawing once again
(Shafer, 1985; Sneed, 1985; Pearl, 1988; Halpern, 2003; Bovens and
Ferreira, 2010) the lesson that the process through which informa-
tion is gathered is essential for correctly taking conditionalisation
on X as a guide to learning X.
10.1 basic-know, super-know and the opaque proposi-
tion principle
Mahtani introduces a distinction between two kinds of knowledge,
viz. basic-knowledge and super-knowledge. Consider the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
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abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.
When asking whether someone knows the First Amendment, I
might be asking two different things. One the one hand, I might
be asking if they knew that Congress cannot restrict several key
freedoms (of religion, of speech and of the press). Someone could
presumably know this without knowing it’s the First Amendment,
or even in the Constitution at all. In this case, they would basic-
know it. On the other hand, someone could believe Congress is
actively and lawfully (although regrettably) restricting the free-
dom of religion in the US, but nevertheless know that the First
Amendment of the Constitution says that it doesn’t have the right
to do that. Such a person would super-know the First Amendment,
but not basic-know it. Of course, a third individual could both
basic-know it and super-know it.1
Now Mahtani introduces a type of reflection principle and claims
that if we were to interpret the highlighted occurrence of the verb
‘know’ in this principle as basic-know the principle fails. If we were
to interpret it as super-know, it holds.
op If: for some claim H and value v, an agent knows
that there is a true proposition E such that if (s)he were
to come to know E (and not to learn or forget anything
1 Mahtani believes this distinction plays an important role in the understanding of a
probabilistic principle, but despite that, she doesn’t formally distinguish between
basic-know and super-know. In particular, it is not clear from Mahtani’s paper
how a formal model engendering basic-knowledge would differ from one engen-
dering super-knowledge. Nevertheless, I believe one wouldn’t need to explore
this distinction further, as the correct probabilistic model for Mahtani’s puzzle
will offer a solution to the problem she raises without requiring any special con-
strual of ‘knowledge’.
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else), then his or her credence in H should be v
Then: that agent ought to have a credence of v in H.
(Mahtani, forthcoming, p. 3)
We take the principle in its basic-know reading to mean the follow-
ing: For a credence function p over an algebra S, for E ⊆ S such that
p(E)=1 and some proposition H ⊆ S and value v ∈ [0, 1]: if for any
e ∈ E were an agent to come to know it (and not to learn or forget
anything else), then his or her credence in H would be v, then that
agent ought to have a credence of v in H.2 In order to show that
this principle fails Mahtani provides a counterexample, the World’s
smallest lottery (WSL from now on):
wsl Suppose that you have bought a ticket in the
World’s Smallest Lottery. There are four tickets (tickets 1,
2, 3 and 4) and four players, each of whom has bought
a single ticket. There are two prizes, and so two of the
four tickets have been selected randomly as the winners.
Your ticket is number 1. Assuming that you are rational,
what is your credence that (WIN1) your ticket number 1
is a winner? (Mahtani, forthcoming, p. 2)
To clarify the details of WSL, she explains the procedure by which
the winning tickets are selected as follows:
First (s)he picks out one ticket at random from amongst
the four; then (s)he picks out a further winning ticket
from the remaining three tickets. Thus there are two
ways that ticket 1 might be selected: one way is by be-
ing selected on the first draw, and the other is by not
2 Mahtani distinguishes between two senses of basic-know. In this paper we focus
on what she calls the variable reading of OP under basic-know. We gloss over the
distinction between this reading and the other as it doesn’t impact the discussion
below.
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being selected on the first draw but being selected on the
subsequent draw. (Mahtani, forthcoming, fn. 1)
First, Mahtani claims that the probability of WIN1 is 12 (forthcoming,
fn. 1). This is correct, but to make it precise let’s construct the
probability space carefully so that we can actually get this result as
the verdict of a probabilistic model. Consider the following model
of WSL, 〈X, S, p〉: X={(1,2), (1,3), (1,4), (2,3), (2,4), (3,4)}; S= 2X;
p({(1,2)}) = p({(1,3)}) = p({(1,4)}) = p({(2,3)}) = p({(2,4)}) = p({(3,4)}) =
1
6 .
Each number i stands for “Ticket i wins a prize”. Each element of
the sample space represents a pair of winning tickets (assuming
the order in which they are declared winning tickets is irrelevant
to the set-up). The algebra over which we define our measure
is simply the power set of the sample space. The probability
function works as the scenario indicates: the probability of WIN1,
i.e. {(1,2),(1,3),(1,4)}, is the same as the probability of WIN2, i.e.
{(1,2),(2,3),(2,4)}, etc. and is equal to 12 . The same holds of WIN3 and
WIN4. There is nothing puzzling about this fact as WIN1, WIN2,
WIN3 and WIN4 are not disjoint, so it is not surprising that they
don’t sum up to 1.
Second, Mahtani (forthcoming, p.2) calculates the probability of
WIN1 conditional on learning that WIN2:
p(WIN1|WIN2) = p(WIN1∩WIN2)
p(WIN2)
=
1
6
1
2
=
1
3
,
and notices that the probability of WIN1 given WIN2 is the same as
the probability of WIN1 given WIN3, and as the probability of WIN1
given WIN4. From this Mahtani raises the following challenge:
You know then that there is some true proposition (either
WIN2, WIN3 or WIN4) such that if you were to come
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to know it, you would – and rationally should – have
a credence of 1/3 in WIN1. Doesn’t it follow that your
actual current credence in WIN1 should be 1/3? After
all, you know that there is a true proposition that would
rightly drive your credence in WIN1 down to 1/3 if you
but knew it. You do not know this proposition – it is
opaque to you – but isn’t knowing that there is such a
proposition enough? (Mahtani, forthcoming, pp. 2-3)
In other words, in WSL, it seems there exists some true proposition
(either WIN2, WIN3, or WIN4) such that if you were to come to
know it then your credence in WIN1 should decrease to 13 . If OP
were true, then your credence in WIN1 should already be 13 even
before hearing which of WIN2, WIN3 and WIN4 actually holds.
This reading of OP is the basic-know one, as you do not know
which proposition E actually is. You know that E can be one of three
distinct propositions that jointly exhaust the ways in which the
world could be (that is, p(WIN1) + p(WIN2) + p(WIN3) = 1), but
you do not know which one it is, as it is a different one depending
of the state of the world and that is unknown to you. You would
have super-known E if you knew that E was WIN2, say.3
But, Mahtani argues, OP cannot be true (at least not under this
reading). We could easily conjure up propositions LOSE2, LOSE3
and LOSE4 (“Ticket i is a losing ticket”) and then, on the one
hand, one of these propositions must be true, and on the other
p(WIN1|LOSE2) = p(WIN1|LOSE3) = p(WIN1|LOSE4) = 23 (Mah-
tani, forthcoming, p. 5). Therefore, if OP were to hold p(WIN1)
should at the same time be 1/3 and 2/3.
3 In this paper I focus solely on Mahtani’s rejection of OP under its basic-know
reading, and won’t discuss super-knowledge any further.
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To sum up, ‘to know’ can be disambiguated into ‘to basic-know’
or to ‘super-know’ and a reflection-like principle, viz. OP, fails
if the relevant instance of know in its formulation is interpreted
as basic-know. According to Mahtani, WSL witnesses the failure
of the principle in its basic-know reading. I believe this claim in
incorrect and that the mistake lies in the way Mahtani applies
conditionalisation on X as formal construal of ‘learning X’. As
puzzles such as the Monty Hall and the 3 Prisoners have taught us
this has to be done very carefully and by paying attention to the
context in which the agent learns the new information - we can
follow Mahtani in calling this the information-gathering process
(Bovens and Olsson, 2000). The failure of Mahtani’s analysis of
WSL is thus instructive by offering us yet another opportunity to
think about what conditions are required for correctly applying
conditionalisation to model every day learning.
The next section presents the 3 Prisoners problem, the intuitive, but
incorrect, solution to it, the correct solution to it and finally how
this solution applies to several generalisations of the standard prob-
lem. The last generalisation discussed will be shown to be perfectly
equivalent to the WSL and the exact correspondences between the
two puzzles will be explained.
10.2 the 3 prisoners problem
In this section we discuss the 3 Prisoners Problem and a few gener-
alisations and variations thereof. The purpose of this exercise is to
lead the reader from the very well-known solution to the standard
version of the problem to the solution of one of its generalisations
which is perfectly analogous to Mahtani’s WSL.
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3 prisoners problem Three prisoners, A, B, and
C, have been tried for murder, and their verdicts will
be read and their sentences executed tomorrow morn-
ing. They know only that one of them will be declared
guilty and will be hanged to death while the other two
will be set free; the identity of the condemned prisoner is
revealed to the very reliable prison guard, but not to the
prisoners themselves. In the middle of the night, Prisoner
A calls the guard over and makes the following request:
"Please give this letter to one of my friends - to one who
is to be released. You and I know that at least one of them
will be freed." The guard takes the letter and promises to
do as told. An hour later prisoner A calls the guard and
asks "Can you tell me which of my friends you gave the
letter to? (. . . )" The guard answers "I gave the letter to
Prisoner B; he will be released tomorrow."(Pearl, 1988, p.
58 )
What is A’s chance of being executed upon learning that B is to
be released. Here is a quick way of reasoning about this puzzle:
initially A had one chance in three to be executed. Now that he
knows B is to be released, he knows that either him or C will
be executed. Therefore after hearing the guard’s answer, he will
increase his credence in being executed from one in three to one in
two.
Here is a quick probability model to show this. Take the probabil-
ity model 〈Z, F, p〉. Z = {Ae, Be, Ce}, where Ae means A will be
executed, Be means B will be executed and Ce means that C will be
executed. Let F = 2Z and p({Ae}) = p({Be}) = p({Ce}) = 13 (from
now on I will omit certain curly brackets to simplify the notation).
Assuming Prisoner A’s credence function after hearing the guard’s
answer is obtained by conditionalization, i.e. his posterior credence
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function will be p(·|¬Be), we can calculate A’s posterior credence in
being executed:
p(Ae|¬Be) = p(Ae ∩ ¬Be)
p(¬Be)
=
p(Ae ∩ {Ae, Ce})
p({Ae, Ce})
=
p({Ae})
p({Ae}) + p({Ce})
=
1
3
1
3 +
1
3
=
1
2
This answer is incorrect. And Judea Pearl explains the problem with
it by pointing his readers towards the following subsequent argu-
ment A could make upon raising his credence in Ae to 13 :
". . . Worse yet, by sheer symmetry, my chances of dying
would also have risen to 50% if the guard had named
C instead of B - so my chances must have been 50% to
begin with. I must be hallucinating . . . " (Pearl, 1988, p.
59)
The problem with this reasoning is that in modelling the scenario we
have ignored relevant information about the information-gathering
process by which A comes to know that ¬Be. By this I mean the full
range of answers that A could have obtained from the guard. To
understand why the context (as Pearl calls it) is important it suffices
to suppose the guard always answers "I gave the letter to Prisoner
B", irrespective of what state of the world he is in. Then, A’s rational
response should be to ignore his answer altogether, and not change
his credence function to p(·|¬Be). This isn’t presumably the case,
but the puzzle remains silent on the actual details of the protocol the
guard will be following when delivering the letter and answering
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A’s question. So in one sense, it is impossible to say what the correct
answer is - the problem is under-specified. Nevertheless, there seem
to be some salient assumptions we could make, and we can call
them the protocol4 that the guard will follow
1. the guard will never give A’s fate away - that is it will only
reveal information about one (and only one) of the other pris-
oners;
2. the guard will never lie - to wit, he will never answer that a
prisoner will be released if they are sentenced to hang or vice
versa; and finally
3. if the guard has a choice as to whom to deliver the letter, the
guard uses a fair random device to make a decision.
The following conditional probability table captures these assump-
tions about the protocol the guard follows (since this section will
generalise the problem along several dimensions I will use the fol-
lowing notation: N-k-m Prisoners is the variation of the standard
3 Prisoners problems in which there are N prisoners, k death sen-
tences and m letters/answers the guard delivers/offers)
Ae Be Ce
B will be released 1/2 0 1
C will be released 1/2 1 0
Table 36: Protocol 1 for 3-1-1 Prisoners
In this table, each column corresponds to a possible world - one in
which A is executed, one in which B is executed or one in which
C is executed - and each row corresponds to a possible answer the
guard could give. Consequently, the numbers in the cells represent
4 Some authors call the information-gathering process in a scenario, the protocol of
that scenario. The two concepts are assumed to be interchangeable in this paper.
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the probability A will receive the row-answer in the column-world.
This table is just a nice visualisation of a sophisticated sample space
(Halpern, 2003) in which we take into consideration every answer
the prisoner could receive. Such a space would contain four atomic
events with positive probability: (Ae, B will be released), (Ae, C will
be released), (Be, C will be released) and (Ce, B will be released).
The probability of (Ae, B will be released) and (Ae, C will be re-
leased) will be equal to the probability of (Be, C will be released)
and to the probability of (Ce, B will be released), that is 1/3. (Ae,
B will be released) and (Ae, C will be released) will both receive
probability 1/6. All the conditional probability tables below will in-
duce in a similar fashion a sophisticated probability model, but we
won’t present that in detail. We assume throughout that A assigns
equal priors to all states of the world. With this in place we can
re-calculate A’s posterior credence of being executed:
p(Ae|B will be released) = p(B will be released|Ae)p(Ae)
∑i∈{Ae,Be,Ce} p(B will be released|i)p(i)
=
1
2 × 13
1
2 × 13 + 0× 13 + 1× 13
=
1
3
In other words, upon learning the guard’s answer, A has no reason
to change his credence regarding his own fate. However, not the
same is the case regarding C’s fate:
p(Ce|B will be released) = 2
3
Notice however, that we A has no reason to worry he might be
hallucinating, as
p(Ce|C will be released) = 0
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This result is based on the three assumptions above. Can we make
different assumptions such that A’s posterior credence in being exe-
cuted to indeed be 12? Yes, for instance we could adopt assumptions
(1), (2), and (4).
4. if A is to be executed, the guard will always take the letter to
Prisoner B.
This set of assumptions gives rise to a different protocol for the
guard:
Ae Be Ce
B will be released 1 0 1
C will be released 0 1 0
Table 37: Protocol 2 for 3-1-1 Prisoners
In this case, we can recreate the posterior credence arrived at by the
naive reasoning above, but the threat of hallucinating has once again
disappeared:
p(Ae|B will be released) = 1
2
p(Ae|C will be released) = 0
This is a well-known puzzle in probability theory and is structurally
analogous to the Monty Hall problem. Unsurprisingly this solution
to the 3 Prisoners has been given to the Monty Hall, as well (Sneed,
1985; Shafer, 1985; Bovens and Ferreira, 2010), and discussed further
in relation to other puzzles such as the Sleeping Beauty Problem and
the Doomsday Argument (Halpern, 2004; Bovens and Ferreira, 2010;
Halpern, 2015). It can also be found in several textbooks (Pearl,
1988; Halpern, 2003) and we do not claim to bring anything new to
it. Furthermore this reasoning naturally extends to finitely many
prisoners, executions and answers the guard may give (Wechsler
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et al., 2005). Below, I present the cases of 4-1-1 Prisoners and 4-2-1
Prisoners, respectively, and show how the latter is a structural
analogue of Mahtani’s WSL.
Firstly, imagine that instead of 3 prisoners expecting the execution
we now have 4. Everything else stays the same, including assump-
tions (1)-(3) above. Then the following table captures the protocol
the guard could follow in this scenario:
Ae Be Ce De
B will be released 1/3 0 1/2 1/2
C will be released 1/3 1/2 0 1/2
D will be released 1/3 1/2 1/2 0
Table 38: Protocol for 4-1-1 Prisoners
A’s posterior credences upon hearing that B will be released will be:
p(Ae|B will be released) = p(B will be released|Ae)p(Ae)
∑i∈{Ae,Be,Ce,De} p(B will be released|i)p(i)
=
1
3 × 14
1
3 × 14 + 0× 14 + 12 × 14 + 12 × 14
=
1
4
Again, A’s credence that he will be executed doesn’t change upon
hearing the guard’s answer. It was 1/4 before and it stays the same.
Just as before, A’s credence regarding C’s and D’s fates does change,
but an easy verification will establish that no threat of hallucinating
is present.
We can now extend the scenario in another dimension too and as-
sume 2 prisoners out of the 4 who will be executed. Suppose further
the guard still only delivers one letter and, hence, Prisoner A only
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learns about the fate of one other prisoner (never himself - assump-
tions 1-3 still hold). Such a scenario could be modeled in the follow-
ing way. Let AeBe mean that prisoners A and B will be executed and
suppose the order in which they are executed does not matter (the
decision of whom to execute is done all at once, say). Finally, we
assume once again all resulting 6 possible worlds have equal priors
according to Prisoner A.
AeBe AeCe AeDe BeCe BeDe CeDe
B will be released 0 1/2 1/2 0 0 1
C will be released 1/2 0 1/2 0 1 0
D will be released 1/2 1/2 0 1 0 0
Table 39: Protocol 1 for 4-2-1 Prisoners
In this model we can retrieve the event corresponding to ‘Prisoner A
being executed’, call this AE, as the union between (AeBe), (AeCe)
and (AeDe). The prior of this event is unsurprisingly 12 . Then, we
can calculate again Prisoner A’s posterior credence that he will be
executed (let Y = {AeBe, AeCe, AeDe, BeCe, BeDe, CeDe}):
p(AE|B will be released) = p(B will be released|AE)p(AE)
∑i∈Y p(B will be released|i)p(i)
=
p(B will be released∩AE)
p(AE) × p(Ae)
∑i∈Y p(B will be released|i)p(i)
=
p(B will be released∩ AE)
∑i∈Y p(B will be released|i)p(i)
=
∑j∈AE p(B will be released|j)p(j)
∑i∈Y p(B will be released|i)p(i)
=
0× 16 + 12 + 16 + 12 × 16
0× 16 + 12 + 16 + 12 × 16 + 0× 16 + 0× 16 + 1× 16
=
1
2
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Now, let’s depart from the formulation of the 3 Prisoner problem
above and reflect on a situation in which we ask what credence Pris-
oner A assigns to being released upon hearing the guard’s answer.
To look at this, it is easier to re-model the scenario as such (let now
ArBr stand for prisoners A and B will be released)
ArBr ArCr ArDr BrCr BrDr CrDr
B will be released 1 0 0 1/2 1/2 0
C will be released 0 1 0 1/2 0 1/2
D will be released 0 0 1 0 1/2 1/2
Table 40: Protocol 2 for 4-2-1 Prisoners
An easy calculation will establish that
p(Ar|B will be released) = 1
2
, but
p(Cr|B will be released) = 1
4
We can further re-imagine the standard presentation of the scenario
to reflect on what would happen if the guard won’t say who will be
released, but rather who will be executed:
ArBr ArCr ArDr BrCr BrDr CrDr
B will be executed 0 1/2 1/2 0 0 1
C will be executed 1/2 0 1/2 0 1 0
D will be executed 1/2 1/2 0 1 0 0
Table 41: Protocol 3 for 4-2-1 Prisoners
Another easy calculation will establish that in this case, too:
p(Ar|B will be executed) = 1
2
, but
p(Cr|B will be executed) = 3
4
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Finally, we can imagine the guard having a choice between taking
the letter to another Prisoner who is to be released or one who is
to be executed. To construct the protocol for the guard in this case,
we need to make some refinements to assumption 3 above. We can
tweak assumption 3 in two salient ways. One possible (and salient)
protocol would be the following:
5. The guard will use a random device to decide whom to deliver
the letter to.
ArBr ArCr ArDr BrCr BrDr CrDr
B will be released 1/3 0 0 1/3 1/3 0
C will be released 0 1/3 0 1/3 0 1/3
D will be released 0 0 1/3 0 1/3 1/3
B will be executed 0 1/3 1/3 0 0 1/3
C will be executed 1/3 0 1/3 0 1/3 0
D will be executed 1/3 1/3 0 1/3 0 0
Table 42: Protocol 4 for 4-2-1 Prisoners
With this protocol in mind, Prisoner A’s posterior credence in being
released after hearing what the guard tells him about prisoners B, C,
or D will be released will be:
p(Ar|B will be released) = 1
3
,
p(Ar|C will be released) = 1
3
,
p(Ar|D will be released) = 1
3
.
But this looks very similar to what we identified as the incorrect
reasoning above. Wouldn’t Prisoner A in this case think that he may
be hallucinating and that his prior in A should be 13 , too (see the
quote from Pearl, above). No! Although Prisoner A believes the
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guard could give any of these three answers (i.e. B will be released,
C will be released and D will be released), they do not exhaust all
the pieces of information Prisoner A believes the guard could pass
on to him. The guard could also tell him that B will be executed,
C will be executed or that D will be executed. His posteriors upon
learning any of these will be:
p(Ar|B will be executed) = 2
3
,
p(Ar|B will be executed) = 2
3
,
p(Ar|B will be executed) = 2
3
.
To wit, it isn’t the case that Prisoner A can be thinking that
whatever the guard tells him, his credence in being executed would
drop to 1/3. It could also increase to 2/3. He can be sure that
the information he receives will have an impact on his credences
regarding his own predicament, but he cannot be sure what that
impact will be. So no danger of hallucinating.
There is a different salient way in which Assumption 3 could be
tweaked and this in turn generates yet a further possible protocol.
6. The guard will use a random device to decide whether to de-
liver the letter to one of the prisoners awaiting execution or to
one of those who will be released and then another (indepen-
dent) random device to decide which one of the soon to be
released/executed prisoners should receive it.
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ArBr ArCr ArDr BrCr BrDr CrDr
B will be released 1/2 0 0 1/4 1/4 0
C will be released 0 1/2 0 1/4 0 1/4
D will be released 0 0 1/2 0 1/4 1/4
B will be executed 0 1/4 1/4 0 0 1/2
C will be executed 1/4 0 1/4 0 1/2 0
D will be executed 1/4 1/4 0 1/2 0 0
Table 43: Protocol 5 for 4-2-1 Prisoners
On this protocol, the answer the guard gives Prisoner A won’t have
an impact on his credence regarding his own predicament, but it
will affect what he believes regarding the fate of others:
p(Ar|B will be released) = 1
2
,
p(Ar|B will be executed) = 1
2
, but
p(Cr|B will be released) = 1
3
,
p(Cr|B will be executed) = 2
3
,
10.3 the op, carefully
Let’s recall the principle: For a credence function p over an algebra
S, for E ⊆ S such that p(E)=1 and some proposition H ⊆ S and
value v ∈ [0, 1]: if for any e ∈ E were an agent to come to know it
(and not to learn or forget anything else), then his or her credence
in H would be v, then that agent ought to have a credence of v in
H.
Recall also that the model 〈X, S, p〉 presented in section 1 appeared
to show the principle didn’t hold. In that model, there were two
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possible sets E, viz. {WIN2, WIN3, WIN4} and {LOSE2, LOSE3,
LOSE4}, but the agent’s posterior credence in WIN1 given she
came to learn any of the elements of the former was 1/3, whereas
learning any of the elements of the former would increase her
posterior to 2/3.
However, what the 3 Prisoners (and its variations) teaches us is
that one has to be very careful when modelling the information an
agent comes to know. In particular, one has to take into account
the explicit or implicit information-gathering process underlying
the act of learning described in a scenario. With the information-
gathering process clearly articulated, it is not longer the case that
any proposition expressed in the algebra can come to be known.
Only those which are stipulated by the information-gathering
process can come the agent’s way. What this shows is that OP is
indeed ambiguous, but the ambiguity relates to how we construe
‘coming to know’: in the naive way which leads Prisoner A to
worrying he may be hallucinating, or in a more sophisticated way,
which delivers the correct posterior credences. The discussion of
the 3 Prisoners above should stand as evidence that we ought to
follow the latter modelling strategy.
Now, carefully accounting for the information-gathering process
turns the set of propositions on which the agent can conditionalise
into a partition. This is easy to observe in relation to all the exam-
ples discussed in the previous section. Each element of that set is
one of the possible items of information the agent could learn. This
is implicit in Shafer’s (1985, Appendix 1) formal model of protocols
as trees and is discussed at length in Grünwald (2013). The latter
also formulates a rule of thumb:
Briefly, for general spaces Y , if the set of events X on
which you can condition is not a partition of Y , then
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conditioning on any of these events is unsafe. (Grünwald,
2013, p. 243)
In consequence, when ‘coming to know’ is restricted to only refer
to the propositions that accrue to the agent given the information-
gathering process, OP becomes a theorem of the probability
calculus. The proof is immediate and is also included in Mahtani
(forthcoming, fn. 21). Mahtani, however, seems to believe the set
of propositions you can learn can only form a partition under the
super-know reading of OP and doesn’t recognise its relevance for
the basic-know reading under the information-gathering process.
With these conceptual clarifications let’s see why the 4-2-1 Prisoners
under Protocol 4 (the reason we focus on this example will become
apparent in the next section) doesn’t represent a counterexample
to OP. According to Protocol 4, there are only 6 answers the guard
could give Prisoner A, so only 6 viable propositions the agent could
come to know and consequently, 6 possible candidates for elements
for the set E stipulated in the formulation of OP. As we saw above,
although the first three possible answers would all change A’s be-
liefs with respect to his own fate in the same way, the latter three
answers the guard could give him have a different impact on his cre-
dences. An easy verification will show that this holds of all possible
propositions H, in the event space generated by that protocol. There-
fore, the antecedent of OP is false for the case of 4-2-1 Prisoners so
the principle continues to hold.
10.4 mahtani’s argument, carefully
It is easy to observe the case of 4-2-1 Prisoners is completely analo-
gous to Mahtani’s WSL: let the 4 prisoners stand for the four lottery
tickets; to win the lottery is to be released, to lose the lottery is
to be executed; and the guard’s answer represents being informed
180 the opaque proposition principle and information-gathering processes
that a particular ticket is a winning or a losing one. Why then did
Mahtani reach a different conclusion?
Mahtani makes two passes at analysing WSL. The first one is
presented in section 1, above. And its mistake is the same as the
intuitive analysis of the 3 Prisoners: it ignores the information-
gathering process and assumes learning that ‘Ticket 2 is a winning
ticket’ is the same as conditionalising on WIN2.
Mahtani makes a second pass at analysing WSL, though, this time
thinking explicitly about an information-gathering process analo-
gous to Protocol 4 above: "the organizer selected a ticket from
amongst tickets 2, 3 and 4 at random, and told you the outcome
for that ticket regardless of whether it won or lost." (Mahtani, forth-
coming, p. 21) Nevertheless she quickly argues that this wouldn’t
impact the result of her original analysis of WSL in a significant
way. That casts a doubt over the previous section. Her argument is
as follows:
suppose that E is WIN3: similar reasoning applies
if E is instead either WIN2 or WIN4. Then when
WIN3 is revealed to you, you come to know both
WIN3 (E), and (F) the fact that ticket 3 has been
randomly selected from amongst tickets 2, 3 and 4
to be revealed to you. Thus your new credence in
WIN1 should equal your prior credence conditional
on this new evidence, i.e. Cr(WIN1|WIN3& F) =
Cr(WIN1&WIN3&F)/Cr(WIN3&F). Cr(WIN1&WIN3&F)
= Cr(WIN1&WIN3)×Cr(F),because F is independent of
(WIN1&WIN3): which ticket was randomly selected
to be revealed to you does not depend on which
tickets have been selected to win the lottery. Thus
Cr(WIN1&WIN3&F) = Cr(WIN1&WIN3)×Cr(F)=1/6 ×
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1/3 = 1/18. Similarly Cr(WIN3&F) = Cr(WIN3)×Cr(F) =
1/2 × 1/3 = 1/6. Thus Cr(WIN1|WIN3&F) = 1/18/1/6
= 1/3. (Mahtani, forthcoming, fn. 28)
If OP were to hold, the prior credence in WIN1, Mahtani argues,
should drop to 1/3. The above reasoning is, however, incorrect. To
see this begin by noticing that Mahtani’s modelling language is
not clear: she re-uses the names WIN1, WIN2, WIN3 and WIN4
without explaining what propositions they denote. One natural
assumption would be to suppose they denote the same propositions
as before (see the explanation of the model underlying her initial
analysis of WSL in section 1). However in this passage Mahtani
isn’t analysing WSL, but a puzzle like WSL which also specifies a
particular information-gathering process. The first glimpse we are
in a different set-up is when Mahtani introduces the proposition F.
But again she doesn’t explain what its denotation is. In the next
paragraph I show that there are two possible denotations for the
names WIN1, WIN2, WIN3 and WIN4 Mahtani could be assuming
in the above passage, but for both of them Mahtani’s conclusion
doesn’t follow.
Let the probabilistic model 〈X′, S′, p〉 represent WSL with the
information-gathering process presented above. The sample space
should contain information about both the outcome of the lottery
X={(1,2),(1,3),(1,4),(2,3),(2,4),(3,4)} and of the ticket to be revealed,
that is Y={F,F’,F”}, where F is the proposition that ticket 3 is to be
revealed, F’ that ticket 2 will be revealed and finally, F”, that ticket
4 will be revealed. Notice the elements in Y cannot be expressed
in terms of the elements in X - as Mahtani correctly points out, a
good model of the scenario would make the choice of the ticket
to be revealed independent of the winning tickets. Therefore,
X′ 6= X (this is the reason why the denotation of WIN3, say, cannot
remain the same as in the initial modelling of WSL without the
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information-gathering process). One natural way of defining the
sample space is X′ = X × Y and we can then take S′ = 2X′ . In this
model "Ticket 3 is a winning ticket" is the proposition W3, that is
{(1,3,F),(1,3,F’),(1,3,F”),(2,3,F),(2,3,F’),(2,3,F”),(3,4,F),(3,4,F’),(3,4,F”)},
whereas "Ticket 3 will be revealed" is X × F. The probability
function is defined in the intuitive way: p(X × F) = p(X × F′) =
p(X× F′′) = 13 and p(W1) = p(W2) = p(W3) = p(W4) = 12 .
What is WIN3, say, in Mahtani’s argument? The first possibility is
that what she calls WIN3 is in fact W3, that is the proposition that
ticket 3 is a winning ticket. If that is the case, however, upon learn-
ing it you don’t "come to know both WIN3 (E), and (F) the fact that
ticket 3 has been randomly selected from amongst tickets 2, 3 and 4
to be revealed to you". It is easy to check W3 is compatible with both
F’ and F” and, hence, on this interpretation Mahtani’s argument
doesn’t follow. The second possibility is that WIN3 is W3&F. In this
case learning it will reveal that "ticket 3 has been randomly selected
from amongst tickets 2, 3 and 4 to be revealed to you". However,
E cannot simply be the set {WIN2, WIN3, WIN4} because in this
model, the propositions W2&F, W3&F,W4&F do not exhaust the
entire space. The world can be such that both W3 and F’: that ticket
3 is a winning ticket but nevertheless ticket 2 is randomly selected
to be revealed. In other words, given the information-gathering pro-
cess Mahtani specifies, the organiser could also announce that ticket
2 has lost. Nevertheless, the posterior credence in the proposition
that ticket 1 is a winning ticket after learning that ticket 2 has lost,
say, is 23 . So the antecedent of OP is still not satisfied.
10.5 conclusion
To sum up, for conditionalization to be justified, one first needs
to know what information could come one’s way. In other words,
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conditionalization cannot be the method used for incorporating
new evidence unless you know before the new information comes
what you can (and cannot) learn. Then, when you learn X, you also
learn ‘in some way’ that you have learnt it (what Mahtani would
probably call ‘coming to super-know’ X), but this means that you
learn that out of the different pieces of information that could have
been delivered, X was the one that actually was sent to you.
Without formally capturing (in the probability model) the
information-gathering process, conditionalisation is not guaranteed
to deliver the correct answer to what it means to learn a proposi-
tion. If a scenario doesn’t contain any explicit reference about the
information-gathering process - the scenario is under-specified, and
if there isn’t any salient way of filling in that gap or if we don’t want
to commit to any way of doing so, then you should be very wary of
applying conditionalisation to model learning in that scenario. This
is the lesson of the Monty Hall, the 3 Prisoners, etc.

Part IV
R AT I O N A L I T Y I N P R A C T I C E
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O N A D I L E M M A O F R E D I S T R I B U T I O N
McKenzie Alexander (2013) presents a dilemma for a social planner
who wants to correct an unfair distribution of an indivisible good
between two equally worthy individuals or groups:
dilemma Either social planner guarantees a fair outcome, or she
follows a fair procedure (but not both).
The argument is disconcertingly simple. Suppose the initial distri-
bution is biased against b. If b nevertheless receives the good against
all odds, as it were, it would seem unfair to take it away from
her. However, if a receives the good then the social planner would
want to intervene and redistribute. There are two strategies the
social planner could follow when redistributing: the redistribution
could be fair, offering equal chances to a and b of winning the good
redistributed, or it could be unfair. McKenzie Alexander proves
that if the social planner follows the former strategy, then ex ante, a
and b have unequal chances of receiving the good. The procedure
for redistributing is fair, but the outcome is that b is favoured
(overall). On the other hand, if the social planner follows the latter
strategy, then equal chances can be guaranteed ex ante, assuming
the social planner chooses the appropriate biased lottery, but the
redistribution would be biased against b. To wit, the social planner
can either employ a fair redistribution procedure or guarantee a fair
distributive mechanism ex ante. But not both!
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In this paper I show that Dilemma only holds if the social planner
can redistribute the good in question at most once. Consider the
scenario that McKenzie Alexander discusses:
1
3
yy
2
3
%%
a : L; b : W a : W; b : L p0b(W) =
1
3
There are two ways the scenario can play out. Either a wins (W,
and b loses, L) or b wins. The chance of a winning is 23 and the
chance of b winning is the complement, 13 . We assumed a and b
are equally worthy and thus, following, they have an equal claim to
the good (Broome, 1990). Since b’s chance of receiving the good is
less than 12 as a result of this distribution, it means she is aggrieved.
If the b nevertheless wins, Mckenzie Alexander contends the social
planner should refrain from interfering. Taking the good away from
b would be like punishing her for making it despite the odds which
were stacked against her. So the social planner should only interfere
when a wins this distribution. Assume then she follows the first
strategy outlined above.
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At the level of the redistribution both a and b are given an equal
chance of winning the good by the social planner. This is in line with
their (equal) claim. However, if this is how the social planner inter-
feres, the redistributive mechanism he thus creates awards b an ex
ante higher chance of winning the good than her claim, p1b(W) =
2
3 .
If we assume that a had no doing in the initial bias in his favour, we
have a strong intuition this set-up is unfair. This is the first horn of
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Dilemma. By redistributing fairly, i.e. according to the claims of the
two individuals involved, the social planner generated an ex ante un-
fair mechanism. Can the social planner do anything to correct this ex
ante unfairness? The answer is YES. He can redistribute once again
if the individual aggrieved by the last redistribution performed does
not win the good. In this case, after the first redistribution, a is left
with a chance of winning less than his claim. So whenever a loses
the good, the social planner seems entitled to offer him another, fair
chance.
1
3
ww
2
3
''
a : L; b : W a : W; b : L
1
2
xx
1
2
&&
a : W; b : L a : L; b : W
1
2
xx
1
2
&&
a : L; b : W a : W; b : L
p0b(W) =
1
3
<
1
2
p1b(W) =
1
3
+
2
3
× 1
2
=
2
3
>
1
2
p2b(W) =
1
3
+
2
3
× 1
22
=
1
2
=
1
2
Evaluate the situation after the first redistribution: a is now ag-
grieved since a’s ex ante chance of winning the good, p1a(W) =
1
3 <
1
2 .
Therefore the social planner can redistribute again whenever a loses
the redistribution. After the second redistribution, both individuals
a and b now have equal ex ante chances of winning the good
which is being distributed and hence there is no need for the social
planner to correct when one of them loses. This is good news, but
notice that the analysis was dependent on the initial bias. It worked
for p = 13 . Does the solution work for all initial biases (for all unfair
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distributions)? The answer is again YES. Figure 4 tracks how the
ex ante chances of winning the good evolve over 10 redistributions
for values of the initial bias between 0 and 12 in 0.01 increments. A
formal proof is provided at the end.
Figure 4: The evolution of the ex ante chances of winning the good over 10
redistributions for values of the initial bias between 0 and 1/2 in
0.01 increments
McKenzie Alexander writes that
[s]ometimes the correct response to an injustice gener-
ated by an unfair decision procedure is to use another
unfair decision procedure, which appears to disadvan-
tage (in some sense) the same person again. In these
cases, two wrongs do make a right.(McKenzie Alexander,
2013, p. 230, my emphasis)
The result of this paper then is that the bias against an aggrieved
individual always washes out when we allow for sufficiently many
redistributions. In other words, we do not have to make a second
wrong in order to make right by the aggrieved: at most infinitely
many rights will do. This is encouraging. But even if it is always the
on a dilemma of redistribution 191
case that a social planner can correct an initial unfair distribution
by behaving fairly towards both the aggrieved and the favoured, no
social planner has infinite time and resources. Can anything bet-
ter be done for real social planners? The answer is one last time YES.
I contend it is unproblematic to assume people are not sensitive to
minute differences in probabilities. Then let the sensitivity of the
most sensitive member of the two person society we are concerned
about in this paper be δ. I investigated two possible values for δ:
δ1 = 0.001 and δ2 = 0.01. Under δ1 the individuals in the society
cannot tell a .500 chance of winning the good apart from a .5001
chance. Under δ2 they cannot tell apart a .50 from a .51 chance
of winning the good. It turns out that for δ1 it takes at most nine
redistributions for the probability of winning for b to reach the
interval [.499, .501] and hence become identical to 12 . For δ2, the
probability of winning for b reaches a value in [.49, .51] in at most six
redistributions.1 The result is interesting as it tells us that no matter
what the bias of an initial distribution is, it is always possible for
a social planner to offer the two participants to the distribution
equal ex ante chances of winning the good in at most six fair
redistributions (assuming that the most sensitive of the aggrieved
and the favoured of the original distribution has sensitivity δ2).
This is something that a real social planner can actually make use of.
In conclusion, contrary to McKenzie Alexander’s point, there is no
tension between procedural and outcome fairness as long as the
social planner is given the opportunity to redistribute sufficiently
many times. It may be the case that “sometimes... two wrongs
make a right" but so do a wrong and infinitely many rights. And in
1 This resulted by testing all values of the initial bias, p, between 0 and 12 in 0.01
increments in Mathematica 8. Notebooks used are available upon request.
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fact, a wrong and sufficiently many rights (depending on p and δ)
are right enough.
proof of main result
Let xi stand for the probability of the aggrieved of the initial distri-
bution winning after the ith redistribution,
x1 = p + (1− p)12
xn = xn−1 + (1− p) 12n iff xn−1 <
1
2
= xn−1 − (1− p) 12n iff xn−1 >
1
2
=
1
2
iff xn−1 =
1
2
We can now formally state the main result of this paper:
limn→∞(xn) = 12 . Let the following sequences stand for the elements
in (xn) less than 12 and greater than
1
2 , respectively:
(an) = {a ∈ (xn) : a < 12}
(bn) = {b ∈ (xn) : b > 12}
In order to prove Theorem 1 it is enough to prove that the limit of
both (an) and (bn) is 12 . The proofs are symmetrical and we will only
show the proof for (bn). We will first show that (bn) is decreasing
and then (by the Squeezing Theorem) that its limit is indeed 12 .
Take bm ∈ (bn). By construction, bm ∈ (xn). Suppose it corresponds
to element xn ∈ (xn). Remark that m may differ from n. Since
bm > 12 , xn >
1
2 . Therefore xn+1 = xn − (1− p) 12n+1 . If xn+1 > 12 then
xn+1 = bm+1 if not, xn+2 = xn − (1− p) 12n+1 + (1− p) 12n+2 and so
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on. Therefore, depending on the value of p, bm+1 = xn+kn , for some
natural number kn.2
bm+1 = xn − (1− p) 12n+1 + (1− p)
1
2n+2
+ · · ·+ (1− p) 1
2n+kn
= xn − (1− p)( 12n+1 −
1
2n+2
− · · · − 1
2n+kn
)
= xn − (1− p) 12n+kn
In consequence,
bm − bm+1 = xn − xn + (1− p) 12n+kn
= (1− p) 1
2n+kn
> 0
This concludes the proof that (bm) is a decreasing sequence. In order
to show that the limit of all elements in (xn) greater than 12 when
n→ ∞ is 12 it is enough to show that
1
2
− 1
2n
≤ (xn)xn≥ 12 ≤
1
2
+
1
2n+1+kn+1
If this is the case, by the Squeeze Theorem
limn→∞(xn)xn≥ 12 = limn→∞(
1
2
− 1
2n
) = limn→∞(
1
2
+
1
2n+1+kn
) =
1
2
The first inequality obviously holds since all elements of the se-
quence (12 − 12n ) are at most 12 . And all elements of (xn)xn≥ 12 ≥
1
2 ,
by construction. Then we only need to check the second inequality.
We do this by induction:
x1 = p + (1− p)12 ≤
1
2
+
1
21+1+k1
2 kn has to be at least 1, in which case both xn and xn+1 are greater than 12 ; and
kn+1 ≥ kn
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Since k1 is 0 (as x1 ≥ 12 for all values of p), the right hand side of the
inequality will equal 34 which is the highest value (xn) reaches:
xn ≤ 12 +
1
2n+1+kn
xn − (1− p) 12n+kn ≤
1
2
+
1
2n+1+kn
− (1− p) 1
2n+kn
xn+k ≤ 12 +
1
2n+1+kn
− (1− p) 1
2n+kn
What the induction aims to establish is that xn+kn ≤ 12 + 12n+2+kn+1 . So
we need to show that (the following reasoning steps are all equiva-
lent):
1
2
+
1
2n+1+kn
− (1− p) 1
2n+kn
≤ 1
2
+
1
2n+2+kn+1
1
2n+1+kn
− 1
2n+2+kn+1
≤ (1− p) 1
2n+kn
21+kn+1−kn − 1 ≤ (1− p)22+kn+1−kn
21+kn+1−kn − (1− p)22+kn+1−kn ≤ 1
21+kn+1−kn(1− 2+ p) ≤ 1
21+kn+1−kn(p− 1) ≤ 1
But p− 1 < 0 for all values of p
Therefore, for all values of p, all n: xn ≤ 12 + 12n+1+kn . This concludes
the proof.
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A N E F F I C I E N C Y A R G U M E N T F O R U N I S E X
R E S T R O O M S
In this paper we construct a model to evaluate the waiting times
for unisex vs. gender-segregated restrooms and show by means of
simulations that, given certain plausible assumptions, the unisex
set-up provides drastic reductions in the total waiting times. This
translates into greater productivity at lower overhead costs in terms
of estates for firms. The move to unisex restrooms will indirectly
benefit members of the trans∗1 community, carers of people with
disabilities, as well as parents and children of different genders.
Moreover it will contribute towards increased potty parity.
In the past year we have witnessed a heated public debate regarding
whether restroom access should be linked to one’s sex at birth.
But the debate goes at least back to the 70s: according to Mary
Anne Case, part of the opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment
was (at least) publicly justified by a warning that "passage of the
ERA would mean a mandatory end to restrooms segregated by
sex. Leaflets urging voters to reject the [Equal Rights Act] even
claimed it was ‘also known as the Common Toilet Law.’" (Case,
2010, p. 1) The debate has now been rekindled and focused on
how our society should treat its members who identify as trans∗.
1 We follow Seelman (2016) and use "trans∗ to denote inclusion of a broader range
of gender non-conforming identities, including those who may not use the term
transgender for themselves." (Seelman, 2016, fn. 1)
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House Bill 2 (HB2) in North Carolina2 and G.G. v. Gloucester County
School Board3 have provided the crucible for debating this question.
Discussions surrounding these two cases have largely been carried
out in terms of justice and safety: As to justice, there is an issue of
minority rights: Should the needs of a small minority be protected
against the preferences of a large majority for sex-segregated
bathrooms? As to safety, the question is whether accommodating
the trans∗ minority would bring about a decrease in security of
other vulnerable groups, viz. girls and women.
Both ways of framing the debate tend to engage people’s moral and
political intuitions from widely divergent sides of the political and
socioeconomic spectrum and lead to a very polarized arena with
participants becoming more and more entrenched in their positions.
Moreover, each party feels that the other is disrespectful of their
deeply held beliefs, making dialogue difficult. To make some
headway in this debate, we propose a different way of framing the
issue, one we hope will provide some common ground among all
groups.
Our idea is simple: de-segregate restrooms and transform all re-
strooms into unisex facilities. The move to unisex restrooms in-
creases economic efficiency in two ways. Firstly, preserving the
current architecture but opening all stalls to everyone, it leads to
a drastic reduction in waiting times. Secondly, calculating the maxi-
mum waiting time allowed by current legislation for the segregated
set-up we can calculate how many toilets we can eliminate in a uni-
sex set-up so that the waiting times are still under the current max-
imum threshold. Since everyone cares about economic efficiency,
2 http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2015E2/Bills/House/PDF/H2v4.pdf
3 http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/gloucester-county-school-
board-v-g-g/
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there is at least one argument in favour of unisex restrooms that all
can agree on.
12.1 background
In the past year we have seen a surge in legislation, public debate
and scandals surrounding the way we use public restrooms. In this
section we very briefly try to take stock of what has happened in
the US, as well as in Canada and the UK.
12.1.1 United States
In the 2017 legislative session, sixteen states “have considered
legislation that would restrict access to multiuser restrooms,
locker rooms, and other sex-segregated facilities on the basis of a
definition of sex or gender consistent with sex assigned at birth
or ‘biological sex.’”4 Six states have “considered legislation that
would preempt municipal and county-level anti-discrimination
laws,”5 and fourteen states “have considered legislation that would
limit transgender students’ rights at school.”6 Nevertheless, North
Carolina is the only state so far to pass a bathroom bill, i.e. the now
repealed HB2.
The backlash against HB2 has been impressive. Associated Press
tracked businesses that have changed their plans of investing in
the State as a consequence of the bill, such as a PayPal, and enter-
tainment events that were cancelled or postponed, such as a Ringo
Star concert, the NCAA games, etc. and concluded that it would
cost North Carolina an estimated $3.76 billion in lost business over
4 http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-bathroom-bill-legislative-
tracking635951130.aspx
5 Idem.
6 Idem.
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a dozen year period if the bill were to stay in place.7 Under the
mounting pressure, the state legislature repealed and replaced HB2
by HB1428 on 30 March 2017. Although the provisions of HB142
are themselves highly controversial (for good reasons), the bill effec-
tively stopped the boycott of the state.
12.1.2 United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the public discourse around the issue of
unisex restrooms is less heated. Firstly, more and more schools are
introducing unisex facilities,9 and with few exceptions,10 the move
seems to be unopposed.
Secondly, the Barbican Centre in London changed a pair of its
restrooms into ‘gender-neutral with urinals’ and ‘gender-neutral
with cubicle‘ restrooms. In other words they have just converted
existing men’s and women’s restrooms into ‘gender-neutral’ ones.
While the move was received with some opposition,11 the issue
with the decision involved the resulting inequality between men
and women in terms of access to facilities. It was not that men
could enter the women’s restroom that infuriated patrons, but that
they would now have more access opportunities both in their old
restroom (now gender-neutral with urinals) and in the women’s
restroom (now gender-neutral without urinals), wheareas very few
7 https://apnews.com/fa4528580f3e4a01bb68bcb272f1f0f8
8 http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2017/Bills/House/HTML/H142v5.html
9 Several award-winning school designs include unisex facilities for the pupils. See
for instance, pp. 22-23 of http://www.parliament.scot/S4_FinanceCommittee/
Meeting%20Papers/2016_01_18_Public_Papers(1).pdf.
10 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/unisex-school-
toilets-gender-neutral-london-inclusive-bathrooms-lgbt-same-sex-
a7441841.html
11 https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/women-queue-up-to-condemn-arts-
centres-unisex-lavatories-jq9mswjsp
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women would have taken advantage of the possibility to enter the
‘gender-neutral’ with urinals restroom.
Finally, during a parliamentary debate on December 2016 on trans-
gender equality, Caroline Flint (Labour MP for Don Valley and
Shadow Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change) stated
that
I welcome the debate, because it is vital for us to consider
the issue of transgender rights, but should we not also be
wary of creating gender-neutral environments that may
prove more of a risk to women themselves? A recent
case involving my old university, the University of East
Anglia, which has gender-neutral toilets, revealed that
a man had been using those facilities to harass women.
He was charged and convicted. How does the right hon.
Lady [Mrs. Maria Miller, the Conservative MP for Bas-
ingstoke] think we can protect women from male vio-
lence in gender-neutral environments?12
12.1.3 Canada
Finally, the discussion on restrooms in Canada has revolved around
the seemingly innocuous Bill C-16. The proposal is to "[amend] the
Canadian Human Rights Act to add gender identity and gender
expression to the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination."13 Ac-
tivists opposing the bill have argued that adopting it would soon
lead to opening women’s facilities to anyone who declares to iden-
tify as such and this, in turn, will lead to an increase in violence
12 https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2016-12-01/debates/D4F283FB-
2C02-4C8C-8C7E-BEAB889D1425/TransgenderEquality
13 https://openparliament.ca/bills/42-1/C-16/?tab=mentions
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against women.14 Interpreting the bill as a first step towards giving
people who identify as trans∗ the choice of which restroom to use
has some support especially given that a previous attempt to pass
this bill in 2015 failed due to an amendment that explicitly exempted
restrooms and changing rooms.15 So the opinion of the Canadian
legislative seems to be that people who identify as trans∗ should
have their right to choose the restroom they use protected by law.
Despite the dissent, Bill C-19 was voted into law on June 19, 2017.
12.2 three problems regarding access to public facili-
ties
In the past year the media has focused almost entirely on how bath-
room bills impact the members of the trans∗ community. And justly
so since the laws have been directly targeted at them. But, neverthe-
less, they are not the only group affected. A second group further
marginalized by defining bathroom access in terms of one’s sex or
gender is that of people with a disability who require a carer. In
many circumstances the carer and the person they are caring for
have different genders and making a choice as to which facilities to
use raises significant issues. Finally, this paper will also discuss a
problem related to bathroom access which is not directly connected
to the recent legislation, viz. the differential access to restrooms for
women vs. men. I expand on all three issues below and explore
some of the solutions that have been offered on both sides of the
ideological spectrum.
14 http://womanmeanssomething.com/
15 https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/sep/08/canadians-support-
transgender-rights-poll
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12.2.1 Access trans∗
According to the largest survey of the experiences of trans∗ people
in the US (James et al., 2016), 59% of respondents (out of 27,715
surveyed) sometimes refrained from using a restroom outside of
their home in the previous year. One of the main rationale given
was fear of confrontations. The same survey also found that 24%
were asked in the previous year at least once whether they were in
the right restroom and 9% were deliberately denied or stopped from
using a restroom over the same period of time. Finally, and more
worryingly, 12% of respondents were "verbally harassed, physically
attacked, and/or sexual assaulted when accessing or while using a
restroom in the past year", 32% refrained from drinking or eating
and 8% developed a urinary-tract infection or other kidney-related
problems (due to refraining from using the restroom). Therefore,
access to bathrooms represents not only an encroachment on this
minority’s rights and liberties, but poses a public health risk as
well. A solution is required and in recent years we have witnessed
both conservative and liberal attempts to tackle the problem. The
former involves creating ’special’ facilities for trans∗ individuals
(which may take the form of unisex single-stall facilities). The latter,
allowing all individual access to the facility matching the gender
they identify with (and expanding the Civil Rights Act to protect
this right against discrimination).
The best know example of the Conservative strategy to tackle the
problem of bathroom access for members of the trans∗ community
is that of Gavin Grimm. At the beginning of his sophomore year
in 2014, Gavin informed his school of his intention to begin transi-
tioning in all aspects of his life and with his principals’s approval
began using the men’s restrooms.16 Nevertheless, upon receiving
16 https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/gavin-
grimm-just-wanted-to-use-the-bathroom-he-didnt-think-the-
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complaints from some some of the parents the Gloucester School
Board voted 6-1 on 9 December 2014 to adopt a policy limiting
access to restrooms "to the corresponding biological genders"17
and requiring “students with ‘gender identity issues’ to use an
alternative private facility.”18 Gavin and the ACLU fought the
decision up to the Supreme Court, but before the latter could rule,
the case was sent back to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
"to be reconsidered in light of the Departments of Justice and
Education rescinding of a Title IX guidance clarifying protections
for transgender students."19
The best known liberal solution to tackling the problem of re-
stroom access for trans∗ individuals is the controversial Charlotte
City Council Ordinance 7056, passed on February 22, 2016, and
extending the list of protected characteristics included in the City
Code to cover ‘sexual orientation’, ‘gender identity’ and ‘gender
expression’.20 Moreover, the Ordinance removed Section 12-59 of
the City Code that was allowing for sex-based discrimination in
access to restrooms, shower rooms, dormitories, etc. The Ordinance
took effect on 1 April 2016 and generated ample public debate
especially after the State legislature passed HB2 and in effect
repealed it.
The advantage of the conservative solution is that it offers secure
access to restroom facilities for members of the trans∗ community
nation-would-debate-it/2016/08/30/23fc9892-6a26-11e6-ba32-
5a4bf5aad4fa_story.html?utm_term=.15eacd85a3c3
17 https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-supreme-court-rejects-
transgender-rights-case-n729556
18 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/20/us/appeals-court-favors-
transgender-student-in-virginia-restroom-case.html
19 https://www.aclu.org/cases/gg-v-gloucester-county-school-board
20 http://charlottenc.gov/NonDiscrimination/Documents/NDO%20Ordinance%
207056.pdf#search=ordinance%207056
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by offering them separate facilities. However, at the same time it
denies their claim to transition socially and be recognised as having
the gender they wish to be identified with. On the other hand, while
the liberal solution does offer them recognition and legal protection,
it doesn’t guarantee their safety in public restrooms (at least not by
itself). This problem is even more acute as it affects several members
of the trans∗ community more than others:
Transgender men (75%) were far more likely to report
sometimes or always avoiding using a public restroom,
in contrast to transgender women (53%) and non-binary
respondents (53%). Undocumented residents were also
more likely to report sometimes or always avoiding using
a public restroom in the past year (72%). Eighty percent
(80%) of respondents who said that others could always
or usually tell that they were transgender and 72% of
those who said that others can sometimes tell they are
transgender reported avoiding using public restroom, in
contrast to 48% of those who said that others can rarely
or never tell that they are transgender (James et al., 2016)
In other words, those who can ‘pass’ more easily are less affected by
the laws of urinary segregation as they have fewer problems inside
restrooms than those for whom it is more difficult to pass as the
gender they identify with (if any).
12.2.2 Access for people with disabilities
An unintended target of the Bathroom Wars generated by the
situation in North Carolina has been the group of people with
disabilities, including physical and developmental disabilities,
who sometimes cannot safely use the restroom without assistance.
According to Sam Crane, the legal director and director of public
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policy for the nonprofit Autistic Self Advocacy Network, “[o]ften, a
person’s assistant will be someone of a different gender.”21 Indeed,
according to Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute, 89% of personal
care attendants are female, while according to the U.S. Census
Bureau, around 17% of men and 20% of women have a disability.22
Therefore, assuming that an equal percentage of disabled men
and women are in need of a carer, it is quite likely for men with
disabilities to have female carers. And in these cases, bills such
as HB2 pose a significant threat to how they access public restrooms.
Despite HB2 being silent on this issue, conservatives have recently
become more aware of this concern. While their approach is to con-
tinue limiting access to restrooms based on one’s ‘biological sex’,23
some of their proposals provide exceptions to this requirement for
the case of carers (and sometimes parents accompanying children).
For instance, out of the 16 states considering legislation restricting
access to multiuser restrooms, Texas’s Senate Bill 6, Virginia’s House
Bill 1612 and Washington’s House Bill 1011 explicitly made excep-
tions.24 The latter stipulates:
Nothing in this section prevents a minor child or a per-
son with a disability from entering a facility segregated
by gender when the child or person is a different gender
from the gender for which the facility is segregated if: (a)
A parent, guardian, supervisor, or caretaker is escorting
the minor child or the person with a disability to or from
21 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/parenting/wp/2017/05/16/
why-parents-of-kids-with-special-needs-are-fighting-bathroom-
bills/?utm_term=.1e9bc6cc222d
22 https://www.paraquad.org/blog/bathroom-bills-affect-people-with-
disabilities/
23 Different state laws have different provisions, but many define biological sex as
the sex assigned at birth and recorded in one’s birth certificate.
24 http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-bathroom-bill-legislative-
tracking635951130.aspx
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the facility, (b) the child or person is under the custody,
control, supervision, or care of the parent, guardian, su-
pervisor, or caretaker, and (c) the gender of the parent,
guardian, supervisor, or caretaker is the same as the gen-
der for which the facility is segregated.25
As of September 2017, out of the three only Washington’s HB1011 is
still being considered.
12.2.3 Access for women
It is a well-established fact that during the intermission of any kind
of event a long queue forms for the women’s restrooms, whereas
men walz in and out of their restrooms. This is taken by many
as evidence of an inherent inequality in the legislation on (and
architecture of) public venues. The claim that the situation should
change by bringing about parity not in terms of number of toilets,
or square meters, but waiting time, is known as the demand for
potty parity.
One of the cases that galvanised the public debate in the US is the
case of a woman who in 1990 was fined for causing a disturbance at
a Houston country-western concert by going into a men’s restroom.
Her decision was motivated by the long queue for the women’s
restroom. The Municipal Court acquitted her, but the media
dubbed the public debate that ensues ‘Pottygate.’26
The US federal standards, viz. regulation 1910.141(c)(1)(i) of the
US Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety Health Admin-
25 http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2017-18/Pdf/Bills/House%
20Bills/1011.pdf
26 http://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/03/us/woman-is-acquitted-in-trial-
for-using-the-men-s-room.html
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istration,27 aim to ensure equality of facilities and set the same
minimum number of facilities for both men and women. But
what this usually means is that men receive many more facilities:
although men’s restrooms may have fewer stalls than women’s,
they manage to fit in more urinals (less wall-space and surface) and
thus have more access opportunities. Moreover, research suggests
that women take longer to use the restroom (Baillie et al., 2009)
and they do so more often. All of these differences compound into
creating waiting time inequality in public venues. We will discuss
these matters in more depth below.
A natural answer to this problem is to increase the number of facili-
ties mandated by law. For instance, in 2005 New York City Council
passed the Women’s Restroom Equity Bill, requiring all new estab-
lishments to observe a ratio of 2:1 on women stalls vs. men stalls
and urinals.28 Already existing establishments are required to com-
ply with this when they undergo extensive renovation. Although
this kind of legisaltion is welcomed, it still falls short of being a
solution for two reasons: 1) its effects will take a long time to be
seen given the need of current establishments to go through signif-
icant architectural change; and 2) it is not obvious that all relevant
establishments will be able to comply. Many theatres and concert
halls are housed in listed buildings thus making any structural ren-
ovations subject to an impenetrable barrier of administrative checks
and approvals.
27 https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=
STANDARDS&p_id=9790#1910.141(c)(1)(i)
28 http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/26/nyregion/council-passes-a-bill-to-
shorten-the-line-at-the-ladies-room.html
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12.3 one solution to three problems : unisex re-
strooms
In this paper we propose a solution that would contribute towards
(partially) solving all three of the above problems: shifting from
gender segregated restrooms to unisex restrooms. With respect
to the first problem, unisex facilities eliminate the need to make
a decision as to which restroom to use and also eliminate the
gender-expectation of the patrons using that facility. With regards
to the second problem, unisex restrooms allow caregivers (and
parents) access to the facilities appropriate for the persons they
are assisting. Finally, with regards to the third problem, shifting
to unisex restrooms increases the number of facilities available to
women. As such they ensure parity for all patrons and (for certain
assumptions to be discussed below) the parity does not come at the
cost of leveling-down.
This idea is not new and both academic articles and op-ed pieces
have questioned the motivation of segregated facilities.29 For in-
stance, Terry Kogan writes that:
Some argue that one solution is to convert all public re-
strooms to unisex use, thereby eliminating the need to
even consider a patron’s sex. This might strike some
as bizarre or drastic. Many assume that separating re-
strooms based on a person’s biological sex is the “nat-
ural” way to determine who should and should not be
permitted to use these public spaces.30
The author of this piece in Slate asks:
29 For a history of the laws of urinary segregation see Kogan (2007).
30 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/11/gender-
bathrooms-transgender-men-women-restrooms
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Why is the bathroom seen as an untouchable, unchange-
able safe space? Naturally, everyone wants to be comfort-
able when taking care of bathroom business, but how is
a restroom different than other public spaces in which
people want to be left alone? Is it simply a social con-
struction? If comfort is the main concern, why is the
comfort of some people privileged over that of others?
And are we comfortable with that?31
And Kathryn Anthony and Meghan Dufresne observe that:
Gender-segregated restrooms no longer work for a sig-
nificant part of the population. Yet, family-friendly or
companion-care restrooms that allow males and females
to accompany each other, as well as unisex restrooms, are
still all too rare. (Anthony and Dufresne, 2007, p. 268)
Finally, Case writes that
Basic queuing theory confirms that making fully en-
closed single user facilities available to either sex on de-
mand, as airplane toilets are, would cut down on overall
waiting times and promote the most efficient use of avail-
able toilet facilities. Case (2010, p. 7)
Despite all of this discussion, this paper represents as far we are
aware, the first attempt at gauging the impact of such a policy
in terms of the economic advantage and efficiency it would bring
about. To do so, the paper sets itself the task of answering the fol-
lowing questions:
question 1 How much time do women waste queuing for female
facilities?
31 http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2013/12/26/
gender_neutral_bathrooms_all_bathrooms_should_be_open_to_all_users.html
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question 2 How much time do men waste queuing for male facil-
ities?
question 3 How much time would people waste queuing for fa-
cilities if they were to be open to all genders?
In the next section we present the method by which we attempted to
answer these three question and in the following section we discuss
the answers we came up with.
12.4 methodology
According to US Department of Labor’s Standard 29 CFR
1910.141(c)(1)(i) and the interpretation thereof employers have
to allow their employees as many restroom breaks as they require.32
Therefore the time they spend in the restroom is included in their
work contract and a company needs to allow for less productivity
during a day on account of restroom breaks.33 However, the same
does not hold for the time spent queuing in front of the restroom.
This is something an employer does have the legal right to try
to minimize. We can calculate the total waiting time incurred
by waiting to use a restroom by adding the waiting time of all
32 The interpretation makes it explicit that the standard "requires employers
to make toilet facilities available so that employees can use them when
they need to do so. The employer may not impose unreasonable restric-
tions on employee use of the facilities." https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/
owadisp.show_document?p_table=interpretations&p_id=22932
33 See though Zwiebel v. Plastipak Packaging in which the court’s decision stated
that "[w]hile there is a clear public policy in favor of allowing employees ac-
cess to workplace restrooms, it does not support the proposition that employ-
ees may leave their tasks or stations at any time without responsibly making
sure that production is not jeopardized. In recognition of an employer’s legit-
imate interest in avoiding disruptions, there is also a clear public policy in fa-
vor of allowing reasonable restrictions on employees’ access to the restrooms."
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5386413555521481804
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employees who require a restroom break. Less waiting time would
translate into a more efficient set-up which would allow for more
productivity. In this chapter we argue that the answers to Questions
1 to 3 above will show employers that it makes business sense to
introduce unisex restrooms
In order to answer Questions 1,2 and 3 above, we first need to
answer some preliminary questions. The answers to these questions
will determine the parameters of the model:
What is the time interval over which we evaluate the impact of the different
set-ups (segregated vs. unisex)? For the purposes of this model we
assumed this to be 120 time points, corresponding to 120 minutes.
Our interpretation is that this time period spans the period over
which every employee has to use the bathroom (no more and no
less than) once. Here is the motivation behind this. It is usually
assumed that people make between 6 and 8 ‘visits’ to the restroom
a day. Assuming 8 hours of sleep, 8 hours of work and 8 hours
of ‘rest’, we stipulated that during a work day an employee will
visit the restroom 4 times on average. Therefore, each employee is
assumed to visit the restroom once per every 2-hour block during
the workday. We assume these visits happen ‘at random’ within
each 2-hour block.
How long does a bathroom visit last? There is very little evidence
on the average time people spend in the restroom, although there
is ample anecdotal evidence of employers complaining about
employees taking ‘too many’ restroom breaks and women ‘taking
longer’. For the purposes of this model we assume the results of
Baillie et al. (2009). They tracked 120 college students using public
restrooms in a library and found that women take on average 178.9
sec. while men take 118.4 sec. We round these values to 3 time
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points (minutes) for women and 2 time points (minutes) for men.
Note that other studies arrived at different results. For instance,
(Case, 2010, p. 3) cites a study done by a Cornell student suggesting
that women spend on average 79 seconds, whereas men only
spend 45 seconds in the restroom. Our model is flexible enough
to accommodate other values, but we will not do so in the present
paper.
One thing to note about all the studies on this matter is that they
only measure the time spent in the restroom from going in to
coming out. There is no analysis of what aspect of the restroom
experience causes the difference in timing. Usual explanations
include: behaviour (women use the bathroom for more than just
bodily function), clothing (women’s clothing is less efficient than
men’s) and, finally, architectural (‘navigating’ a stall is more time
consuming than ‘navigating’ a urinal). In any case, all studies
suggest a slightly longer time for women than for men.
What is the number of restrooms available for each gender? In order to
model the number of bathroom stalls available to each gender we fol-
lowed regulation 1910.141(c)(1)(i) of the US Department of Labor’s
Occupational Safety and Health Administration which states that:
Except as otherwise indicated in this paragraph (c)(1)(i),
toilet facilities, in toilet rooms separate for each sex, shall
be provided in all places of employment in accordance
with table J-1 of this section. The number of facilities to
be provided for each sex shall be based on the number
of employees of that sex for whom the facilities are fur-
nished. Where toilet rooms will be occupied by no more
than one person at a time, can be locked from the in-
side, and contain at least one water closet, separate toilet
rooms for each sex need not be provided. Where such
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single-occupancy rooms have more than one toilet facil-
ity, only one such facility in each toilet room shall be
counted for the purpose of Table J-1 [see Table 44, be-
low].
Number of employees of each sex Minimum number of toilets per sex
1 to 15 1
16 to 35 2
36 to 55 3
56 to 80 4
81 to 110 5
111 to 150 6
Over 150 1 additional one for each 40 employees
Table 44: Table J-1
How about the use of urinals? The presence of urinals is usually as-
sumed to be responsible for the shorter average time men spend in
the restroom as opposed to women. For the purposes of this model
we assumed no urinals are installed - they are not required by law,
though they are permitted. In the case of fewer than 35 employees
this assumption is legitimate as the above regulation contains the
following clarification:
When toilets will only be used by men, urinals may be
provided instead of toilets, except that the number of toi-
lets in such cases shall not be reduced to less than two-
thirds of the minimum specified.
This means that for fewer than 35 employees, no urinals can be in-
stalled to replace some of the required stalls (as there would be two
or fewer stalls). For simplicity, we also assume the absence of urinals
also for larger companies.
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How many stalls do employers install? We assume that employers
never install more than the minimum required number of stalls.
What is the ratio of men to women? We assume there are as many
women as men.
When do the employees need to use the restroom? For each employee
we select an arbitrary integer between 1 and 120 under a uniform
distribution.
How do we ensure robustness? For each number of employees we
simulate both set-ups (segregated vs. unisex) 10,000 times. The
outcome reported is the average of all the 10,000 values obtained
for each set-up and each number of employees.
Finally, here is how the algorithm works. Assume we are in a
situation for which the above legislation requires n facilities. The
first n arrivals incur 0 waiting time. Men will occupy the facility for
2 minutes, women for 3. So for all subsequent arrivals we can track
the time they have waited before being able to occupy the facility. If
the (n+1)-th arrival happens very soon after the n-th, they may find
all facilities occupied. Then they will wait until the employee who
arrived first leaves. The number of minutes in which the employee
is idle waiting to occupy the facility is tallied. We tally the waiting
times for firms respecting the federal minimum requirements listed
above that have between 1 and 150 male employees and 1 and
150 women employees under segregated conditions and 2 and 300
people under unisex conditions. We then simulated each situation
10,000 times to determine the expected waiting times for women
(Question 1), for men (Question 2), and for an employee under the
unisex set-up (Question 3).
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12.5 results
In this section we present the results of our simulation.34 Figure 5
presents the expected waiting times women and men incur in firms
from 1 to 150 employees for each gender. The measure for time is
minutes per 2-hour interval. Figure 6 shows the waiting times for
women and men combined for firms with equal number of women
and men and the minimum number of segregated bathrooms for
each sex vs. the expected waiting times for the same firms were
they to open facilities to all employees. We model firms with 2
employees up to firms with 300 employees.
Figure 5: Expected waiting time: Women (top) vs. Men (bottom)
What we find is that there is a significant difference between the
average expected waiting times for female vs. male employees. For
34 If you wish to consult the notebooks used for this chapter, please contact the
author.
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Figure 6: Expected waiting time: Segregated (top) vs. Unisex (bottom)
instance, in large firms of 300 employees, there can be a tenfold
difference in the average waiting time women incur as opposed
to men. Moreover, moving to a unisex set-up seems to generate a
drastic reduction in the waiting time per employee. Looking again
at large firms of 300 employees, the reduction between the average
expected waiting time of an employee in the segregated set-up and
the unisex set-up can be approximately eighteen-fold.
Figure 7 puts together the above two figures showing the compar-
isons between women, men and unisex. As can be easily observed
from this picture, the waiting times for the unisex set-up are better
than the waiting times for men employees only in the segregated
set-up. This makes the introduction of unisex facilities a Pareto
improvement over the current model. That being said, this is
affected by the difference we take to be in terms of ‘restroom time’
216 an efficiency argument for unisex restrooms
between women and men. The more similar we assume they are
in terms of restroom usage, the likelier it is to obtain a Pareto
improvement by shifting to unisex facilities. We do not explore
different input values further in this paper.
Figure 7: Expected waiting time: Women (top), Men (middle) and Unisex
(bottom)
With the average expected waiting times per every 2-hour block,
we can calculate how much women- and men- working-time a
firm loses during a year depending on their number of employees.
Figure 8 shows the results for the segregated set-up. In contrast,
Figure 9 shows the expected hours of labour lost in a year for both
male and female employees in the segregated set-up vs. the unisex
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set-up.35
Figure 8: Expected loss in labour time: Women (top) vs. Men (bottom)
The results show a significant difference between the hours women
lose as opposed to the hours men lose. Again, in certain condi-
tions, this difference can be approximately tenfold. One way of
interpreting this gender-difference is from the perspective of potty
parity. Women have less access to office facilities given their needs
under the current legislation than men do. This leads not only
to discomfort and possible health issues, but it may also affect
differences in inclusion and performance on the job If a firm were
to pursue our suggestion and change to a unisex set-up it would
35 In order to perform these calculations we assume one of the visits employees
making during their workday happens during their lunch break and hence should
not count towards decreased efficiency.
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Figure 9: Expected loss in labour time: Segregated (top) vs. Unisex (bot-
tom)
not only increase efficiency all-around, but it would also eradicate
this gender imbalance.
A possible criticism at this point could be that although the relative
time difference between women and men is significant, in absolute
terms the situation is not that bad. The worst it can get is that in a
firm with 300 employees, over a year, a female employee is expected
to waste approximately 2 hours queuing to use the restroom. This
is significantly worse than what her male colleague is expected to
waste (12 minutes), but it does not feel like a large enough number
to warrant any kind of policy change by itself. In other words, such
a critic would probably say that we shouldn’t pursue equality for
equality’s sake if no real gain is to be obtained from the change.
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We are not fully convinced by this criticism,36 but let us grant it for
a moment. Then we can still approach the issue from a different
angle. Consider the following question.
question 4 Assuming that the maximum wasted time for wom-
en/men according the current legislation is considered ‘accept-
able’ how many unisex facilities would we need?
The idea is simple. Looking at the current legislation as the status
quo, what is the worse situation under the status quo? What’s the
longest time an employee has to wait? Figure 10 repeats Figure 5
but clearly indicates the benchmark: the longest average expected
waiting time for an employee (regardless of gender) is .73 minutes.
If this were the acceptable standard for maximum waiting time,
then how many facilities could we remove from a unisex set-up and
still guarantee the average expected waiting time for an employee
is under this standard of .73 minutes. Figure 11 depicts the average
expected waiting time for an employee in a unisex set-up, assuming
we have a combined number of 5 facilities.
Table 45 presents the maximum number of facilities for both genders
in the segregated set-up (according to the US Federal regulations
discussed above) and the unisex set-up for every employee bracket.
The results are telling. If we were to cap the maximum average
expected waiting time for an employee at the worst level permitted
under the current set-up, we would be able to eliminate up to half of
the facilities in a unisex set-up. This would bring about a significant
reduction in overhead costs for firms.
36 And in fact this appears to be merely an artifact of the situation I am modelling
in this chapter. Bovens and Marcoci (December 1, 2017) use the above algorithm
to investigate a situation of two segregated restrooms with 6 stalls each, used by
150 men and 150 women, respectively over an interval of 1 hour. Under these
specifications, a man’s expected waiting time is 27 sec. while a woman’s is 7 min
and 40 sec.
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Figure 10: Expected waiting time: Women (top) vs. Men (bottom)
12.6 possible objections and replies
We end by considering a few possible criticism to the recommenda-
tion of introducing unisex facilities.
threat of violence against women One of the main lines
of argument against the Charlotte City Ordinance, and all other leg-
islation opening restrooms to members of different ‘biological sexes’
(at birth) is that this will permit sexual predators to enter women’s
restrooms and attack girls and women. We were unable to find
any reliable evidence that such a move would have an impact on
the incidence of crimes against women.37 Absence of evidence is
37 Most of the arguments are found on activist blogs. The best two activist
arguments that violence will increase are perhaps this Federalist article sug-
gesting that opening up restrooms to people who identify as trans∗ will
bring about a wave of voyeurism-related incidents http://thefederalist.com/
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Figure 11: Maximum number of employees/5 facilities
not evidence of absence, and hence our recommendation is that be-
fore opening up all restrooms to people of different genders a pilot
study should be conducted monitoring the impact this would have
on safety. Furthermore, special attention should be given to micro-
aggression against women.
modesty and discomfort Another commonly raised issue
with allowing people of different genders to use the same restroom
is that the experience would be uncomfortable to them. Beyond the
problem of modesty, this is particularly worrying since according
to the International Paruresis Association, an estimated 21 million
2017/02/09/data-suggests-unisex-bathrooms-bonanza-male-perverts/, and
this database put together by a Canadian group opposing Bill C-16, http:
//womanmeanssomething.com/violencedatabase/.
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No. of Empl. Min. No. Segregated Min. No. Unisex
2 - 19 2 1
20 - 30 2 2
31 - 62 4 2
63 - 70 4 3
71 - 110 6 3
111 - 160 8 4
161 - 216 10 5
217 - 220 10 6
221 - 270 12 6
270 - 300 12 7
Table 45: Comparisons between minimum no. of facilities required to
keep average expected waiting times under the current maxi-
mum level
Americans38 suffer from paruresis or "shy bladder" syndrome.39 It
seems plausible that the symptoms would be aggravated in a unisex
setting, though to date no research on this issue exists. We contend
that before adopting a unisex set-up more research has to be done
on the discomfort of using unisex facilities and the public health
implications associated with an increase of "shy bladder" syndrome.
In particular, different nudging strategies should be attempted. For
instance, one could retain a few segregated facilities, but, given the
smaller number, this would mean a longer walk for many employ-
ees. Their freedom to use segregated facilities is not taken away, but
they are being nudged to become comfortable with unisex facilities.
loss of urinals Another argument is that moving to a unisex
set-up will decrease the efficiency with which men are able to use
38 http://paruresis.org/
39 They also note that there may be as many as 220 million people suffering from
this social anxiety disorder worldwide.
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the restrooms. The reason is that a unisex restroom will typically
do away with urinals (following the Swedish model), and thus the
access opportunities of a unisex set-up would be less than the sum
of the access opportunities of the gender-segregated set-up. Firstly,
this isn’t necessarily so. Several architecture firms across the US
are currently developing unisex restrooms which provide space for
urinals, but have a separating wall. But secondly, and more im-
portantly, we believe the efficiency question should be asked with
respect to the decrease in average waiting times per employee and
not per gender. In other words, a set up that improves the efficiency
per employee (or that does not increase it at least) is to be preferred
even if it is detrimental to men. In our model the waiting times for
both genders decreased. However, there are plausible inputs for our
model that bring about a decrease in the waiting times for women
and an increase in the waiting time for men. However, overall they
do bring about a decrease in the waiting time per employee. We
believe showing that is enough to recommend such a policy.
12.7 conclusion
To sum up, this paper is making one of the first extensive argu-
ments for changing the current way in which public restrooms are
designed from a gender-segregated one to a unisex one. Our pro-
posal goes further than recent inclusive legislation in two ways: (1)
we propose the introduction of multi-stall unisex restrooms (and not
simply requiring single-stall restrooms be unisex);40 and (2) we pro-
pose opening the restrooms to everyone, and not only people who
identify as trans∗. We show how, based on some plausible (but still
somewhat idealised) assumptions this will lead to an increase in
40 Compare to the recent decision of the New York City Council, http:
//www.reuters.com/article/us-new-york-lgbt/new-york-approves-unisex-
bathrooms-in-nod-to-transgender-people-idUSKCN0Z72XX
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economic efficiency. This would provide a shared basis for discus-
sion for both sides of the ideological spectrum. Nevertheless, we are
wary of the possible risks such a move would bring about, and we
believe our proposal should first be thoroughly piloted. In particu-
lar, we think special consideration should be given to the (possible)
increase in micro-aggressions against women (and not just of violent
crimes) and the (possible) increase in discomfort that resists any at-
tempts to nudge it.
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